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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the trend in commercial finance law to reduce or eliminate the 
obligation to give notice of nonpossessory interests in personal property in systems such 
as those created by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.  Although the purpose and 
merits of such systems have long been debated, they have generally been viewed as 
effective solutions to the problem of secret liens—interests in property that were neither 
recorded nor otherwise readily observable. 
Two recent sets of legislative developments suggest that we may care much less 
about the problem of secret liens than we are willing to acknowledge.  First, recent 
revisions to Article 9 of the UCC, which governs many commercial finance transactions, 
tolerate secret liens that may arise on such increasingly important assets such as data, 
intellectual property, bank accounts, and securities.  Second, states have recently begun to 
enact non-uniform legislation designed to promote asset securitizations.  This legislation 
often gives fully preemptive effect to the parties’ contracts, which would, incidentally, 
appear to displace rules on notice filing that might otherwise apply.  It effectively ends the 
obligation to give notice. 
This Article offers three arguments against this trend.  First, tolerance of secret 
liens challenges recent developments in our understanding of the relationship between 
property rights and information costs.  Second, notice filing systems will act as proxy for 
the information that might otherwise be generated within tightly knit merchant 
communities.  Third, these systems may have important behavioral consequences both for 
those required to provide the notice and for the audience for the information thus 
provided.  This Article therefore counsels caution in enacting legislation that would 
diminish or dilute notice filing in commercial finance transactions. 
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One of the Ten Commandments of Mercantile Law is that an 
effective [notice] filing system is the center pole that holds up the 
entire personal property security tent.1 
[I]t is certainly observable that [notice] filing offices tend to collect 
a good deal of dust between the visits of creditors seeking 
information.2 
Commentators have wondered for some time just what it is we want 
the [notice] filing system to achieve.3 
INTRODUCTION 
Pity the poor financing statement.   
This much-maligned document was once the centerpiece of most 
important commercial finance transactions.  Until recently, to make 
generally enforceable any loan or similar transaction involving personal 
property, this simple statement identifying the borrower, the lender, and 
the property involved had to be filed in a public office designated by 
applicable law, usually Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(“UCC”).4  If the form5 was properly completed and filed, and the 
underlying contracts were executed, the lender’s rights in the borrower’s 
property would be “perfected”—enforceable not only against the 
borrower but also against anyone else seeking to stake a claim in that 
property, such as buyers, other creditors, or a bankruptcy trustee. 
As a general matter, the function of the financing statement, also 
known as a “UCC-1,” has not been in dispute.6  In theory, the UCC-1 
“put[s] a person on notice of the existence of a security interest in a 
 
 1 James J. White, Reforming Article 9 Priorities in Light of Old Ignorance and New Filing 
Rules, 79 MINN. L. REV. 529, 530 (1995). 
 2 John deJ. Pemberton, Jr., Notice Filing for Assignment of Accounts Receivable, 13 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 643, 664 (1948) (citation omitted). 
 3 Peter A. Alces, Abolish the Article 9 Filing System , 79 MINN. L. REV. 679, 705 (1995). 
 4 U.C.C. § 9-401 (2000); U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (2003). 
 5 A form of financing statement as envisioned by UCC § 9-521 is attached as Annex A.  
Copyright by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws.  Reproduced with the permission of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform 
Commercial Code.  All rights reserved. 
 6 As discussed infra  in Part III, the larger informational system, of which the financing 
stat ement is a part, has been the subject of some controversy.  Indeed, an entire symposium issue of 
the Minnesota Law Review was devoted to the question.  See “Managing the Paper Trail”:  
Evaluating and Reforming the Article 9 Filing System , 79 MINN. L. REV. 519 (1995). 
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particular type of property so that further inquiry can be made . . . .”7  The 
role of notice has, in general, also been well understood:  “[O]ne of the 
most firmly rooted doctrines of the common law,” Grant Gilmore has 
observed, was “the protection of creditors against undisclosed interests in 
property.”8  
The financing statement has thus been viewed as a potent antidote to 
the problem of secret liens—the ancient conflict that arises whenever one 
party asserts an interest in property that is neither recorded nor otherwise 
readily observable.9  Secret liens are universally castigated.  As the United 
 
 7 Heights v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 342 A.2d 738, 743 (Pa. 1975).  “The purpose of a notice 
filing statute is to give protection to a creditor by furnishing to others intending to enter a transaction 
with the debtor a starting point for investigation which will result in fair warning concerning the 
transaction contemplated.”  TMMB Funding Corp. v. Associated Food Stores, Inc., 136 A.D.2d 540, 
542 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (citation omitted); see also Marine Drilling Co. v. Hobbs Trailers, 697 
S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Waterfield v. Burnett (In re Burnett), 21 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D.N.M. 
1982); Abney v. I.T.T. Diversified Credit Corp. (In re Envtl. Elec. Sys., Inc.), 11 B.R. 965 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 1981). 
 8 1 GRANT GILMORE , SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 3.2, at 67; § 8.7, at 274 
(1965) (“In the history of our security law there has been one constant factor:  whenever a common 
law device has been covered by a statute, some form of public recordation or filing has been required 
as a condition of perfection of the security interest.”).  Gilmore was a principal drafter of the UCC  As 
Peter Coogan, another prominent participant in the development of the UCC, explained: 
A history of chattel security could well be written in terms of the 400 year struggle by 
debtors and their secured creditors to create security interests of various sorts in the 
debtors’ property without affording notice to buyers or other creditors, and the attendant 
demands by unsecured creditors generally for some kind of notice when all or part of the 
debtors’ assets become subject to security interests.  The parties favoring secrecy have, for 
the most part, been the losers. 
Peter F. Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Recent Chattel 
Security Laws, Including “Notice Filing,” 47 IOWA L. REV. 289 (1962) (footnote omitted). 
 9 See, e.g ., Nunnemaker Transp. Co. v. United Calif. Bank, 456 F.2d 28, 36 (9th Cir. 1972) 
(suggesting in dicta that there is “no risk of a secret lien” where there has been “compliance with the 
notice filing provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code”) (citations omitted); Admor’s Office 
World, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. (In re Admor’s Office World, Inc.), No. 91-B-10773, 1992 WL 
350577, at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1992) (“The Code seeks to protect against the secret lien 
and at the same time to promote notice filing.”) (citing Matter of Pasco Sales Co., 52 A.D.2d 138, 143 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1974); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Kurland Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc., 32 A.D.2d 643, 645 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1969)); United States v. Birco Mining Co. (In re Birco Mining, Inc.), 10 B.R. 545, 
548 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1981) (“The law decries a ‘secret lien,’ Corn  Exchange Bank v. Klauder, 318 
U.S. 434 [(1943)], and notice filing is now an accepted part of commercial law.”). 
As Professor Alces explained: 
The filing system [] prevents pure debt or fraud—the kind that the debtor commits without 
the help of a collusive creditor by granting successive collateral interests in the same 
property without notifying each secured party of the (prior) adverse claimants.  This is the 
true secret lien problem and, for some, it is the raison d’etre of the filing system.  If the 
filing system did not provide an effective means to avoid the risk of pure debtor fraud, 
there might not be any remaining viable argument in favor of the filing system.  So if there 
is to be a filing system, it must reduce, if not eliminate entirely, this fraud risk.  
 2005] Secrets and Liens 425 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed long ago, 
“[s]ecret liens have always been repugnant to the law.”10  Karl Lewellyn 
more colorfully equated the secret lien with “that rat in Denmark.”11 
The problem of secret liens is, in many respects, central to basic 
questions posed by property law:  Who has what rights with respect to 
what things?  At this level, property law addresses what Thomas Merrill 
and Henry Smith characterize as a “massive coordination problem.”12  
When property law works, it does so because, as Carol Rose has 
observed, its “rules . . . signal to all of us, in a clear and distinct language, 
precisely what our obligations are and how we may take care of our 
interests . . . .  I know where I stand and so does everyone else” in relation 
to any given item of property. 13  The problem of secret liens challenges all 
of this because the secrecy of the property interest obscures—indeed, 
cloaks—the signal that would otherwise tell the world that someone has a 
nonpossessory interest in the encumbered property. 
Despite many legitimate concerns with secret liens, two recent sets 
of legislative developments suggest we may care much less about the 
problem than we are willing to acknowledge.  First, Article 9 of the UCC, 
 
Alces, supra note 3, at 703. 
 10 Holt v. Albert Pick & Co., 25 F.2d 378, 380 (4th Cir. 1928); see In re Reliance Equities, Inc., 
966 F.2d 1338, 1343 (10th Cir. 1992) (“‘[T]he Bankruptcy Act abhor[s] secret liens . . . .”) (citation 
omitted); In re Brownsville Brewing Co., 117 F.2d 463, 464 (3d Cir. 1941) (characterizing 
Pennsylvania as “a State whose ‘abhorrence of the secret lien’ did not even admit of the palliative of 
recording”) (quoting Martin v. Mathiot, 14 Serg. & Rawle 214 (Pa. 1826); Commercial Casualty Ins. 
Co. v. Williams, 37 F.2d 326, 327 (4th Cir. 1930) (“Secret liens are repugnant to the law . . . .”); H.K. 
Porter Co. v. Boyd, 171 F. 305, 312 (3rd Cir. 1909) (“No citation of authority is requisite to support 
the proposition that . . . a secret lien could not avail against an attachment or execution creditor, not 
chargeable with knowledge or notice of its existence . . . .”); In re Nolan Motor Co., 25 F. Supp. 186, 
189 (D.D.C. 1938) (“The giving of a secret lien and the attempt to enforce such a lien against the 
claims of creditors represented by the trustee in bankruptcy is repugnant not only to the spirit but to 
the letter of the Bankruptcy Act.”); In re Collins Hosiery Mills, 19 F. Supp. 500, 502 (E.D. Pa. 1937) 
(“[T]he common law of Pennsylvania . . . abhors a secret lien.”); In re Stein, 17 F. Supp. 587, 591 
(E.D. Pa. 1936) (Dickenson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he law abhors secret liens and the like.”); In re J.F. 
Grandy & Son, 146 F. 318, 323 (D.S.C. 1906) (A “secret lien would be abhorrent to equity . . . .”); In 
re Noack, 44 B.R. 172, 175 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984) (“In the final analysis, the facts of each 
particular case shall govern, always bearing in mind the Uniform Commercial Code’s abhorrence of 
secret liens.”) (citing JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 22-3, at 883 (2d ed. 1980)); In re Loop Hosp. P’ship, 35 B.R. 929, 
936 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) (“The UCC has an ‘abhorrence of secret liens.’”) (citing WHITE & 
SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UCC § 22-3, at 883 (2d ed.  1980)).  For a general 
discussion of secret liens, see Julian B. McDonnell, in 1 PETER F. COOGAN ET AL ., SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ¶¶ 1.01-1.06 (1999). 
 11 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback , 52 HARV. L. REV. 725, 730 (1939). 
 12 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 
YALE L.J. 357, 387 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics]. 
 13 Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988). 
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which governs many commercial finance transactions, and which was 
revised effective 2001,14 appears increasingly tolerant of secret liens.  For 
a variety of complex reasons explained below (some intended, some 
perhaps not), security interests in such important assets as data, 
intellectual property, bank accounts, and investment securities will in 
many cases be undiscoverable from the public record. 
Second, and perhaps more controversially, several states have 
recently enacted non-uniform legislation designed to promote asset 
securitizations.15  At least in theory, a securitization differs from a 
traditional loan because the “debtor” in the securitization “sells” property, 
rather than encumbers it.  Sometimes called “structured financings,” 
transactions with these general contours were apparently central to much 
of Enron’s activ ities.16 
The drive to enact facilitation statutes stems in large part from a 
concern that courts may second-guess the contracted-for character of the 
transaction, and treat it not as a sale, but as a financing.17  If so, the 
property allegedly sold would remain available for the debtor’s other 
creditors to share if the debtor went into bankruptcy.  These statutes 
purport to solve this problem by giving full preemptive power to the 
underlying contracts (e.g., the sales documents).18  If these statutes mean 
 
 14 Revised Article 9 has been enacted in all states and in most went into effect July 1, 2001.  
See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Why States Should Adopt the 
Uniform Commercial Code—Revised Article 9, at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ 
uniformact_why/uniformacts-why-ucca92.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2005). 
 15 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2701A-2703A (2004).  Other states that have recently 
enacted similar statutes include Alabama, ALA. CODE  § 35-10A-2(a)(1) (2004); Louisiana, LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(e) (West 2002); North Carolina, N.C.  GEN. STAT. § 25-9A-102 (2002); Ohio, 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1109.75 (Anderson 2002); Texas, T X. BUS. & COM. § 9.109(e) (Vernon 
2002).  The most recent addition to the field is Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1.473 (Michie 2004). 
 16 There has already been some effort to distinguish securitizations from the types of 
t ransactions in issue in Enron.  See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of 
Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1314 (2002) [hereinafter 
Schwarcz, Enron].  Schwarcz has argued that “unlike in Enron, structured transactions 
[(securitizations)] typically transfer substantive risk away from the company originating, or 
sponsoring the transaction . . . .”  Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a 
World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3-4 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Complexity].  As discussed 
in Part II.C., infra , the securitization facilitation statutes would, by their terms, insulate these 
transactions from all other applicable rules, including those on notice filing, even if they had none of 
the distinctive virtues identified by Professor Schwarcz.  See Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset 
Securitization and Bankruptcy Reform:  Dead or Dormant? , 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 101 (2002) 
[hereinafter Lipson, Enron] (discussing Enron’s use of securitization). 
 17 Securitization has, in Professor Mann’s view, “produced a powerful impetus for legislation 
ensuring that those transactions receive favorable treatment in bankruptcy.”  Ronald J. Mann, The 
Rise of State Bankruptcy-Directed Legislation, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1805, 1816 (2004). 
 18 See supra note 15. 
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what they say, they should create an enormous exception to all state-law 
based notice filing systems, including those contemplated by the UCC.  
They effectively end the obligation to give notice. 
This Article considers how we have come to diminish the role of 
notice filing and what that might mean.  Although the subject matter may 
be technical, the thesis of the Article is simple:  Reducing public notice of 
nonpossessory interests in property increases the likelihood of secret 
liens, which, in turn, creates direct and indirect costs (economic and 
otherwise) that have not been fully considered. 
Part I provides a brief history of notice in commercial finance law 
and the role that notice filing has played in generating and disseminating 
information about property in and across commercial communities.  This 
information has historically played an important part in deterring—or 
avoiding—secret liens.  Part I concludes with a discussion of the modern 
systems by which notice of nonpossessory interests is given in 
commercial finance transactions, including the UCC-1 financing 
statement system. 
Part II explains in detail three common sets of commercial finance 
transactions that may now, despite these systems, give rise to secret liens:  
(i) secured transactions involving data or intellectual property; (ii) control 
security interests; and (iii) asset securitization transactions subject to 
facilitation statutes.  In all three, a secured party, or other financing party, 
will have a nonpossessory interest in a debtor’s property that is not readily 
discoverable from the public record.  Even if such transactions were not 
intended to harm creditors or anyone else, they would nevertheless create 
secret liens because there is no public , verifiable system that determines 
the existence and nature of these rights. 
Part III considers how our law has grown—and continues to grow—
increasingly tolerant of secret liens.  This Part argues, in essence, that we 
have been seduced by a series of arguments about the economics of 
commercial finance law and notice filing.  Economically, the arguments 
posit, notice filing regimes impose direct and indirect costs of compliance 
that fail to produce corresponding informational benefits.  Unfortunately, 
the economic arguments are incomplete, often speculative, and, in any 
case, lack empirical support. 
Part IV considers these developments in light of three arguments 
against this trend and in favor of more widespread notice filing regimes.  
First, this Part examines the trend in property theory to link property 
rights with information costs.  The recent work of Thomas Merrill and 
Henry Smith, for example, suggests that property rights arise and are 
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enforceable when they are readily discoverable.19  Undercutting the notice 
filing system challenges this developing understanding of property rights. 
Second, this Part examines the role that information about property 
plays more generally in commercial communities, based both on the 
historical analysis set forth in Part I and the recent empirical work of 
Robert Ellickson20 and Lisa Bernstein,21 whose findings suggest that 
community structures can often be a proxy for more formal information-
generating rules which might govern notice filing.  An inference from 
their work, however, might be that in the absence of well-defined 
community structures, more formal information devices like notice filing 
take on increasing importance. 
Third, this Part considers some of the behavioral implications of 
notice filing and, in particular, the indirect effects that mandatory notice 
filing might have on those obligated to make the filings.  This Part 
observes that forcing debtors to disclose information in financing 
statements may have valuable cautioning and reflexive functions, which 
provide systemic integrity. 
The Article concludes not with a call for reform, but instead a note of 
caution, urging those who would further undermine the UCC-1 financing 
statement system to consider carefully the colla teral consequences of such 
moves. 
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF NOTICE, PROPERTY, AND COMMUNITY IN 
 
 19 See, e.g. , Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 12; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:  The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE 
L.J.  1 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Optimal Property]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, 
The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 833-42 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, 
Interface].  Henry Smith has elaborated on some of their work in Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property:  
Form, Context and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (2003).  A recent article critical of certain aspects of the 
Merrill and Smith approach appears in Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and 
Verification:  The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 
(2002).  As discussed infra , Hansmann and Kraakman nevertheless claim there exists a strong link 
between notice and property rights, a claim which current trends would appear to undermine.  See 
infra notes 366-70 and accompanying text. 
 20 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 52-53, 
72-76 (1991) [hereinafter ELLICKSON, ORDER]; Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 
1315, 1320-21 (1993). 
 21 See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:  Rethinking the Code’s Search for 
Imminent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal 
System:  Extralegal Contra ctual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) 
[hereinafter Bernstein, Diamond Industry]; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton 
Industry:  Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH . L. REV. 1724 
(2001). 
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COMMERCIAL FINANCE LAW 
The problem of secret liens is, in many respects, a subset of the basic 
informational problems embodied in the law of property:  How do we 
know who has what rights with respect to what things?  Historically, 
information about property was signaled by physical phenomena:  
Peaceful possession, for example, was often strong evidence of 
ownership.  This may have made sense in a simpler world.  As societies 
became more complex and disaggregated, however, physical observations 
in defined community structures could no longer provide reliable 
information about a debtor’s property.  As increasingly complex (and 
potentially devious) transactions occurred in increasingly sophisticated 
forms, notice filing became a proxy for the information and controls that 
community might otherwise have provided. 
A. Possession as Notice 
Historically, possession was viewed as the basis of property rights,22 
and this would appear to be as true of the security interest (“pledge”) as 
any other property interest.23  If creditor A took possession of debtor B’s 
flock of sheep to secure B’s debt to A, at least in theory, there would be no 
doubt in the minds of those asserting an interest in B’s property about B’s 
rights in the sheep:  To all appearances, he had none.  And, conversely, 
where B did have possession, it would be reasonable for creditors or 
purchasers to conclude that he did, in fact, have title or some other equally 
important set of rights (e.g., a lien).  Possession was property.  Or, 
 
 22 See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979); Carol 
M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985) [hereinafter Rose, 
Possession].  Or, in the immortal words of English playwright Colley Cibber (1671-1757), 
“Possession is eleven points in the law.”  COLLEY CIBBER, WOMAN’S WIT, act 1. 
 23 “The legal system’s original method of providing [information about ownership] was to give 
primacy to possession.  At common law, a debtor’s possession of personal property assured a 
prospective creditor that the debtor could give him an unencumbered interest in that property.”  
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership:  An Examination of the Scope of 
Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175, 180 (1983) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Baird & Jackson, 
Possession and Ownership].  According to Baird and Jackson, this was because “possession has been 
viewed as the best available source of information concerning ‘ownership’ of most types of personal 
property.”  Id. (citing 13 Eliz., c. 5 (1570); Twyne’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601)).  Baird and 
Jackson have developed a fairly elaborate theory about the relationship between property rights and 
information, which has important implications for the ongoing debate about the notice filing system.  
See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property, 
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 292 [hereinafter Baird & Jackson, Uncertainty]; see also  Douglas G. Baird, Notice 
Filing and the Problem  of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL. STUD. 53 (1983)  [hereinafter Baird, 
Ostensible Ownership]. 
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perhaps more accurately, the signal sent by peaceful possession was said 
to justify the conclusion that the possessor had a “property interest” in the 
thing possessed. 
Perhaps the most famous articulation of the link between notice and 
possessory property rights in the commercial context appears in Clow v. 
Woods.24  In Clow, a tanner, Hancock, conveyed to creditors, Clow and 
Sharp, mortgages on Hancock’s vats of hides and tanning equipment.25  
The creditors neither took possession of this personal property collateral 
nor recorded the mortgage.26  The debtor’s former business partner, Poe, 
sued for his share of the value of the firm, obtained a judgment, and sent 
the sheriff to execute on the same hides and equipment.27  The secured 
creditors sued the sheriff seeking to recover the proceeds of the sale of 
this property, arguing in substance that their mortgage had priority over 
Poe’s execution lien. 28  Unfortunately for the secured creditors, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to enforce their mortgage, viewing 
it as fraudulent in law, if not in fact.29 
Clow turned, in significant part, on the informational problem 
created by the separation of property right from possessory fact.  Judge 
Gibson reasoned that the “secrecy” of the mortgages (security interests) 
would harm other creditors of the debtor, Hancock, because these other 
creditors would mistakenly rely on the apparent value of his hides and 
equipment in deciding to lend to him.30  His ownership of this property, 
ostensibly free and clear of the rights of all others, would induce 
unwitting, and perhaps unsophisticated, creditors to extend unsecured 
credit at their peril.  Judge Gibson opined: 
[A] creditor ought not to be suffered to secure himself by means that may 
ultimately work an injury to third persons . . . .  Where possession has been 
retained without any stipulation in the conveyance, the cases have 
uniformly declared that to be, not only evidence of fraud, but fraud per se.  
Such a case is not inconsistent with the most perfect honesty; yet a court 
 
 24 5 Serg. & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819). 
 25 Id. at 276. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 283, 288. The court held the mortgage transaction was a per se fraud against creditors 
and was void under the Statute of 13 Elizabeth.  Id. at 288.  As discussed infra , the Statute of 13 
Elizabeth was the earliest  form of the prohibition on transfers of property that hinder, delay, or 
defraud creditors.  See infra notes 53, 55-61 and accompanying text. 
 30 Clow, 5 Serg. & Rawle at 279 (The contract between the debtor and creditors was a “secret 
matter[] between the parties themselves, and can afford no notice to creditors.”). 
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will not stop to inquire, whether there be actual fraud or not; the law will 
impute it, at all events, because it would be dangerous to the public to 
countenance such a transaction under any circumstances.  The parties will 
not be suffered to unravel it, and show, that what seemed fraudulent, was 
not in fact so.  Would it be less against sound policy to suffer a vendor to 
remain in possession, under an agreement to that effect expressed in the 
conveyance, and thus to create a secret [e]ncumbrance on his personal 
property, when to the world he appears to be the absolute owner, and gains 
credit as such.31 
Clow thus articulated what came to be known as the problem of ostensible 
ownership—the making of credit or other investment decisions in reliance 
on the potentially misleading appearance that a debtor has rights in 
property by virtue of physical possession. 32 
Some have questioned whether ostensible ownership creates much of 
a problem. 33  Professor Mooney, for example, has argued that creditors 
and others are unlikely to rely, reasonably or otherwise, on the mere fact 
that a debtor possessed certain assets when making a credit or other 
investment decision. 34  Mooney’s argument centers principally on 
proposals to extend notice filing rules to personal property leasing 
transactions.35  Mooney successfully argues notice filing would add 
nothing to such transactions because sophisticated creditors either already 
knew the debtor leased its property, or did not care one way or the other.36  
Because ostensible ownership problems by definition involve misplaced 
reliance on a debtor’s property, and creditors rarely rely in “unreasonable” 
ways, Mooney concludes that “[p]erhaps there is no real ‘problem’ at 
all.”37 
 
 31 Id. at 280, 281. 
 32 See Baird & Jackson, Possession and Ownership , supra note 23, at 178 n.15. 
 33 See, e.g., Charles Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of “Ostensible Ownership” and Article 
9 Filing:  A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REV. 683, 
725-38, 738 n.160 (1988) [hereinafter Mooney, Myth] (critiquing claim that possession creates an 
“ostensible ownership” problem). 
 34 Id. at 740 (“Although hard empirical data remains elusive, a review of Code cases dealing 
with priority disputes between lessors and third parties supports the argument that mistaken and 
detrimental reliance on lessees’ possession of equipment is not commonplace.”) (footnote omitted). 
 35 See generally  Amelia H. Boss, The History of Article 2A:  A Lesson for Practitioner and 
Scholar Alike, 39 ALA. L. REV. 575 (1988). 
 36 Mooney, Myth, supra note 33, at 785-88. 
 37 Id. at 740.  It  should be noted that personal property leasing cases sometimes have important 
implications for notice filing.  The so -called recharacterization cases hold generally that a lease that 
was, in substance, a secured financing may be recharacterized as such and, if the lessor (read:  secured 
party) failed to give required notice, it would lose its priority to a bankruptcy trustee.  See, e.g., Duke 
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While possession technically remains a viable method of creating 
and enforcing property interests in commercial finance transactions,38 it 
would appear Mooney is at least partially right because it is simply not 
clear what “possession” means.39  As any first-year law student can attest, 
possession is a highly elusive concept.  In simpler times, Professor Rose 
may well have been correct that original possessory claims to property 
“look[] like a kind of speech, with the audience composed of all others 
who might be interested in claiming the object in question.”40  Today, 
however, we do not “possess” most of the things we claim to possess in 
ordinary language.  Professor Schroeder has elaborated on this point, 
noting that the enormous number of potential, complex property 
relationships, coupled with the development of fictitious legal entities 
such as corporations, which may hold and convey interests in property, 
make physical custody an extremely poor signal of any information about 
either the property itself or its “ostensible” owner.41 
 
Energy Royal, LLC v. Pillowtex Corp. (In re Pillowtex, Inc.), 349 F.3d 711 (3d Cir. 2003) (setting 
forth criteria for determining whether transaction is a “true lease” or “disguised financing”); In re 
PCH Assocs., 949 F.2d 585, 595-97 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing PCH Assocs. v. Liona Corp., 55 B.R.  273 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985)); In re Independence Vill., Inc., 52 B.R. 715 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985). 
UCC § 9-505 now explicitly contemplates—and permits—the filing of precautionary financing 
statements.  In at least some states that might be a good idea, because a sale-leaseback that is not 
recorded may be treated as a fraudulent transfer.  California Civil Code § 3440, for example, makes a 
sale-leaseback void as against creditors of the transferor unless a UCC financing statement is filed in 
the office of t he California Secretary of State prior to the sale and a notice of the intended transfer is 
published not less than ten days before the transfer.  CAL. CIV. CODE  § 3440 (West 2004). 
 38 UCC § 9-313(c) provides that a secured party may take and perfect a possessory security 
interest in certain types of collateral in the physical possession of some third party (i.e., not the 
debtor) so long as the third party has agreed that it holds the collateral for the benefit of the secured 
party.  Possessory security interests are not only permitted with respect to most tangible collateral, but 
are actually required to perfect a security interest in money.  Id. § 9-312(b)(3).  The possessory 
security interest is presumed to perform the informational functions one might ordinarily associate 
with notice filing because it is an exception to the general rule that a financing statement must be filed 
to perfect a security interest.  Id. § 9-310(b)(6).  It is also considered a proxy for the contract that 
creates a security interest, a written or electronic security agreement.  Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(B)-(C).  This 
is somewhat surprising, given that the UCC provides no guidance about what “possession” might 
mean for these purposes.  The UCC “does not define ‘possession.’”  Id. § 9-313 cmt. 3.  The UCC 
“adopts the general concept [of possession] as it developed under former Article 9.”  Id.  While 
former Article 9, § 9-305, certainly contemplated the creation and perfection of security interests by 
secured party possession, it also said little about what possession might have meant in this context.  
See  U.C.C. § 9-305 (2000). 
 39 It is this uncertainty that led Professor Phillips to observe that “business people look to 
written, not possessory evidence of ownership.  And this view leads generally to recognizing filing, 
but not possession[,] as a means of notice.”  David M. Phillips, Flawed Perfection:  From Possession 
to Filing Under Article 9 (pt. I),  59 B.U. L. REV. 1, 35 (1979). 
 40 Rose, Possession, supra note 22, at 78-79. 
 41 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration:  The Myth that the U.C.C. Killed 
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The ambiguity of possession also infects the creditor’s side of things.  
For example, even if a lender has actual physical possession, we still do 
not know what to make of potential creditors of the possessory creditor.  
After all, it is entirely conceivable that A (B’s creditor) may take 
possession of B’s property to secure B’s obligation.  But it is at least 
theoretically possible that A may have its own creditor or purchaser (C).42  
Why should C be any less gullible than B’s creditors?  Does not A’s 
possession of B’s property signal to A’s secondary stakeholders, such as 
C, the very same thing that B’s possession would signal to B’s creditors, 
etc?43  How would C know from observing A’s possession that B retains 
an interest (e.g., equity) in the property? 
Possession undoubtedly sends an ambiguous signal, but that is only 
half the story.  As discussed in Part IV.C infra, we are just beginning to 
develop theories about how human beings process information and form 
judgments in the presence of ambiguity.  It would appear that in smaller 
and more tightly knit communities, possession may well have been an 
effective signal.  Otherwise, it seems unlikely possession could ever have 
been an acceptable means of distributing property rights.  If so, Clow is 
ultimately wrong in result, even if it may be correct in its policy concerns.  
If, as seems likely, Hancock’s creditors—and in particular, Poe, the 
creditor and former business partner—knew or had reason to know that 
Clow and Sharp had a mortgage on Hancock’s property, what value 
would notice filing or creditor possession have added?  How did Poe or 
anyone else mistakenly rely on Hancock’s (the debtor’s) possession? 
 
“Property,” 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1281 (1996); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Some Realism About Legal 
Surrealism , 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 486-87 (1996) [hereinafter Schroeder, Surrealism ] 
(“Regardless of what has been historically assumed, contemporary property practices suggest that, 
today, physical custody provides very, very little (if any) information about ownership.”).  Professor 
Schroeder thus argues with some force that possession in commercial law is at best a metaphor for what she 
calls “sensuous grasping.”  Id. at 455.  Yet, as Schroeder observes, it is a metaphor that fails to serve 
commercial law well.  Id. at 492.  It is simply not meaningful to view transactions in intangible property—
which is increasingly where the real value is—as like a physical conveyance, a simple “farmer’s transaction.”  
Id. (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback , 52 HARV. L. REV. 725, 732 (1939)).  For 
example, investment property (e.g., stocks and bonds) often exists in complex networks of computers which 
are owned, and perhaps “possessed,” by firms, which are then linked in complex, pyramidal broker-dealer 
relationships.  See Prefatory Note, U.C.C. Art. 8 (1994) (discussing evolution of securit ies holding 
systems). 
 42 See Baird & Jackson, Uncertainty, supra note 23, at 307. 
 43 Baird and Jackson dismiss this problem of “repledge” as being “largely a theoretical one.”  
Id.  Presumably they were not thinking about the role that transactions of this type play in the 
securities markets.  Professor Kettering has, however, found examples of this problem, especially as 
to the complex pyramidal transactions among securities broker-dealers.  See Kenneth C. Kettering, 
Repledge and Pre-Default Sale of Securities Collateral Under Revised Article 9, 74 CHI-KENT L. 
REV. 1109 (1999). 
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Perhaps the ultimate problem with the possessory security interest 
has only indirectly involved information.  This is the practical problem 
arising from the fact that, as the economy grew in depth, breadth, and 
complexity, possessory security interests became neither useful nor 
appealing to those engaged in increasingly sophisticated mercantile 
transactions.44  If true to form, the debtor could not possess or make use of 
property held by the secured creditor.  Hancock, the tanner in Clow, 
would not have been able to produce the leather goods that were 
presumably his stock in trade and the sale of which would make it 
possible for him to repay the loan.  If not true to form, there remained the 
distinct possibility of ex post judicial nullification.  For manufacturers, 
this meant their equipment could not secure a loan; for merchants, the 
same prohibition limited the value of their inventory.  Nor could future 
interests secure present loans.  Nor could intangible rights serve as 
collateral, and so on.  Possession thus became a speed bump on the road 
to increasingly complex, disaggregated property rights.45  Increasingly 
dynamic uses of property would render possession vestigial at best and 
misleading at worst.  
B. Notice Systems 
Given these problems with the possessory security interest, it is not 
surprising that pressure developed to find an alternative to the information 
problems presented by the possessory security interest.  The alternative 
was notice filing.46  Linking the right to enforce a nonpossessory interest 
in property (e.g., a security interest) to publicly filed notice of that interest 
has had a long and complex career.  Since notice filing systems exploded 
with the disaggregation of community during the industrial revolution, it 
may also be that notice filing developed as a proxy for the information 
that possession would once have provided to creditors in smaller, more 
tightly-knit communities. 
 
 44 Baird & Jackson, Uncertainty, supra  note 23, at 308. 
 45 See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 9-10 (1956) 
(“[P]revailing nineteenth century attitudes in fact made private property pre-eminently a dynamic, not 
a static institution.”). 
 46 At least originally, however, it was not considered to be a particularly good one.  Professor 
Gilmore observed, “[o]riginally filing was looked on as merely an alternative, a less desirable 
alternative, to possession taken by the secured party.”  GILMORE , supra  note 8, § 15.1, at 462. 
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1. The Roots of Notice Filing:  Recordation, Fraudulent Conveyance, 
and Sign Posting 
Separating property from information about it—conveying property 
information in some way other than possession—well precedes the 
modern notice filing systems we have today.47  Indeed, even while Clow 
might have counseled that possession was the only (or principal) method 
of creating an effective security interest in personal property in the early 
nineteenth century, real property rights were already being reified in 
recordation systems that would be the forerunners of the notice filing 
systems that became ubiquitous in the latter half of that century. 
In England, for example, recordation systems developed with respect 
to real property and were used as a matter of choice48 or custom.49  In 
 
 47 At one level, linking nonpossessory property rights to notice goes back at least as far the 
ancient Greeks, for whom the “horos” gave posted notice of an interest in real property.  As Benito 
Arruñada explains: 
[H]oroi contained the essential data of the encumbrance (always, the nature of the horos as 
security, and more often, but not always, the existence of a written agreement, the name of 
the creditor, and the amount of the debt) and, in some cases, the name of the person who 
kept the document of the transaction, supposedly to make it possible for third parties to 
collect more information. This system was one of the first to make an hypotheca 
possible—namely the use of land as collateral without temporarily transferring ownership 
or possession to the lender. 
Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 401, 412 
(2003). 
 48 See John Hanna, The Extension of Public Recordation, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 617, 620 (1931) 
(“Prior to the Norman [C] onquest there seems to have been a system of voluntary registration of land 
deeds in monasteries.”).  Even where not voluntary, Professor Bowers reports they may have been 
easily circumvented.  See James W. Bowers, Of Bureaucrats’ Brothers-in-Law and Bankruptcy 
Taxes:  Article 9 Filing Systems and the Market for Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 721, 722-23 
(1995).  The 1535 English Statute of Enrollments, which required recordation of a “bargain and 
conveyance” of real property often failed, Bowers argues, because lawyers simply papered around the 
transaction.  Id. at 731; see Hanna, supra, at 619 (discussing Statute of Enrollments). 
 49 In a 1907 issue of Green Bag , Joseph H. Beale, Jr. suggests borough custom in England 
required the registration of deeds to real property and might have influenced the settlers in 
Massachusetts and Virginia.  See Joseph H. Beale, Jr., The Origin of the System of Recording Deeds 
in America, 19 GREEN BAG 335, 338 (1907).  The custom of London, for example, was said to be as 
follows: 
The persons that sealed the deed must go before the Lord Mayor, or the Recorder and one 
Alderman, and make acknowledgement that the same is their act and deed; if a wife be a 
party, she is to be examined by them, whether it was done with her full and free consent, 
without any kind of compulsion; in testimony of which the Lord Mayor or the Recorder 
and Alderman set their hands to it, for which each may demand 4d[] and the attorney’s fee 
for the judgment is 2d.  Afterwards the deed must be delivered to the clerk of the 
Inrolments [sic] who at the next Hustings will cause proclamation to be made thereof 
according to the customs of the court. 
Id. (quoting WILLIAM BOHUN, PRIVILEGIA LONDINI 241 (3d ed. 1723)). 
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colonial North America, real property recording systems performed 
several different functions.  Certain communities in Massachusetts, for 
example, may have used recording and acknowledgment rules to limit the 
admission of new members of the community or to control improvements 
to property.50  More frequently, it appears that recordation was viewed as 
a way to address the problem of fraudulent conveyance—a conveyance 
intended to place property out of the reach of creditors.51  For example, in 
1640, both Jamestown52 and the Massachusetts court53 enacted rules 
providing that a nonpossessory interest in real property—title or 
mortgage—would be treated as fraudulent unless publicly recorded.54 
The problem of fraudulent conveyances appears to have had a 
significant influence on the development of notice filing rules and 
provides some insight into the historic role that community might play in 
all of this.  In Twyne’s Case,55 for example, one Pierce was indebted to 
 
 50 Id. at 336-37 (citing BOSTON RECORD  COMMISSIONER’S REPORTS, vol. iv., p. 8 & vol. ii, p. 5 
(1635); CAMBRIDGE TOWN RECORDS, vol. ii. pp. 4, 10 (1632)). 
 51 Id. at 335 (citing HENING’S STATUTES, vol. I, p. 227); see Mark DeWolfe Howe, The 
Recording of Deeds in the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 28 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1948). 
 52 Beale, supra note 49, at 335. 
 53 Id. at 337.  The Massachusetts rule provided as follows: 
For avoyding all fraudulent conveyences, & that every man may know what estate or 
interest other men may have in any houses, lands or other hereditamants they are to deale 
in, it is therefore ordered, that after the end of this month no morgage, bargaine, sale, or 
graunt hearafter to bee of any houses, lands, rents, or other heredit amants shalbee of force 
against any other person except the graunter & his heires, unless the same bee recorded, as 
is hereafter expressed. 
I Records of Massachusetts 116 (1640). 
Perhaps foreshadowing the streamlined notice requirements of the UCC, the ordinance further 
provided that “it is not intended that the whole bargaine, sale, & c. shalbee entered, but onely the 
names of the graunter & grauntee, the thing & the estate graunted & the date; and all such entryes 
shalbee certified to the recorder at Boston.”  Beale, supra  note 49, at 337.  As discussed below, the 
modern UCC-1 financing statement requires only a cursory recitation of the debtor (grantor), secured 
party (grantee), and brief description of the collateral.  U.C.C § 9-503(a) (2003).   
Hanna also suggests colonial law embraced recordation as a response to the problem of 
fraudulent conveyance.  See Hanna, supra  note 48, at 620 (“England has influenced American law 
makers in the drafting of recording statutes . . . as [demonstrated by] the statutes of fraudulent 
conveyances and reputed ownership.”) (citing Statute of Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., c. 5 § 2 (1570)). 
 54 Professor Howe uncovered certain amendments to Massachusetts’ statute suggesting that 
recording was required only where a grantor (i.e., debtor) retained possession following a 
conveyance.  See Howe, supra  note 51, at 4 (“[T]he provision in the Code of 1648 makes it 
abundantly clear that recording would thereafter be required only if the grantor remained in 
possession.”). 
 55 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (St ar Chamber 1601).  The Star Chamber was enforcing the Statute of 13 
Elizabeth, id. at 810, which provided that transfers with the “intent[ ] to delay, hinder or defraud, 
creditors and others” were void, provided for recovery of the “whole value of . . . goods and chattels” 
transferred, to be shared by the Crown and aggrieved parties, such as creditors, and provided for 
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Twyne and to another creditor.56  “In secret,” however, Pierce conveyed 
all of his property to Twyne in satisfaction of the debt.57  Despite the 
conveyance, Pierce nevertheless continued to act as if the property 
remained his, including by marking and selling sheep as if they were his, 
and not Twyne’s.58  In avoiding the conveyance, the Star Chamber 
reasoned “a secret transfer is always a badge of fraud.”59 
One way to understand fraudulent conveyance was as an affront to 
community norms.  The statute that Twyne’s Case enforced—the Statute 
13 Elizabeth chapter 5—was enacted in part to deal with debtors who 
would remove themselves and/or their property from the community once 
it became apparent that they could not satisfy their debts.60  Professor 
Flint explains: 
Overburdened debtors in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries frequently 
transferred all their lands and goods to their friends in trust for use of the 
grantor through fictitious sales, fled to one of the numerous sanctuaries 
where the king’s courts’ power did not govern, lived luxuriously from the 
income of the property transferred until the creditor accepted payment of a 
small portion of the debt and released the remainder, then returned, and had 
back their property.61 
 
criminal sanctions against the parties to the transfer.  13 Eliz., c. 5 § 2. 
 56 Id. at 810-11. 
 57 Id. at 811. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id.  Professor Mooney and others have argued that Twyne was a case chiefly about fraud and 
not, as Baird and Jackson claim, about ostensible ownership.  See Mooney, Myth, supra  note 33, at 
727 n.166.  Cf. Baird & Jackson, Ostensible Ownership , supra note 23. 
 60 See supra note 55 for the text of Statute 13 Elizabeth c. 5.  The Statute of Elizabeth is the 
forerunner of all modern fraudulent conveyance statutes, including the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act, 7A U.L.A. 2 (1999) and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 7A U.L.A. 266 
(1999).  Either the Fraudulent Conveyance Act, the Fraudulent Transfer Act, or a common law 
expression of the Statute 13 Elizabeth is in force in every state in the United States. 
 61 George Lee Flint, Jr., Secured Transactions History:  The Fraudulent Myth , 29 N.M. L. REV. 
363, 380 (1999) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Flint, Fraudulent Myth ]. The problem of fraudulent 
conveyance differs in some respects from the problem of secret liens.  At least historically, as in 
Twyne’s Case, a fraudulent conveyance involved a transfer of property after a debt was incurred and 
not satisfied.  Placing the property out of reach of the creditor was the chief evil in such cases.  Secret 
lien cases, however, often involved a transfer of property prior to a debt being incurred.  The problem 
of fraudulent conveyance is thus largely ex post, while the problem of secret liens may be ex post or 
ex ante.  Yet the essential informational problem is the same in both.  The actual secrecy of the 
transaction in Twyne’s Case, and the presumptive secrecy of the transaction in Clow, appear to have 
been as troubling as any ill intent in either to evade creditors. 
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Recordation systems appear to have developed, in part, as an 
informational proxy for possession which could deter or correct the 
problems of fraudulent conveyances and secret liens.  Although these 
systems existed even before the American Revolution,62 they began to 
flourish later, in the early part of the nineteenth century with a view to 
preventing or remedying problems like those in Twyne’s Case.63  
Recording was viewed as a means of deterring the actual or constructive 
fraud presumed to be at the heart of the non-possessory property 
interest.64  To the extent that fraudulent conveyances were a transgression 
of community norms, the compulsory disclosure of information became a 
method of regulating that which the community could not. 
These systems bloomed with the industrial revolution and its 
insatiable appetite for liquidity.  As Professor Gilmore explained: 
The unprecedentedly rapid expansion of industrial facilities created an 
equally unprecedented demand for credit.  The financing institutions which 
were the source of credit naturally desired security for the loans . . . .  As 
industrialization progressed, personal rather than real property came to be 
the principal repository of wealth.  The mortgage on Blackacre would no 
longer be enough to support the merchant’s insatiable demand for credit 
and the banker’s demand for security.  Nor would the medieval institution 
of pledge suffice to take up the slack of . . . [industrial] property which 
could not be pledged because it had to be used in the borrower’s business    
. . . .   The story of how the equipment and the rolling stock and the stock in 
trade came to be available as collateral is essentially the story of personal 
property security law in the nineteenth century.65 
 
 62 See id. at 363 n.5; see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Secured Transactions History:  The Impact 
of Textile Machinery on the Chattel Mortgage Acts of the Northeast, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 303 (1999); 
George Lee Flint, Jr., Secured Transactions History:  The Northern Struggle to Defeat the Judgment 
Lien in the Pre-Chattel Mortgage Act Era , 20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1 (2000).  Professor Flint has 
recently argued that concerns about secret liens may have influenced legislatures enacting chattel 
mortgage acts before the Industrial Revolution.  See George Lee Flint, Jr. & Marie Juliet Alfaro, 
Secured Transactions History:  The First Chattel Mortgage Acts in the Anglo-American World , 30 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1403, 1450-51 (2004). 
 63 See GILMORE , supra note 8, §§ 2.1-2.2, at 25-27 (discussing history of chattel mortgage acts 
as response to problems of fraudulent conveyance).  Compare Flint, Fraudulent Myth, supra note 61, 
at 367 (“This study importantly eliminates Gilmore’s implication of the nonpossessory secured 
transaction as a fraudulent transaction.”).  For purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to resolve 
whether nonpossessory secured transactions were or were not fraudulent.  The ultimate questions are 
why public notice systems took hold and whether they continue to make sense. 
 64 GILMORE , supra note 8, §§ 2.1-2.2, at 25-27. 
 65 Id. § 2.1, at 25.  Of course, Professor Gilmore also observed that the same pressures that led 
to a wide variety of complex alternatives to the pledge were not replicated in England, where 
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 These developments presented policy makers with a choice.  On the 
one hand, they could do nothing, and tolerate the growing likelihood that 
creditors and other potential investors would be duped by the potentially 
misleading appearance that property in fact belonged to the possessor.  
They might then take refuge in the possibility that merchant communities 
would develop methods of communication that would reliably distribute 
this information.66  Alternatively, they could establish systems to force 
this information into the public domain.  To a significant degree, they 
chose the la tter.67 
Yet, if policy makers chose to force merchants and financers to 
disclose nonpossessory interests in personal property through public 
notice systems, they did not—at least initially—appear concerned with 
the efficiency or simplicity of such systems.68  Rather, while growing 
industrialization in the nineteenth century may have sought increasingly 
efficient methods of creating liquidity, it would appear that commercial 
finance statutes of that era were anything but simple.  First, the recording 
systems did not, strictly speaking, require notice filing. 69  Rather, being 
rooted in the real property recordation systems, they usually called for the 
recording of elaborate documentation, including the filing of the mortgage 
itself and sometimes ancillary materials, such as affidavits and 
acknowledgments of good faith and consideration.70  These additional 
documents were, in Professor Gilmore’s estimation, “self-serving,” and 
reflected “the deep-rooted nineteenth century suspicion that a [non-
possessory] mortgage on personal property was in all probability a species 
of fraudulent conveyance.”71 
Second, because there were several different independent security 
devices, there were several different independent recording systems.72  
 
commercial needs were addressed “in an altogether simpler fashion.”  Id. 
 66 One example of this might be the posting of signs indicating the presence of a factors’ lien, a 
phenomena discussed infra in notes 73-78 and accompanying text. 
 67 The author notes parenthetically that at least one other factor likely motivated policy makers 
at this time:  raising revenue.  As discussed in part III.B.1, infra , a number of writers have argued that 
many of the more formal information systems designed to solve the problem of secret liens were in 
whole or in part tax schemes.  See, e.g., Mooney, Myth, supra note 33, at  726 n.162 (citing 1 
GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 61b-c, at 89-93 (rev. ed. 
1940)). 
 68 See GILMORE , supra  note 8, § 15.2, at 466. 
 69 See id. 
 70 See, e.g., id.; Coogan, supra  note 8, at 291. 
 71 GILMORE , supra note 8, § 15.2, at 466. 
 72 See id. § 15.1, at 463 (“The typical pre-Code pattern included separate filing systems for 
chattel mortgages, for conditional sales, for trust receipts, for factors’ liens, and for assignments of 
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Because lenders frequently had to engage multiple security systems, they 
had to comply with multiple notice systems.  While this would 
presumably have increased the incidence of innocent mistakes, it is not 
apparent that it resulted in more or, more importantly, better information 
on which creditors and other investors could rely. 
This tendency to confuse quantity of information with quality 
persisted into the early twentieth century, reaching an apex of sorts with 
the enactment of the factors’ lien acts.  These acts often required both 
notice filing and the posting of signs on debtors’ doors.  The prototype for 
this type of law was the New York Factors’ Lien Act,73 enacted after 
some political skirmishing in 1911.74  As enacted, the law provided: 
Liens upon merchandise or the proceeds thereof created by agreement for 
the purpose of securing the repayment of loans . . . made upon the security 
of said merchandise . . . shall not be void or presumed to be fraudulent or 
void as against creditors or otherwise, by reason of want of delivery to or 
possession on the part of the lienor, whether such merchandise shall be in 
existence at the time of the creation of the lien or shall come into existence 
subsequently thereto . . . provided there shall be placed and maintained in a 
conspicuous place at the entrance of every building . . . at which such 
merchandise . . . shall be located . . . a sign on which is printed . . . the 
name of the lienor and . . . provided further that a notice of the lien is 
filed . . . .75 
Duplicative notice—filed and posted—was justified on informational 
grounds.  In support of the Factors’ Lien Act, Assemblyman (later 
 
accounts receivable.”). 
 73 N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1911, ch. 326, § 1, amended by N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1931, ch. 766; N.Y. 
SESS. LAWS 1935, ch. 690; N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1943, ch. 635; N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1954, ch. 594, as 
amended, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 45 (1954). 
 74 The Factors’ Lien Act was initially vetoed in 1910, the year it was introduced in New York.  
See Robert M. Zinman, Dominion and the Factor’s Lien:  Does Section 45 of the New York Personal 
Property Law Abrogate the “Dominion Rule”?, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 59, 70 (1961).  The history of 
the initial veto and subsequent modification and enactment of the Factors’ Lien Act is somewhat 
confused.  Peter Coogan indicates that Governor Charles Evans Hughes vetoed the legislation because 
it lacked a provision requiring sign posting.  Coogan, supra  note 8, at 294 n.8.  Professor Zinman and 
several other authors he cites suggest the Act originally contained only the sign posting requirement 
and not the additional requirement of notice filing.  See Zinman, supra, at 68.  The weight of authority 
would appear to be on Professor Zinman’s side.  See id. at 68 n.51.  In any case, the important point is 
not the legislative history of the Act, but how public notice may or may not solve property 
information problems, like those of secret liens.  Problems with sign posting and the factors’ liens acts 
in general are discussed in a symposium issue of Law and Contemporary Problems.  See Symposium, 
Secured Commercial Financing, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 553 (1948). 
 75 N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1911, ch. 326, § 1. 
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Governor) Alfred E. Smith argued, “[a]ll that the bill does is to substitute 
public notice for actual possession of the goods.”76  Notice—by filing and 
sign posting—was, in Smith’s words, “a form of constructive possession 
of the goods.”77  If one believed possession was a meaningful method of 
conveying information about property, one might then accept the idea that 
notice filing was at least as effective.78 
Factoring is a good example of how notice filing became proxy for 
information a community might otherwise have generated about a 
debtor’s property.  Factoring began as a form of consignment sales 
transaction:79  Remote manufacturers, often garment makers, would 
deliver goods to factors in the cities, who would sell the goods and remit 
proceeds to the manufacturer.80  So long as the factor had possession, it 
appeared the factor also had a lien. 81  Problems arose for factors, however, 
when the manufacturers began to retain possession of their finished goods 
in warehouses they owned or leased in the sales markets, while factors 
continued to provide financing, principally by purchasing the receivables 
that would be generated when the merchandise was sold.82  Without 
possession of the goods, the factor would lose its common law lien. 
Because these transactions were not covered by the recording 
statutes then in force, the parties had to develop some way to establish the 
factor’s nonpossessory lien on the manufacturer’s goods in the event the 
manufacturer went bankrupt.  The method chosen by the community of 
factors and merchants was sign posting.  For example, in Ryttenberg v. 
Shefer,83 a case that arose before enactment of the Factors’ Lien Act, the 
parties assigned the manufacturer’s warehouse lease to the factor, and a 
sign was posted at the entrance to the storage floor, indicating that the 
 
 76 Zinman, supra note 74, at 70 (citations omitted). 
 77 Id. 
 78 See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. 
 79 See Herbert R. Silverman, Factoring:  Its Legal Aspects and Economic Justifications, 13 
LAW & CONTEMP . PROB. 593 (1948).  Silverman has suggested that, broadly understood, factoring 
well preceded the law of the United St ates and was apparently part of Roman commerce.  See id. 
 80 See id.  Factors differed from brokers because the factor was said to be entrusted with the 
merchandise and would apparently absorb the loss in the event the customer ultimately failed to pay.  
Id. (citing PARONS ON CONTRACT 100 (5th ed. 1905)). 
 81 See Zinman, supra  note 74, at 65 (citations omitted); see also Kruger v. Wilcox, Ambler 252, 
27 Eng. Rep. 168 (Ch. 1755) (holding at common law that factor had a general lien on the goods and 
products of his principal in the factor’s possession).  The common law possessory lien was later 
enacted by the New York Legislature as N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1830, ch. 179. 
 82 Zinman, supra note 74, at 66-67. 
 83 131 Fed. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1904). 
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premises had been “annexed” to the factor.84  Despite expert testimony to 
the effect that this was the industry’s way of giving public notice of a 
factor’s lien, the court concluded the sign was “indecisive” because the 
premises did not in law belong to the factor, and therefore the factor could 
have been barred by injunction from the premises.85 
Cases like Ryttenberg called for a legislative response, which came 
in the form of the Factors’ Lien Act.86  As noted earlier, New York may 
have been willing to permit factors to retain nonpossessory liens on 
merchants’ inventory, but only if public notice of the interest was given.87  
Sign posting was one way this notice was to be given.  Yet, sign posting 
was not, by itself, apparently sufficient notice of the property interest in 
question.  As originally proposed, the Factors’ Lien Act required only 
sign posting and not the additional step of notice filing.88  For this reason, 
Charles Evans Hughes, then-governor of New York,89 vetoed it in 1910.90  
Without notice filing, he said, the Factors’ Lien Act “‘would . . . facilitate 
secret liens and fraudulent transactions.’”91  Once notice filing was added, 
Hughes signed the bill into law.92 
Sign posting as required by the Factors’ Lien Act would have a short 
shelf-life as a method of conveying property information in commercial 
finance transactions.  In 1954, New York amended the Factors’ Lien Act 
to eliminate the sign posting requirement.93  The reasons for eliminating 
sign posting would sound familiar to us today.  The proponent of the 
amendment, Assemblyman Stanley Steingut, argued that sign posting was 
“completely old-fashioned, in that it presupposes that credit grantors 
make a personal examination of the premises of the credit seeker.  As a 
 
 84 Id. at 320.  The sign stated, “Shefer, Schramm & Vogel, Annex.”  Id.  Shefer was the factor.  
Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1911, ch. 326, § 1, amended by N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1931, ch. 766; N.Y. 
SESS. LAWS 1935, ch. 690; N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1943, ch. 635; N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1954, ch. 594, as 
amended, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 45 (1954). 
 87 See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
 88 See Silverman, supra note 79, at 599. 
 89 From 1930 to 1941, Hughes served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  See 1 LAURENCE 
H. T RIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1383-84 (3d ed. 2000). 
 90 See Silverman, supra note 79, at 599. 
 91 See id. (quoting Veto Memorandum of Charles Evans Hughes, Governor of New York (June 
25, 1910)) (citations omitted). 
 92 Id.; see also discussion supra  note 74. 
 93 N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1954, ch. 594. 
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matter of fact, credit grantors rely upon financial statements and upon 
credit reports issued by . . . credit agencies . . . .”94 
This suggests community norms about the generation of information 
have historically been important in deciding what information should be 
conveyed and how.  While sign posting may at one time have conveyed 
important signals about relationships between things and people, it 
became increasingly clear the sign told the community little of value.  The 
sign became, in Professor Zinman’s words, a “superfluous nuisance.”95  
Worse, while it may have provided little useful information to the 
merchant community, it did give information to others who may have had 
no legitimate reason to know about the debtor’s finances, such as 
customers, competitors, and employees.96  And, of course, there was 
always the possibility that the unscrupulous debtor might remove the sign 
on the eve of bankruptcy, thereby exposing the lender to the risk that it 
would effectively lose its entire property interest.97  The sign, like 
possession before it, was a temporary impediment to the development of 
richer, and more complex, commercial relationships. 
2. Notice Filing 
While sign posting may have withered away, notice filing survived.  
Indeed, it flourished and continued to abstract away from the real property 
recordation model which preceded it.  The Uniform Trust Receipts Act,98 
promulgated in 1933, “popularized the idea that for certain kinds of 
transactions,” such as those involving inventory or accounts receivable, 
it is not essential for all of the details of the transaction to be spread upon 
the public record so long as the record gives an indication where an 
interested party might inquire to learn whether or not particular collateral of 
the indicated class or type is subject to the perfected security interest.99   
 
 94 Zinman, supra note 74, at 83 n.117. 
 95 Id. at 83. 
 96 See id. 
 97 See id. 
 98 UNIF. T RUST RECEIPTS ACT, 9C U.L.A. 665 (1943). 
 99 Coogan, supra  note 8, at 314-15 (footnote omitted).  The Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1933, 
permitted the filing of a “statement of trust receipt financing” of the following form: 
The entruster, whose chief place of business within this state is at, [or who has no place of 
business within this state and whose chief place of business outside this state is at] is or 
expects to be engaged in financing under trust receipt transactions the acquisition by the 
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The drafters of the UCC picked up on this theme.  Until recently, notice 
filing was the near-universal means of rendering a nonpossessory security 
interest in personal property enforceable against third partie s.100 
Today, when notice is required, it will be given in one of two general 
ways.  If some registry already exists with respect to the type of property 
in question, Article 9 “steps back” to require that notice of the security 
interest in that type of property be perfected by giving notice in the 
existing registry. 101  But where another registry does not exist—and that 
may well be true much of the time—the security interest will be perfected 
by filing a UCC-1 financing statement in the state of the debtor’s 
location. 102  The UCC-1103 is a simple form—paper or electronic—that 
 
trustee, whose chief place of business within this state is at of goods of the following 
description: 
[coffee, silk, automobiles, or the like.] 
[Signed] Entruster 
[Signed] Trustee. 
U.T.R.A. § 13(2).  This form can be seen as an ur-UCC-1, a simple notice of the pre-UCC equivalent 
of the non-possessory security interest. 
 100 See GILMORE , supra note 8, § 15.1, at 463 (“As nonpossessory security interests become 
more familiar, filing comes to be looked on not merely as an alternative to possession but as the 
exclusive method of perfection.”); see also William C. Hillman, What’s in a Name:  The U.C.C. 
Filing System in the Courts, 44 OKLA L. REV. 151 (1991) (“[T]he primary method of perfection  
[under former Article 9 was] by the filing of a financing statement.”).  The rules on notice in 
prerevision Article 9 appeared principally in UCC §§ 9-401 through 9-407 (2000). 
 101 See U.C.C. §§ 9-310(a); 9-311(a)(1) (2003).  UCC § 9-311 provides that a financing 
stat ement is not “effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to . . . a statute, regulation, 
or treaty of the United States whose requirements for a security interest’s obtaining priority over the 
rights of a lien creditor with respect to the property . . . .”  This provision preempts the general rule 
contained in § 9-310 that a financing statement must be filed to perfect a security interest . 
The Official Comment to UCC § 9-311(a) explains that an example of such a statute is 49 
U.S.C. § 44107 (2000), for civil aircraft.  Section 44107 establishes “a system for recording . . . 
conveyances that affect an interest in civil aircraft of the United States” including “leases and 
instruments executed for security purposes, including conditional sales contracts, assignments, and 
amendments.”  49 U.S.C. § 44107(a).  Other federal statutes that might preempt Article 9’s filing 
system include the Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. § 31343, and federal law governing security 
interests in rolling stock, 49 U.S.C. § 11301(a).  See Drabkin v. Cont’l Ill. Bank & Trust Co. (In re 
Auto-Train Corp.), 9 B.R. 207 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1981). 
An especially important category of collateral here will be copyright and perhaps other types of 
intellectual property.  See Jonathan C. Lipson, Financing Information Technologies:  Fairness and 
Function, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1067, 1104-22 [hereinafter Lipson, Information Technologies]; Jonathan 
C. Lipson, Remote Control:  Revised Article 9 and the Negotiability of Information, 63 OHIO ST. L.J 
1327 (2002) [hereinafter Lipson, Remote Control].  As discussed infra , notes 166-169 and 
accompanying text, the recent decision in In re World Auxiliary Power, 303 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 
2002), provides some clarity about the scope of federal law in this context, but may also create other 
problems.  
 102 U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-307, 9-310, 9-501 (2003).  Generally speaking, a corporate, or other 
“registered organization,” debtor will be “located” in its state of formation (e.g., a Delaware 
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sets forth the debtor’s name, the secured party’s name, and a brief 
description of the property subject to the security interest.104  The 
financing statement may also set forth certain other items of information 
about the debtor, including its organizational type, identification number 
(if any), and its address.105 
The UCC-1 financing statement is most decidedly not a property 
recordation device, as might be found in the real property or intellectua l 
property contexts.  Strictly speaking, the properly filed financing 
statement neither creates the security interest nor even assures the world 
that such an interest has in fact been granted.106  Rather, the filed 
financing statement is intended to put searchers on “inquiry notice” of the 
possible existence of a security interest.107  It is thus not surprising that the 
rules on describing collateral in the financing statement are moderately 
flexible.  Collateral may be described by, among others, “specific listing,” 
“category,” “type,”  or “any other method, if the identity of the collateral 
is objectively determinable.”108 
While the financing statement may not be a granting instrument, it is 
nevertheless the document that gives the security interest its true force as 
“property,” that is its universal effectiveness against most challengers.  
 
corporation is located in Delaware, even if it has no physical presence in that state).  Id. § 9-307 
(2003); see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Article 9 Filing System:  Why the Debtor’s State of Incorporation 
Should Be the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing:  A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REV. 577 (1995). 
 103 A copy of the UCC-1 form is set forth in Annex A. 
 104 U.C.C. §§ 9-503, 9-521. 
 105 Id. § 9-516(b). 
 106 Rather, as any survivor of a basic class on secured credit can tell you, the interest is “created” 
by the “attachment” of the security interest, a state of affairs that exists if a debtor has  received value 
(e.g., a loan), has rights in the collateral (e.g., owns it) and has contracted to grant the security interest.  
See id. § 9-203(a). 
 107 Id. § 9-502.  “What is required to be filed is . . . only a simple record providing a limited 
amount of information,” the official comment to UCC § 9-502 provides.  Id. § 9-502, cmt. 2.  “The 
notice itself indicates merely that a person may have an interest in the collateral indicated.  Further 
inquiry from the parties concerned will be necessary to disclose the complete state of affairs.”  Id. 
 108 Id. § 9-108(b).  Strictly speaking, the rules governing the description of collateral in a 
financing statement are set forth in UCC § 9-504, where the operative term is, confusingly enough, 
described as “indication.”  For a financing statement to be effective, it must “indicate” the collateral, 
UCC § 9-502(a)(3), which may either be a “description” that comports with UCC § 9-108 or an 
“indication” that the financing statement covers “all assets” of the debtor.  Id. § 9-504(2).  The 
distinction between “description” and “indication” is attributable not to concerns about secret liens, 
but instead to the mechanics of creating a blanket lien (all assets security interest).  See id. § 9-504(2) 
& cmt. 2 (2003).  While a financing statement may, as noted, be effective merely by indicating a 
security interest in “all assets, ” UCC § 9-108(c) forbids such “supergeneric” descriptions in the 
security agreement if it purports to take a security interest in all or substantially all of a debtor’s 
property.  Id. § 9-108(c) & cmt. 2 (commenting that an “‘all assets’ or ‘all personal property’ 
description for purposes of a security agreement is not sufficient”). 
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The financing statement system may thus be seen as an articulation of the 
link between property rights and notice obligations that arises when other 
means of gathering information about a debtor (e.g., its community) are 
unavailing.  As Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson have observed, 
“[notice f]iling systems work because the legal rules provide not only a 
benefit to a person who desires to acquire a property right but also a 
corresponding responsibility.  One is obliged to stake one’s claim in the 
filing system so that future parties will be able to find it.”109 
Ironically, it appears that the true force of notice filing has come not 
from its informational value but from its in terrorem effect, i.e., the 
penalty imposed on the secured creditor whose notice is defective.  This is 
because a trustee for a debtor that has sought bankruptcy protection may 
exploit these defects by avoiding transactions in which notice is flawed.110  
If the transaction is avoided, the property becomes part of the debtor’s 
estate effectively free of the security interest111 and is then available for 
redistribution to all of the debtor’s stakeholders (e.g., general creditors). 
This power, sometimes called the “strong-arm power,” is rooted in 
concerns about the problem of secret liens.112  In 1910, Congress amended 
the Bankruptcy Act then in force to expand a bankruptcy trustee’s 
avoidance powers.113  Congress was concerned that cases like York 
Manufacturing Co. v. Cassell paralyzed bankruptcy trustees trying to 
recapture for the estate property that had been conditionally assigned in 
unrecorded transactions.114  In response to York , Congress amended the 
Bankruptcy Act to provide that bankruptcy trustees “shall be deemed 
vested with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor holding a 
lien by legal or equitable proceedings . . . .”115  Congress reasoned that an 
“unrecorded instrument [of conveyance] . . . which would have been void 
in the state courts had the property been . . . levied upon by attachment or 
 
 109 Baird & Jackson, Uncertainty, supra note 23, at 312. 
 110 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2000). 
 111 Id. §§ 541, 551. 
 112 It was needed, Congress indicated, “to prevent the evil of secret liens.”  61 CONG. REC. 2275 
(1910). 
 113 See H.R. REP. NO. 61-511, at 6-7 (1910). 
 114 201 U.S. 344, 352 (1906).  The Court reasoned in York Manufacturing that because the 
bankruptcy trustee “stands simply in the shoes of the bankrupt . . . he has no greater right than the 
bankrupt.”  Id.  Having no greater rights in machinery that was conditionally assigned to the 
“unperfected” seller in that case, the trustee was unable to recover the property for the benefit of the 
debtor’s other creditors.  Id. at 353. 
 115 Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412 § 8, 36 Stat. 838, 840. 
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execution from a state court” should be ineffective (“void”) as against a 
bankruptcy trustee.116 
Eradicating secret liens remains the goal of the strong-arm power.  
Thus, the 1973 Report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the 
United States, which led ultimately to the Bankruptcy Code, observed, 
“[o]ne of the essential features of any bankruptcy law is the inclusion of 
provisions designed to invalidate secret transfers made by the bankrupt 
prior to the date of the filing of petition.”117  Although the Bankruptcy 
Code has been through several major revisions since the early part of the 
twentieth century, the strong-arm power remains essentially intact and is 
today found in § 544(a)(1).118 
If deterring the creation of secret interests in a debtor’s property was 
the purpose of the strong-arm power, one might think that merely 
technical failures in notice, which did not meaningfully impair the quality 
of the notice actually given, would not expose the transaction to 
avoidance.  That is, to the extent notice was actually given, the transaction 
should be good against the bankruptcy trustee because the transaction was 
no longer “secret.” 
That, however, is not the way avoidance law developed.  Case law 
under the strong-arm power is replete with instances of secured parties 
losing their security interests for reasons that appear, in retrospect, to have 
been nit-picky, at best, and capricious, at worst.119  Initially, it was 
thought these injustices could be attributed to the arcane statutes that 
governed secured transactions prior to general enactment of the UCC.120  
 
 116 61 CONG. REC. 2271. 
 117 See Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. REP. NO. 93-137, at 18 
(1973). 
 118 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2000).  Section 544(a)(3) gives the bankruptcy trustee the rights 
and powers of “a bona fide purchaser of real property . . . from the debtor, against whom applicable 
law permits such transfer to be perfected.”  Id. § 544(a)(3).  This section differs from § 544(a)(1) in 
several respects, including that it implies in law that the trustee has the rights of a “bona fide 
purchaser.”  Ordinarily, lien creditors (i.e., the bankruptcy trustee under § 544(a)(1)) are not “bona 
fide purchasers.”  See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (2003) (defining “purchase” to exclude “involuntary” 
conveyances such as those involving lien creditors). 
 119 See Lipson, Information Technologies, supra note 101; James J. White, Revising Article 9 to 
Reduce Wasteful Litigation , 26 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV, 823, 837-38 (1993) [hereinafter White, 
Wasteful Litig ation]. 
 120 See Coogan, supra  note 8, at 319 (“The secured party has had a rough time with the filing 
systems of pre-Code chattel security law.  Decision after decision, to say nothing of the statutes 
themselves, has disregarded the real function of a filing or recording system–namely, to give notice to 
other creditors of the actual or possible existence of security interests in property which appears to be 
owned by the debtor.”).  See generally  David Gray Carlson, Debt Collection as Rent Seeking, 79 
MINN. L. REV. 817, 834 (1995) [hereinafter Carlson, Debt Collection] (“It cannot be denied . . . that 
debtor’s counsel and bankruptcy judges exalt in hanging a secured creditor out to dry for the most 
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The great formalities that attended pre-Code law created ample 
opportunities for aggressive trustee’s counsel.121  Even under the UCC, 
trustee’s counsel has been able  to exploit seemingly innocuous footfaults 
in the notice given.  Mistakes in the debtor’s name,122 descriptions of 
collateral,123 or the place of filing124 have all been used against the secured 
party. 
It is not clear how these uses of the strong-arm power support the 
informational goals of notice filing.  If, as may well have been true in 
many of these cases, the community of creditors knew or had reason to 
know the debtor’s property was encumbered, it is not clear that a minor 
error in the debtor’s name or collateral description created a secret lien, 
perpetrated a fraud, or otherwise violated norms of the applicable 
merchant community.  It may be that the strong-arm power is a necessary 
evil, exerting in terrorem force over creditors, compelling them—as the 
Clow court suggested—to “leave nothing unperformed, within the 
compass of their power, to secure third persons from the consequences of 
the apparent ownership of the vendor.”125  But simply asking lenders to do 
more does not necessarily assure that anyone else will have a meaningful 
understanding of what the debtor does or does not have. 
 
inconsequential mistakes.”). 
 121 Some of the older cases are collected by Coogan, supra note 8, at 291 n.5 (citing Amberson 
Inv. Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 266 F.2d 767 (10th Cir. 1959) (recorded mortgage failed to recite maturity 
date of secured note); In re Urban, 136 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1943) (absence of affidavit); In re Int’l 
Harvester Co., 9 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1925) (copy of affidavit insufficient); In re Prod. Aids Co., 193 F. 
Supp. 180, 185 (S.D. Iowa 1961) (failure to indicate corporate authority to sign); In re Leven, 42 F. 
Supp. 484 (D. Md. 1941) (failure of affiant to disclose agency status); In re Holley, 25 F.2d 979 (N.D. 
Iowa 1928) (failure to disclose title of subscribing notary); Nordman v. Rau, 119 Pac. 351 (Kan. 
1911) (purchaser not bound by knowledge of faulty mortgage); Sickinger v. Zimel, 77 A.2d 905 (N.J. 
1951) (false recital of consideration)).  See also R.I. Hosp. Nat’l Bank v. Larson, 79 A.2d 182 (Conn. 
1951) (failing to specify day when monthly payments were due). 
 122 See, e.g., In re Tyler, 23 B.R. 806 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (filing against “Tri-Molded 
Plastics, Inc.” ineffective where debtor’s name is “Tri-Moulded Plastics, Inc.”); ITT Commercial Fin. 
v. Bank of the W., 166 F.3d 295 (Tex. 1999) (filing against “Compucentro, USA, Inc.” ineffective 
where debtor’s name is “Compu-Centro, USA, Inc.”). 
 123 In re K.L. Smith Enters., Ltd., 2 B.R. 280 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (laying hens were 
“livestock,” not “equipment” or “inventory”); see In re Northeast Chick Serv., Inc., 43 B.R. 326 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (finding chickens were “farm products,” not “inventory”). 
 124 Perhaps the leading candidate here is In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd., 116 B.R. 194 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990), which held that, even though the secured party filed effective UCC-1 
financing statements, its security interest in the debtor’s library of copyrighted films and the proceeds 
from those films (royalties) was not perfected because it was not recorded in the Copyright Office.  
See Lipson, Information Technologies, supra note 101, at 1071 (lamenting unfairness of apparent 
arbitrariness of perfection rules as applied to information technology collateral). 
 125 Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275, 281 (Pa. 1819). 
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At bottom, it would appear notice filing systems developed at least in 
part as proxy for the information that would otherwise have been readily 
available in simpler, community-based information systems (e.g., systems 
that recognized only possessory liens).  Information-forcing systems such 
as the UCC-1 were a response to certain types of community 
transgressions—those that involved secret interests in property.  The 
strong-arm power may then be seen as a blunt information-generating 
tool, more troublesome for its over- and under-inclusiveness than for its 
basic goals.  It is, however, our response to the fact that, in a world with 
increasingly complex and fragmented community structures—or none at 
all— “creditors need to verify their claims.”126 
C. Modern Systems:  Private Credit Reporting and Contract 
There is something vaguely quaint about a system that purports to 
establish information about nonpossessory interests in personal property 
through the filing of slips of paper in the offices of various public officials 
(e.g., secretaries of state).127  Indeed, the implausibility of such a system 
forms the basis for one of the arguments against the continued use of the 
notice filing system.128  There are undoubtedly those who view the 
financing statement system as little better than the posted sign under the 
Factors’ Lien Act. 
The truth is that we have a poor understanding of the purpose that 
notice filing currently serves.  It is tempting to view notice filing as 
vestigial, however, because we know the information that is likely to be 
most important to a community of creditors will derive from either or 
both of two “private” sources:  (i) information intermediaries, like Dun & 
Bradstreet, who provide analyses of companies as to such matters as 
timeliness of payment, credit history, and so on129 and/or (ii) contract and 
due diligence. 
 
 126 Alces, supra note 3, at 680; see Peter A. Alces & Robert M. Lloyd, An Agenda for Reform of 
the Article 9 Filing System , 44 OKLA . L. REV. 99 (1991) (noting the UCC-1 system is “the very 
foundation of the personal property security law in the United States”) (footnote omitted). 
 127 Of course, Article 9 is “medium neutral” in certain  respects and permits the electronic filing 
of financing statements.  See U.C.C. §§ 9-516(a) (discussing rules for effective “communication” of 
financing statements); 9-102(a)(18)(C) (defining “communicate” to include electronic transmission, if 
permitted by filing office rules); 9-102 cmt. 9.a. (discussing medium neutrality and electronic notice 
filing). 
 128 These and other objections were gathered in a Minnesota Law Review symposium cited 
supra  at note 6 and discussed infra in Part III.B.  
 129 In its own words: 
D&B manages the world’s most valuable commercial database with information on 83 
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Consider first the information intermediaries.  Firms like Dun & 
Bradstreet provide enormous databases of information, including credit 
information about thousands of businesses, which is available to potential 
creditors or litigants for a price.130  One might think these systems would 
be of greater value to the community of likely creditors than the filed 
financing statement, which is, at best, only suggestive of the existence of 
nonpossessory property interests.  This is consistent with Professor Lynn 
LoPucki’s view that unsecured creditors often “cash-flow” surf and gather 
information about their debtors through a variety of private and informal 
channels.131  According to LoPucki, 
if the debtor does not seasonably pay its unsecured creditors, that fact will 
be transmitted through credit reporting and other information channels to 
the debtor’s secured creditors, employees, suppliers, customers and other 
trading partners.  If the reports get bad enough, others will refuse to deal 
and the debtor will be unable to remain in business.  In this conception, 
unsecured debt is likely to be short term and restricted to amounts that are 
small in relation to the creditor’s portfolio. The unsecured creditor monitors 
the debtor through credit reports and other sources of information and 
evaluates the risk that the business will be discontinued.132 
 Yet, one component of Dun & Bradstreet and other similar analyses 
is an assessment of publicly recorded interests in the debtor’s property, 
such as UCC-1 financing statements and judgment liens.133  Other 
 
million companies.  Business information is gathered in 214 countries, in 95 languages or 
dialects, covering 181 monetary currencies.  The database is refreshed one million times a 
day as part of our commitment to provide accurate, comprehensive information for our 
more than 150,000 customers. 
Dun & Bradstreet, Company Information, at http://www.dnb.com/us/about/media/ 
dnbcompanyinformation.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2005). 
Information intermediaries are distinct in certain respects from the credit rating agencies, like 
Moody’s and Standard & Poors—known technically as “nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations”—because they tend to cover smaller companies who do not issue public securities.  
For a general discussion of the rating agencies, see, e.g., Schwarcz, Complexity, supra note 16.  See 
generally Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly:  The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 
1145, 1146 (2003) (“Rating agencies rate companies and debt securities. They are crit ically important 
players in the capital markets.”); Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH . U. L.Q. 43 
(2004). 
 130 See Dun & Bradstreet, D & B Products and Services, at http://www.dnb.com/US/dbpro 
ducts/product_overview/index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2005). 
 131 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994) 
[hereinafter LoPucki, Creditor’s Bargain ]. 
 132 Id. at 1941 (footnotes omitted). 
 133 As of January 2005, for example, Dun & Bradstreet’s “information file inventory” housed 
135,456,457 public records, including liens, at http://www.dnb.com/us/about/ 
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services appear to look to similar types of information. 134  Perhaps the 
most explicit user of UCC financing statement information is Experian, 
which includes a “UCC Profile” in a company’s report and lists up to ten 
of the most recent UCC filings (i.e., original filings, amendments, and/or 
terminations) with the most recent displayed first.135  This suggests that 
even if creditors themselves do not look directly to the filed financing 
statement, the information intermediaries on whom they may rely do. 
There appears to be a growing tendency to rely on these private 
information systems as proxy for information about property, even if that 
is not their principal function.  In In re Communication Dynamics, Inc., 
for example, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware concluded 
that the review of a Dun & Bradstreet report was sufficient “notification” 
of the assignment of a claim to defeat a right of setoff, as provided in 
UCC § 9-404(a), which limits an account debtor’s right to setoff against 
an account if the debtor (i.e., the account debtor’s creditor) has assigned 
the account, and the account debtor has notice of it.136  The account debtor 
in Communication Dynamics was deemed to have notice of the 
assignment of its account because a credit officer for the account debtor 
had obtained a Dun & Bradstreet report about the debtor indicating that a 
secured party had a lien on the debtor’s accounts receivable.137 
 
db_database/dnbinfoquality.html. 
 134 See, e.g., InfoSource USA, About Our Data, at http://list.infousa.com/cgi-
bin/abicgi/abicgi.pl?S53511741409690=bas_session&bas_elements=4&bas_vendor=190000&bas_ty
pe=LC&bas_page=6999&bas_action=AboutOurData (analyzing “secretary of state” information with 
respect to 14 million businesses it covers)  (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). 
 135 See Experian, Sample Business Profile, at http://www.experian.com/business/ page5.html 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2005). 
 136 300 B.R. 220, 225 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003). 
 137 The court explained: 
[Account debtor] T & B argues that it did not receive an authenticated notice because third 
party private information providers, such as [Dun & Bradstreet], are not substitutes for the 
affirmative acts of signing or executing required of the assignee/assignor.  The Debtor 
responds that a writing transmitted directly from a debtor or a secured party to an account 
debtor is not required to satisfy the authentication requirement of the statute. . . .  Using 
this analysis, we conclude that the delivery of the [Dun & Bradstreet] report to T & B, 
which included a statement that the Lenders had a lien in all accounts receivable, meets 
this requirement.  Such reports are often relied upon by parties in determining whether 
such liens exist.  In fact, Mr. Burks testified that T & B does rely on [Dun & Bradstreet]’s 
comprehensive reports for information about its customers.  Therefore, we conclude that, 
having received authenticated notice of the Lenders’ liens on May 1, 2002, T & B’s right 
to setoff does not have priority over the Lenders’ liens under section 9-404 of the UCC. 
Id. at 224-25.  I note parenthetically that the Communication Dynamics opinion would appear to have 
erred in its interpretation of UCC § 9-404(a)(1).  That section provides that the rights of an assignee 
(e.g., a secured party) are “subject to . . . any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the 
assignor [debtor] which accrues before the account debtor receives a notification of the assignment 
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Notice filing may provide part of the informational foundation on 
which these systems are built because all creditors may rely on them 
indirectly for information about credit decisions.  Professor Mann’s work 
tends to confirm this, indicating information asymmetries are often 
managed in the commercial world through a variety of—mostly 
informal—verification systems, including the use of private information 
intermediaries.138  Thus, even if most unsecured creditors do not directly 
rely on the public record, the services upon which they rely for this 
information apparently do. 
The same may be true of the role that contract and due diligence play 
in determining nonpossessory property interests.  As noted supra, Baird 
and Jackson believe the financing statement should—and perhaps does—
exist to allow secured parties to “stake claims” in a debtor’s property. 139  
A corollary to this would be that the system provides information about 
property that is relevant largely, and perhaps only, to this audience.140  Yet 
they—or at least Baird—appear to believe that this information will be 
less important than other aspects of the credit decision.141  Rather, 
 
authenticated by the assignor or the assignee.”  While the Communication Dynamics court discussed 
the meaning of the term “authentication,” 300 B.R. at 225, it failed to recognize that a D & B report is 
not authenticated by the debtor.  The mistake may have been in the court’s assumption that financing 
statements are signed by debtors.  See id. (“[W]e do not go so far as T & B in concluding that [UCC 
§ 9-404(a)] means actual delivery of a signed copy of the financing stat ement . . . .”).  Despite this 
obvious mistake, the court ultimately came to the correct result, recognizing that the account debtor 
retained a right of recoupment under UCC § 9-404(a)(1) because it received no authenticated 
notification from the debtor. 
 138 See, e.g ., Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 159 (1997); Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J. 
2225  (1999) [hereinafter Mann, Verification]. 
 139 Baird & Jackson, Uncertainty, supra note 23, at 312. 
 140 As Baird states, 
a secured  creditor relies on particular assets of the debtor.  He needs to know whether a 
particular piece of property is encumbered.  If the property securing his debt is or might 
become encumbered, the creditor cannot consider the loan secured.  The information that 
the Code provides secured creditors in its filing system is exactly tailored to their needs to 
know whether any claim they make to a particular asset will have priority over any other.  
The filing system is in effect a place where secured creditors stake claims to the debtor’s 
property. 
Baird, Ostensible Ownership, supra  note 23, at 62 (footnote omitted). 
 141 Baird makes two interesting, but unsupported, empirical claims about the role of information 
in secured lending.  First, he argues, “many creditors know before they even meet their debtor that 
they will lend, if at all, on either a secured or unsecured basis.”  Id. at 66.  Second, he argues,  
the usefulness of the information in the filing system does not derive from what it tells 
creditors who are just entering negotiations.  At the early stages, creditors can rely on what 
their debtor tells them . . . .  A lawyer usually does not even have the files checked until 
the deal is fairly far along, far enough, at any rate, for the decision to have been made 
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sophisticated creditors will make informational assessments by 
conducting “due diligence,” whereby the debtor consensually shares 
information with the potential creditor.  The lien search will confirm or 
deny the findings of due diligence. 
It would be tempting to conclude that these private methods of 
learning about nonpossessory interests in property should wholly displace 
the notice filing system.  Like possession and sign posting in older times, 
the claim would be that notice filing should give way to new and 
allegedly superior methods of distributing information about property.  
Yet doing so causes us to forget that notice filing developed as a proxy for 
community-based information (e.g., open, notorious, and peaceful 
possession) and would appear to remain an important, if indirect, 
component of modern information-generation methods.  Part II describes 
three sets of transactions which would appear to display this sort of 
amnesia. 
II. THE END OF NOTICE FILING:  THREE SECRET LIENS 
Neither the UCC nor any other legislative development wholly 
eliminates notice filing under all circumstances.  Even the recent revisions 
to Article 9 of the UCC preserved, and in certain respects improved, the 
notice filing system to the extent it still applies.  Yet, as a statutory matter, 
notice filing will have neither role nor effect in transactions involving 
increasingly important collateral, such as data, intellectual property, and 
bank and securities accounts.  Moreover, securitization “facilitation” 
statutes have the potential to render notice filing entirely optional.  With 
notice filing thus impaired, secret liens can, and perhaps should, flourish.  
This section summarizes how recent legislative developments tolerate, if 
not promote, the creation of secret liens. 
A. Security Interests in  Data and Intellectual Property:  Rules on 
Proceeds and Continuity of Interest 
A shallow reading of Article 9 of the UCC might lead to the 
conclusion that secret liens will be a rarity.  UCC § 9-310(a) provides that 
perfection of a security interest presumptively requires the filing of a 
 
whether the loan will be secured.”   
Id.  Either or both claims may be true—although I have my doubts—but no effort is made to 
substantiate them. 
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financing statement.142  UCC § 9-310(b)(9), however, contains an 
important exception for security interests in “proceeds.”  Because revised 
Article 9 has greatly expanded the definition of proceeds,143 its rules will 
often unwittingly create secret liens on data and intellectual property. 144 
There are at least three ways that a “proceeds” security interest might 
create secret liens.  First, revised § 9-102(a)(64)(A) defines proceeds as 
including, among other things, “whatever is acquired upon the . . . 
license . . . of collateral.”145  This means that licenses of data or 
intellectual property, for example, should be “proceeds” of the original 
collateral, which may or may not have been data or intellectual property 
itself.146  Second, UCC § 9-102(a)(64)(A) provides that the secured party 
may pursue proceeds in the hands of parties other than the debtor.147  This 
means that, unless a license is “ordinary course,” which is broadly 
nonexclusive, the security interest continues in both the original collateral 
and the proceeds, even as to third party licensees, sub-licensees, and so 
on.148 
Third, UCC § 9-102(a)(64)(C) provides that proceeds include “rights 
arising out of collateral.”149  This cryptic phrase is not explained in the 
Official Comments to this section.  It may, however, be quite expansive 
 
 142 U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (2003) (“Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and Section 9-
312(b), a financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests . . . .”). 
 143 Comment 13 to § 9-102 explains that “[t]he revised definition of ‘proceeds’ expands the definition 
beyond that contained in former Section 9-306.”  
 144 See generally Lipson, Remote Control, supra note 101 (discussing effect of rules on proceeds 
and continuity of interest on intellectual property and data). 
 145 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64)(A). 
 146 Compare In re Transp. Design & Tech., Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 640 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985) (declining to 
treat patent as proceeds of patent application under former Article 9), with Lipson, Information Technologies, 
supra  note 101, at 1135-36 (questioning continued viability of Transportation Design rule in light of revised 
Article 9). 
 147 Courts applying former Article 9 had come to this conclusion.  See, e.g., Centerre Bank, N.A. v. New 
Holland Div. of Sperry Corp., 832 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co., 1 B.R. 
324 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979); E. Idaho Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Idaho Gem, Inc., 842 P.2d 282 (Idaho 1992); First 
State Bank v. Clark, 635 N.W.2d 29 (Iowa 2001).  There was, however, a split of authority on the issue.  See 
First State Bank, 635 N.W.2d at 30 (discussing split).  The Official Comment now emphasizes the point:   
“This Article contains no requirement that property be ‘received’ by the debtor for the property to qualify as 
proceeds.”  U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 13(d). 
 148 Article 9 provides that, as a general matter, security interests continue in collateral 
notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition.  U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1).  Security interests will be 
cut off, however, if such a transaction is in “ordinary course.”  Id. §§ 9-320 (ordinary course 
disposition of goods), 9-321 (ordinary course license of general intangibles).  A license will only be 
“ordinary course” if, among other things, it is “non-exclusive” and in the ordinary course of the 
licensor’s business.  See id. § 9-321(a).  See generally Lipson, Remote Control, supra note 101 
(discussing continuity of interest rules). 
 149 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64)(C). 
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and pick up all kinds of rights associated with original collateral, 
including intangible rights in technologies and data associated with 
original collateral.150  I have argued elsewhere that if we take the statute 
seriously, this should mean that customer data is the proceeds of 
inventory, a patent is the proceeds of a trade secret, and a derivative work 
is the proceeds of a copyright.151  In all cases, the later informational 
rights “arise out of” the earlier rights. 
Putting perfection to one side for a moment, this is one reason 
security interests in data and intellectual property will subsist secretly.  It 
is highly unlikely a debtor granting a security interest in one copyright, 
for example, understands that it is, as a matter of law, also granting a 
security interest in all derivative works it later produces.  Similarly, and 
perhaps more importantly, it is unlikely a licensee of the derivative work, 
which also enjoys copyright protection, understands that it may be 
acquiring its interest encumbered by prior security interests. 
The rules on the perfection of security interests in proceeds are 
complex, but the basic idea is that the security interest in proceeds will be 
perfected if the security interest in the original collateral was perfected152 
and any of three things is true:  (i) The financing statement that was filed 
to cover the original collateral does, or could, cover the proceeds; (ii) the 
proceeds are cash or cash equivalents;153 or (iii) the security interest in the 
proceeds becomes perfected in some other way.154  It will be fairly easy to 
satisfy at least one of these requirements, especially when the collateral is 
data or intellectual property. 155  But satisfying these requirements does not 
 
 150 See Lipson, Information Technologies, supra  note 101, at 1132-38. 
 151 Id.  The Copyright Act defines a “derivative work” as “a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation . . . art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other 
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 152 U.C.C. § 9-315(c). 
 153 Known technically as “cash proceeds,” which are defined as “proceeds that are money, 
checks, deposit  accounts, or the like.”  Id. § 9-102(a)(9). 
 154 Id. § 9-315(d). 
 155 Usually, it will be satisfied by the first alternative because data and intellectual property are 
general intangibles in which a security interest could be perfected by the filing of a financing 
statement.  See id. §§ 9-310(a), 9-315(d)(1).  This assumes that Article 9 applies at all.  Article 9 
defers entirely to other preemptive law (e.g., the federal law of copyrights) “to the extent that  . . . a 
statute, regulation or treaty of the United States preempts [it].”  Id. § 9-109(c)(1).  It appears also to 
defer to the notice rules created by other legal systems if they make it possible for a secured party to 
obtain priority over a lien creditor by recording the security interest in the other system.  Id. §§ 9-
310(b)(3), 9-311(a)(1). 
What this means for species of intellectual property subject to varying federal rules is a 
complex question.  In the case of copyrights, for example, it was until recently thought the Copyright 
Act was wholly (or at least largely) preemptive of all of Article 9.  See Lipson, Information 
 456 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 21 
necessarily mean that creditors are likely to know anything about the 
proceeds security interest. 
Consider an example.  Assume that D is an internet retailer of toys.  
D finances its inventory with money borrowed from SP.  SP takes a 
security interest in D’s inventory, which SP perfects by filing a financing 
statement indicating a security interest in “inventory.”  Assume further, as 
is often the case, that when D sells toys in the ordinary course, it collects 
spending, demographic and similar information about its customers.  
Finally, assume that D sells or licenses its list of customer information to 
a data aggregator, B/L. 
Presumably, B/L would believe it was acquiring its interest in this 
customer data free of the property claims of others.  Even if B/L was 
highly diligent and conducted a lien search, it would only find a financing 
statement describing a security interest in “inventory,” not “data” or 
“general intangibles”—the UCC label most likely to cover customer 
data.156  But SP would have a perfected security interest in this data 
because the data is proceeds of the debtor’s inventory, and there is no 
“good faith purchaser” rule that would apply to cut off SP’s security 
interest.157  Thus, if B/L sold or licensed this list to others—even with D’s 
permission—the party that acquired the data from B/L, B/L2, would take 
the data subject to the same encumbrance.  In this instance, it is virtually 
inconceivable that B/L2 would be able to discover SP’s security interest, 
assuming B/L2 even thought to look for it.  It is not clear how the UCC-1 
filed by SP as to D would put B/L or B/L2 on notice of anything.  A clean 
record with regards to B/L2 would be false—SP’s secret lien would 
apparently survive and be enforceable against B/L2. 
 
Technologies, supra note 101, at 1107-14 (discussing Nat’l Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n of Denver (In re Peregrine Entm’t , Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990)).  More recent 
case law, however, suggests the Copyright Act will have preemptive effect only if the underlying 
copyright was registered with the Copyright Office.  See Aerocon Eng’g v. Silicon Valley Bank (In re 
World Auxiliary Power Co.), 303 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2002).  As discussed infra, if this more recent 
case law survives, it means that it will be much easier to perfect a security interest in copyrights under 
Article 9, even if they would be undiscoverable by virtue of Article 9’s perfection rules. 
 156 See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (defin ing general intangibles); see also Lipson, Information 
Technologies, supra note 101, at 1122-32 (discussing data as general intangibles under the UCC). 
 157 See U.C.C. §  9-321.  This section provides that a “licensee in ordinary course of business 
takes its rights under a nonexclusive license free of a security interest in the general intangible created 
by the licensor, even if the security interest is perfected and the licensee knows of its existence.”  A 
“licensee in ordinary course of business” is defined as “a person that becomes a licensee of a general 
intangible in good faith, without knowledge that the license violates the rights of another person in the 
general intangible, and in the ordinary course from a person in the business of licensing general 
intangibles of that kind.”  Id. § 9-321(a); see Lipson, Information Technologies, supra  note 101, at 
1101. 
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The full magnitude of this problem is difficult to gauge.  In theory, of 
course, it should mean that most data in the computers of most businesses 
is encumbered in ways, and by parties, not antic ipated by the owners or 
users of the data.  That said, should SP actually show up and claim the 
right to freeze or seize B/L2’s computer, B/L2 should be expected to 
marshal a host of arguments, including that the data is not “property” 
capable of being encumbered under Article 9.158  This argument seems a 
bit counterintuitive because B/L2 probably treats the data as it would treat 
its other valuable property.  In any case, the jury is out on the question of 
whether data is property for these purposes.159 
A better argument might be one of impossibility.  SP may have a 
security interest in the data, but B/L2 would object, so too would a large 
number of unnamed, unidentified secured parties whose proceeds security 
interests all arose in more or less the same way.  The statutory expression 
of this position would simply follow § 9-315(a)(2), which provides that 
the proceeds security interest continues only to the extent that it is 
“identifiable.”160  A more theoretical approach would rest on the 
observation that the proliferation of security interests would create a sort 
of “anti-commons,” infecting data like a regenerating computer virus.161  
In either case, however, SP has significant potential leverage over a party 
with whom it has not dealt, B/L2, whose reasonable expectations surely 
would be defeated on these facts.  Indeed, to the extent this is a problem 
of contract, it is unclear that SP could ever contract in a way to protect its 
expectations from this sort of problem.  It would have to search too far 
back in too many chains to discover SP. 
What if the problem involved intellectual property rather than data?  
Assume, for example, that D developed a data management software 
program which it licensed to B/L.  Assume further that D’s security 
agreement with SP includes general intangibles, the category that would 
 
 158 See Lipson, Remote Control, supra note 101, at 1350-56. 
 159 See Edward J. Janger, Muddy Property:  Generating and Protecting Information Privacy 
Norms in Bankruptcy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1801, 1840 (2003) (discussing property rights 
treatment of data). 
 160 UCC § 9-315(a)(2) provides that a security interest continues in “identifiable” proceeds 
without providing a definition of the term “identifiable.”  Although Article 9 provides no definition of 
“identifiable,” it does state that non-goods proceeds (e.g., data) would be identifiable “to the extent 
that the secured party identifies the proceeds by a method of tracing, including applicable equitable 
principles, that is permitted under law other than this art icle with respect to commingled property of 
the type involved.”  U.C.C. § 9-315(b)(2). 
 161 See Lipson, Remote Control, supra note 101, at 1410-11 (citing Michael A. Heller, The 
Tragedy of the Anticommons:  Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
621 (1998)). 
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most likely describe intellectual property.  The software would be subject 
to the Copyright Act which would, for certain purposes, preempt Article 
9.162  Until recently, there was some reason to believe the Copyright Act 
preempted all of the Article 9 rules on the perfection of security 
interests.163  If so, B/L might have argued that unless the security interest 
was actually recorded in the United States Copyright Office, the security 
interest would have been unperfected.  If unperfected (because 
undiscoverable in the copyright records), then presumably B/L’s rights 
would have had priority over SP under most circumstances.164 
Recent case law, however, suggests that preemption will no longer 
protect the B/Ls of the world if the underlying copyright is not 
registered.165  In In re World Auxiliary Power, the debtor granted security 
interests in certain unregistered copyrights.166  The bank filed UCC-1 
financing statements as required by the UCC, but did not record the 
security interest with the Copyright Office.167  The debtor’s bankruptcy 
trustee attempted to sell the copyrights free of the bank’s security interest, 
but the bankruptcy court sustained the bank’s objections, finding the bank 
perfected its security interest in unregistered copyrights by filing and 
recording its security interest in accordance with Article 9 of the UCC.168  
The Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that federal copyright law does not 
preempt state law with respect to perfection and priority of security 
interests in unregistered copyrights.169  “There is no reason to infer from 
Congress’s silence as to unregistered copyrights,” the court wrote, “an 
intent to make such copyrights useless as collateral by preempting state 
law but not providing any federal priority scheme for unregistered 
copyrights.  That would amount to a presumption in favor of federal 
preemption, but we are required to presume just the opposite.”170 
Recording copyrights and registering security interests in them 
according to the scheme established by the Copyright Act would 
undoubtedly be a cumbersome, expensive, and time-consuming 
 
 162 See Lipson, Information Technologies, supra note 101, at 1107. 
 163 Id. at 1107-14 (discussing the preemptive force of the Copyright Act). 
 164 UCC § 9-317(d) provides that a licensee or buyer of general intangibles (i.e., intellectual 
property) “takes free of a security interest if the licensee or buyer gives value without knowledge of 
the security interest and before it is perfected.” 
 165 See, e.g., In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 303 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 166 Id. at 1123. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 1124. 
 169 Id. at 1132. 
 170 Id. at 1131 (citations omitted). 
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proposition, one which I certainly have not advocated.171  Nevertheless, it 
is important to see that whenever a security interest arises in a copyright, 
it will automatically arise in a license of that copyright.  In re World 
Auxiliary Power makes it easier to perfect the security interest in both the 
original copyright and the license without actually giving meaningful 
notice, at least vis-à-vis remote parties.  If the license is not ordinary 
course, the security interest will continue and the licensee may have no 
idea that it is taking its license subject to the prior interest of the licensor’s 
secured party.  As with data, the problem grows as intellectual property is 
sublicensed and subdivided, moving further and further away from the 
parties that initially created the encumbrance.  While sublicensees may 
take subject to the security interest, it will, as it is with all secret liens, be 
difficult to discover ex ante. 
The bottom line is that whole categories of increasingly important 
informational assets may be encumbered by secret liens.  It should be 
noted that revised Article 9 is not entirely responsible for this state of 
affairs.  Even prior iterations, which might have required notice more of 
the time, tolerated remote proceeds security interests, which effectively 
create secret liens.172  Rather, the problems arise from expanding the 
definition of proceeds at precisely the wrong moment—when the universe 
of potential proceeds has expanded to include assets that happen to be 
highly mobile and mutable, such as data and intellectual property.  
Together these developments ensure a much larger universe of secret liens 
than we would intuitively expect commercial finance law to tolerate. 
B. Control Security Interests 
A second source of secret liens will arise by virtue of new rules 
concerning the creation of “control” security interests in bank and 
brokerage accounts.  One of revised Article 9’s major changes from prior 
law involves the use of control as a means of creating and perfecting a 
security interest.  Generally speaking, a secured party will have control of 
certain types of collateral—deposit accounts, investment property, 
electronic chattel paper, or letter-of-credit rights173—if the secured party 
has the right to dispose of the property in question.  Because control arises 
 
 171 See Lipson, Information Technologies, supra note 101, at 1107-14. 
 172 Professor LoPucki catalogued ways that a debtor so in clined could fool creditors by secretly 
encumbering property while still complying with the prior (more notice friendly) version of Article 9.  
See Lynn M. LoPucki, Computerization of the Article 9 Filing System:  Thoughts on Building the 
Electronic Highway, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 7-9 (1992). 
 173 U.C.C. §§ 9-106, 9-104, 9-105, 9-107, 9-314(a) (2003). 
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solely by contract or operation of law, notice filing is either not required 
or not permitted.174 
Although the statute does not make this distinction, there would 
appear to be two different kinds of control:  bilateral and trilateral.  
Bilateral control involves two parties, such as a bank and a 
depositor/borrower.  UCC § 9-104 automatically gives the secured party 
that is also a debtor’s depositary bank a security interest in the account in 
question.  Because security interests in deposit accounts as original 
collateral, not proceeds, may only be perfected by control,175 the bank 
need not give notice of its security interest in the bank account. 
Bilateral control has much in common with the right of setoff.  Setoff 
says that a creditor may apply amounts it owes to a debtor to reduce the 
debtor’s obligation to the creditor.176  The classic examples involve bank 
accounts held at banks that also made loans to the borrower.  Because a 
deposit account is simply a debt the bank owes the depositor, setoff 
permits the bank to apply the amount credited to the account—meaning 
owing to the debtor—against any amounts the debtor owes the creditor—
meaning the loan the debtor is obligated to pay the secured party.  
Although the UCC does not generally govern the right of setoff, the right 
has often been characterized as a kind of equitable security interest.177 
Bilateral control is distinct from trilateral control.  Trilateral control 
occurs where the secured party is not also the entity that maintains the 
account.  For example, a secured party has control of a deposit account if 
the depositary bank enters into an agreement—known as a control 
 
 174 As to deposit accounts, filing was apparently considered and rejected early in the process of 
revising Article 9.  See Bruce A. Markell, From Property to Contract and Back:  An Examination of 
Deposit Accounts and Revised Article 9, 74 CHI-KENT. L. REV. 963, 983 (1999) (citing PERMANENT 
EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE ARTICLE 9:  REPORT 70 (1992)). 
 175 U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(1). 
 176 See In re Communication Dynamics, Inc., 300 B.R. 220 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003). 
 177 See id. at 223 (“In essence, the right of setoff ‘elevates an unsecured claim to secured status, 
to the extent that the debtor has a mutual, pre-petit ion claim against the creditor.’”) (quoting Univ . 
Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re Univ. Med. Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1079 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
Former UCC § 9-104 declared the article to be inapplicable to any right of setoff.  However, 
rights of setoff are now expressly recognized currently at UCC §§ 9-306(d)(i) and 9-318(1) (2003).  
Whether a creditor seeking to assert a right of set off must abide by Article 9’s notice filing rules is 
unclear.  In In re Apex Oil Co. , the court observed that “[w]hile we agree . . . that a bank or other 
creditor need not comply with Article 9 and its filing requirements to exercise its right to setoff, we do 
believe that Article 9 governs the priority between that right to setoff and a perfected security 
interest.”  975 F.2d 1365, 1367-68 (8th Cir. 1992), aff’d , Apex Oil Co. v. Artoc Bank & Trust Ltd., 
265 B.R. 144 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001).  That said, courts have also held a secured party that filed a 
financing statement will have priority over a bank asserting a later right of setoff.  See, e.g., Insley 
Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1986). 
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agreement—with the secured party that the depositary bank will comply 
with instructions from the secured party as to the funds in the deposit 
account, without further consent from the debtor.178  As with bilateral 
control, trilateral control arises strictly by contract.  Notice filing is 
neither permitted nor effective. 
Control is justified as a method of perfection as to deposit accounts, 
investment property, and so forth because there is assumed to be a kind of 
community knowledge about the kinds of property in which a security 
interest may be perfected by control.  “No other form of . . . notice is 
necessary” to perfect a security interest in a deposit account, the Official 
Comment tells us, because “all actual and potential creditors of the debtor 
are always on notice that the bank with which the debtor’s deposit 
account is maintained may assert a claim against the deposit account.”179  
Permitting perfection of a security interest by control therefore represents 
“a pragmatic judgment” by the drafters of revised Article 9 that these 
security interests are, in important respects, “public and unambiguous.”180 
Where there is “general knowledge” in an industry that certain kinds 
of property may be held subject to certain kinds of noncustodial claims 
(e.g., brokers always hold securities subject to the claims of other broker-
dealers or lending institutions), it may be appropr iate to dispense with 
public notice filing.181  The “community” of banks and brokers knows or 
assumes that debtors’ deposit and brokerage accounts are likely to be 
encumbered, therefore they could not possibly rely to their detriment on a 
“clean” lien search.  There is presumed to be no “secret” because 
“everyone” knows. 
But this begs the question, who is “everyone?”  Consider an 
example.  Assume that debtor, D, purchases an item of equipment with 
purchase-money financing from the vendor, V.  Under UCC § 9-103, V 
 
 178 U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(2). 
 179 Id. § 9-104 cmt. 3. 
 180 Schroeder, Surrealism, supra  note 41, at 523-24. 
 181 Cf. id. at 522.  Of course, on this logic, no filing or other public notice should ever be 
required because there is likely to be “general knowledge” about the kinds of borrowers that grant 
security interests in their assets and what kinds of assets those might be.  Professor Schroeder does 
acknowledge that a security interest , like any interest in property, must involve public recognition of 
the interest.  Using a Hegelian analysis, she suggests that property “involves the publicly recognizable 
identification of a specific object to a specific legal subject with some rights to control, and exclude 
others from, the object.”  Id. at 527 (citing, among other things, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH , HEGEL, 
ELEMENTS OF A PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 52-53, 58 (Allen W. Wood ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 
Cambridge University Press 1991) (1821)).  Although she appears to support control as a method of 
perfection, it is not clear how that method would be “publicly recognizable,” except among the parties 
to the contract. 
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has a purchase-money security interest in the item of equipment.  If V 
perfects the security interest by filing an effective financing statement 
when the debtor receives the equipment, or within twenty days thereafter, 
V would have priority over any competing, prior security interest held by 
SP.182  V may also believe that she has priority in the identifiable cash 
proceeds associated with the equipment.183  Thus, if D sold the equipment 
or it was lost or destroyed, V would reasonably suppose that it has a 
proceeds security interest in whatever was received upon this disposition 
or loss, such as the purchase price D received or insurance payable with 
respect to the equipment.184 
V might also reasonably expect she has priority in these proceeds.  
But V is likely to be wrong.  UCC § 9-324(a) provides that the purchase-
money priority in proceeds is subject to § 9-327, which sets forth the rules 
on the priority of control security interests.  If the cash proceeds from the 
sale or loss of the equipment were deposited in a bank account maintained 
by D, there is no easy way V can be sure the bank that maintains D’s 
account, B, does not have a control-perfected security interest in the 
account.  It will be possible to verify that D has not granted a security 
interest in the account to B, but it would take more than a typical lien 
search. 
Not only will the lien itself be secret, but if and when V discovers it, 
she will also find that it has priority over her security interest, despite her 
purchase-money priority.  This is because B would not only have the 
security interest in the account, but it would also have priority, even 
though the funds in the account may be proceeds of V’s equipment and 
even though the proceeds would otherwise be entitled to purchase-money 
priority in favor of V.185  As the comment to UCC § 9-327 explains, 
“security interests perfected by control . . . take priority over those 
perfected otherwise, e.g., as identifiable cash proceeds . . . .”186 
 
 182 UCC § 9-324(a) provides: 
[A] perfected purchase-money security interest in [equipment] has priority over a 
conflicting security interest in the same goods, and, except as provided in Section 9-327, a 
perfected security interest in its identifiable proceeds also has priority, if the purchase-
money security interest is perfected when the debtor receives possession of the collateral 
or within 20 days thereafter. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. § 9-102(a)(64) (defining proceeds). 
 185 See id. §§ 9-322(c), 9-327(1) (“A security interest held by a secured party having control of 
[a] deposit account under Section 9-104 has priority over a conflicting security interest held by a 
secured party that does not have control.”). 
 186 Id. § 9-327 cmt. 3. 
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How would V protect herself from the secret lien permitted by the 
control security interest in a deposit account?  Presumably, determining 
the existence and nature of a control security interest would require 
consultation with the parties involved—the debtor, the secured party, and, 
in the case of trilateral control, the bank or intermediary that maintains the 
accounts.  It is also to be assumed the banks and intermediaries would not 
collude with a debtor that fraudulently concealed the grant of a control 
security interest.  There is, however, no obvious way to assure that a 
debtor has not entered into a control agreement.  Under UCC § 9-342, a 
bank that has entered into a control security agreement is “not required to 
confirm the existence of the agreement to another person” unless the 
bank’s customer (i.e., the debtor) so requests.187 A similar rule obtains 
with respect to securities intermediaries or issuers who are parties to 
control agreements.188  It is thus not clear how much comfort one can ever 
take in a statement that the debtor has not encumbered these assets.  These 
assurances may well turn out to be false, and there would be limited 
recourse for the aggrieved party.189 
V could also resort to other contractual protections.  She could, for 
example, ask the debtor and the insurance company to have her named as 
loss payee with respect to the equipment.  If so, and the casualty check 
was actually sent to V, her expectations would be protected.190  
Alternatively, V could enter into a subordination agreement with B, 
whereby B would agree that V would have priority in D’s account with 
respect to any casualty payments arising from damage to the collateral. 191  
But there is no guarantee the other parties will enter into these 
agreements.  In any event, it is difficult to imagine these contractual 
 
 187 Id. § 9-342. 
 188 Id. § 8-106(g). 
 189 Because the bank and broker have no duty to disclose anything, and no relationship with V, it 
is not clear how liability could be established.  Presumably, a claim for breach of the duty of good 
faith could be made under UCC §§ 1-201(b)(20) and 9-625.  It is not, however, clear that such a claim 
would have much likelihood of success.  Even if established, it is not clear what the claim is worth.  
Section 9-625(b) only creates liability for violations of “this article,” not the entire UCC.  Even if 
liability were established, it would be limited to “actual” damages.  If, however, the bank would have 
had priority anyway (i.e., because it had control), it is not clear what damages could be established.  
Absent outright fraud by a secured party, courts are reluctant to subordinate secured parties merely 
because recognizing priority would be “ inequitable.”  See, e.g., Peerless Packing Co. v. Malone & 
Hyde, Inc., 376 S.E.2d 161, 164 n.4 (W. Va. 1988) (absent “virtually fraudulent conduct,” Article 9 
priorities will be respected). 
 190 Ironically, this would be true even if V did not otherwise have purchase-money priority, 
because the possessory security interest in a negotiable instrument will usually have priority over any 
competing interest in the same instrument.  Id. §§ 9-330(d), 9-331(a). 
 191 Id. § 9-339. 
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solutions are more efficient than a notice filing system that would readily 
alert V to the existence of B’s security interest and determine its priority 
ex ante.  While control may bring important benefits to the banks and 
brokerages that sought this type of protection in revised Article 9, it is not 
clear that much consideration was given to costs associated with the secret 
liens that these transactions tolerate. 
C. Asset Securitizations 
New twists on old secured transactions are not the only potential 
source of secret liens in commercial finance law.  A third source will 
involve recent statutory attempts to “facilitate” the development of asset 
securitization transactions, which potentially dispense with notice filing 
entirely.  Under some of these statutes, if a contract transferring property 
uses requisite statutory language, the transfer will be effective even if in 
secret, and even if other law would require notice of it. 
Although several states have enacted such laws, the most important 
is Delaware’s Asset-Backed Securities Facilitation Act (“ABSFA”).192  
ABSFA essentially contemplates a complete opt out of Article 9 and, if 
the statute means what it says, any other law that may conflict with the 
securitization contracts.  “Asset securitizations” are generally defined as 
“the structured process whereby interests in loans and other receivables 
 
 192 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §§ 2701A-2703A (2004).  Other states have facilitation statutes.  See 
Alabama, ALA. CODE § 35-10A-2(a)(1) (2004); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(e) (West 
2002); North Carolina, N.C.  GEN. STAT. § 25-9A-102 (2002); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1109.75 
(Anderson 2002); Texas, T X. BUS. & COM. § 9.109(e) (Vernon 2002).  The statutes in Alabama, North 
Carolina, and Ohio are substantially similar to ABSFA, with all but Ohio’s statute entitled “Asset -
Backed Securities Facilitation Act.”  See ALA. CODE § 35-10A-2(a)(1); N.C.  GEN. STAT. § 25-9A-
102; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1109.75.  Texas and Louisiana, by contrast, simply added a new 
subsection to Article 9 of the revised UCC that left it up to the parties involved in securitization 
transactions to classify the nature of transfers.  See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9 -109(e); T X. BUS. & 
COM. § 9.109(e). 
Texas’s Article 9, for example, provides: 
The application of this Chapter to the sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, 
or promissory notes is not to recharacterize that sale as a transaction to secure indebtedness 
but to protect purchasers of those assets by providing a notice filing system.  For all 
purposes, in the absence of fraud or intentional misrepresentation, the parties’ 
characterization of a transaction as a sale of such assets shall be conclusive that the 
transaction is a sale and is not a secured transaction and that title, legal and equitable, has 
passed to the party characterized as the purchaser of those assets regardless of whether the 
secured party has any recourse against the debtor, whether the debtor is entitled to any 
surplus, or any other term of the parties’ agreement. 
T X. BUS. & COM. § 9.109(e). 
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are packaged, underwritten, and sold in the form of “asset backed” 
securities.”193 
A securitization typically involves at least two parties:  the 
“originator” and the special purpose entity (“SPE”).  The orig inator is the 
original owner and creator of the financial assets, such as accounts 
receivable, lease payments, credit card receivables, or mortgage 
receivables, that are the subject of the securitization transaction.  The 
originator might, for example, be an equipment leasing company, which is 
owed lease payments from its lessees.  The lessee’s payment obligations 
are an asset of the originator.  The SPE is the initial purchaser of these 
eligible assets.194 
Like a secured transaction, the heart of a securitization is a property 
transfer.  The goal of a securitization is a “true sale” of  financial assets 
from the originator to the SPE.195  If the transfer of these assets is a true 
sale, then the assets should be insulated from the originator’s economic 
troubles.196  If the transfer is not a true sale—but is, for example, a 
transfer for security (i.e., a disguised financing)—the originator’s 
bankruptcy estate would retain an interest in the assets.  The assets would 
then be subject to the many provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that 
constrain third parties from acting with respect to property of the debtor’s 
estate.197 
An effective securitization should free the securitization provider—
or, more particularly, those holding the securities issued in the 
transaction—from Bankruptcy Code provisions that:  (i) stay acts to 
obtain possession of, or collect from, property of the debtor’s estate,198 (ii) 
permit the debtor to use cash collateral,199 and (iii) cram-down secured 
 
 193 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY : ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, ASSET 
SECURITIZATION: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK (1997), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ 
handbook/assetsec.pdf.  See also TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, 
FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991 & Supp. 1995); STEVEN L. 
SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE , A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (3d ed. 
2002) [hereinafter SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE ]; SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS 
(Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed. 1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 
STANFORD J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994). 
 194 Securitizations may also involve a third entity that purchases the eligible assets from the SPE 
and issues the securities backed by the income stream they produce. 
 195 Thomas J. Gordon, Comment, Securitization of Executory Future Flo ws as Bankruptcy-
Remote True Sales, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (2000). 
 196 Id. (securitization eliminates risk of regular unsecured and secured arrangements). 
 197 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000). 
 198 Id. § 362(a)(3), (6). 
 199 Id. § 363(c)(2). 
 466 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 21 
claims in a plan of reorganization. 200  Indeed, some commentators claim 
the “efficiency” of securitization derives, in part, from separating the 
debtor and the debtor’s other creditors from these assets.201  Although 
estimates of the value of the securitization market vary, it generally 
involves more than two trillion dollars at any time.202 
If securitization transactions always involved arms length, fair value 
sales of payment rights (e.g., receivables), they would likely present few 
problems.203  However, securitization transactions are often structured in 
such a way that the originator retains the risk that there will be a default or 
other problem with the underlying assets.204  For example, the originator 
may be required to repurchase these assets from the SPE in the event the 
underlying account obligor defaults.  As and to the extent there is recourse 
to the originator, the transaction looks less like a “true sale” and more like 
a secured financing. 205 
 
 200 Id. § 1129(b)(2). 
 201 See Claire A. Hill, Securitization:  A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1061 (1996); Minh Van Ngo, Agency Costs and the Demand and Supply of Secured  Debt and Asset 
Securitization , 19 YALE J. ON REG. 413, 458 (2002); see also  Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of 
Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1996) [hereinafter LoPucki, Death of Liability] (discussing benefits of 
asset securitization where company keeps valuable assets separate from entities at risk). 
 202 One estimate exceeds five trillion dollars.  See Thomas A. Humphries, The Way 
(Securitization) Things Ought to Be, 638 PLI 641, 641 n.2 (2004) (citing Discussion Paper, 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association & The Bond Market Association, Special Purpose 
Entities (SPEs) and the Securitization Market  1 (Jan. 31, 2002), available at http:// 
www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/SPEDiscussionPaper1-31-02.pdf.).  A recent symposium issue of the 
Cardozo Law Review suggests that securitization may be overtaking and displacing secured lending as 
the dominant form of commercial finance.  Symposium, Threats to Secured Lending and Asset 
Securitization , 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539 (2004). 
 203 If, in other words, they were not “judgment proofing” devices.  See LoPucki, Death of 
Liability, supra note 201, at 14-38. 
The structured transactions used by Enron are occasionally offered as proof of the potential 
abuse of securitizations.  See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Governance After Enron, 40 
HOUS. L. REV. 99, 114-15 (2003) (Enron’s balance sheet deceptions were a “securitization policy.”).  
Professors Plank and Schwarcz have each argued the Enron transactions were sui generis, “patently 
improper transactions.”  Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 
25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2004); see Schwarcz, Enron, supra note 16 (distinguishing Enron 
transactions from securit ization transactions).  The difficult part, however, is that neither Plank nor 
Schwarcz have offered a solution to the true sale problem that does not also  create a secret lien 
problem.  Moreover, as discussed infra, notes 266-92 and accompanying text, saying that there are 
differences between “good” and “bad” transactions is no justification for legislation that would 
insulate both from judicial scrutiny, which is the literal effect of ABSFA. 
 204 Edward J. Janger, The Death of Secured Lending , 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1759, 1770-71 
(2004) (discussing transaction structures that provide recourse to originators). 
 205 SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE , supra  note 193, at 621-27; Peter V. Pantaleo et al., 
Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of Financial Assets, 52 BUS. LAW. 159, 161 (1996); 
Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale of Loans and the Role of Recourse, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 287, 
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Although asset securitization is a comparatively recent development 
in commercial finance, the true sale problem has existed for many 
years.206  On one hand, our law has long permitted a buyer to “put” 
defective assets back to a seller (e.g., through a breach of warranty theory) 
without calling into question the sale character of the transaction. 207  On 
the other hand, transactions in which the “seller” guarantees payment,208 
or a particular return on investment,209 or the “buyer” has full recourse to 
the seller are generally viewed as loans and not sales.210  At the margins, it 
is—and has been for many years—difficult to distinguish sales from 
secured loans.211 
 
307-08 (1991) [hereinafter Plank, True Sale of Loans] (arguing payment of the full value, not the 
existence of recourse, should constitute the border between sales of and security interests in accounts 
and chattel paper); Peter L. Mancini, Note, Bankruptcy and the UCC as Applied to Securitization:  
Chara cterizing a Mortgage Loan Transfer as a Sale or a Secured Loan , 73  B.U. L. REV. 873, 876-77 
(1993). 
 206 See Pantaleo et al., supra note 205, at 164 (“Recharacterization [(true sale)] cases are 
centuries old.  They illustrate that the law may not treat a transaction as a sale just because the buyer 
and seller labeled it a sale.”) (footnote omitted). 
 207 In re Grand Union Co., 219 F. 353, 360 (2d Cir. 1914) (Seller of accounts agreed that if the 
accounts were of poor quality, it would repurchase them or pay buyer so as to guarantee a certain rate 
of return for the buyer.); Comm. on Bankr. & Corp. Reorganization of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City 
of N.Y., Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 543-44 (1995) (describing forms of 
recourse that may be permissible in structured finance transactions). 
 208 See Ratto v. Sims (In re Lendvest Mortgage, Inc.), 119 B.R. 199, 200 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) 
(“Where the risk of loss is shifted from the investor to the debtor through a contractual guarantee of 
repayment by the debtor, the transaction is a loan and not a sale.”). 
 209 See Ables v. Major Funding Corp. (In re Major Funding Corp.), 82 B.R. 443, 445 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. 1987); Castle Rock Indus. Bank v. S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc. (In re S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc.), 32 
B.R. 279, 281-82 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983) (Seller originated mortgages, sold certain interests in them 
to buyer, guaranteed the buyer’s recovery on the mortgages and the buyer’s rate of return on its 
investment, indicating the transaction was a loan for security and not a sale.); see also Fireman’s Fund 
Ins. Cos. v. Grover (In re Woodson Co.), 813 F.2d 266, 271 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding there was no true 
sale where investors with the debtor, who were alleged to own mortgages originated by the debtor, 
“were paid interest monthly regardless of whether the original borrower paid [the debtor].  In the 
event of default, [the debtor] paid the investor the interest and the principal balance owed on the 
investor’s [original deposit].”); Merchant’s Transfer & Storage Co. v. Rafferty (In re Gotham Can 
Co.), 48 F.2d 540, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1931) (“The obligation of [the seller] to repay [the buyer] all 
advances [on accounts allegedly sold] in full and to pay certain percentages for the use of the money, 
shows that the transactions were essentially collateral loans, and not sales . . . .”); Pantaleo et al., 
supra note 205. 
 210 Burford-Toothaker Tractor Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 891, 894-96 (5th Cir. 1959) 
(Transferor assigned customers’ installment contracts to bank, but assignment was with full recourse, 
and bank required periodic payments to be made to the bank by the transferor, whether or not the 
customers had paid on the installment contracts.  The court held on these facts that no sale of the 
installment contracts occurred.). 
 211 The true sale question was also central to the dispute in Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 
(1925).  There, Justice Brandeis, writing for a unanimous court, held that a sale of future accounts 
receivable was really a disguised financing, and therefore a fraudulent conveyance void against the 
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The recent history of true sale is dotted with cases in which courts 
were reluctant to recognize the putative sale of payment obligations.  In 
1993, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in 
Octagon Gas Systems v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve, Inc.), held 
financial assets sold by the debtor prior to its bankruptcy should, in fact, 
be included in the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.212  More recently, and more 
controversially, the court in LTV Steel extended the reasoning of Octagon 
to conclude that the bankruptcy estate of the originator retained an 
equitable interest in financial assets and inventory “sold” in a 
securitization. 213 
Parties to securitization transactions have attempted to address the 
true sale problem with fairly elaborate structures and “true sale” opinion 
letters from lawyers, which ostensibly assuage the bond market and those 
who invest in securitization transactions.  Such structures and opinion 
letters are not, however, costless.  Viewing these costs as excessive, the 
securitization industry has sought to establish legislative safe harbors.214  
The most prominent effort to obtain a statutory safe harbor involved § 912 
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001. 215  This provision would have 
amended the Bankruptcy Code to provide that assets transferred in a 
qualifying transaction would be excluded from the debtor’s estate.  In 
light of the alleged misuse of SPEs in the Enron case, § 912 was 
challenged and eventually pulled from the Bankruptcy Reform Act.216 
 
assignor’s bankruptcy trustee.  Id. at 361-63.  The purchaser’s failure to exercise dominion and 
control over the accounts was a fraud on the debtor’s creditors.  Id. at 363 (holding the assignment 
was fraudulent “because of dominion reserved.  It does not raise a presumption of fraud.  It imputes 
fraud conclusively because of the reservation of dominion inconsistent with the effective disposition 
of title and creation of a lien.”).  For thoughtful rehabilitations of Benedict, see Edward J. Janger, 
Brandeis, Progressivism, and Commercial Law:  Rethinking Benedict v. Ratner, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 
63, 74 (1998) (arguing Benedict reflected Brandeis’ “‘progressive’ passion for financial 
accountability”); Schroeder, Surrealism, supra note 41, at 527-28 (arguing the totally subjective 
nature of the assignments prevent creation of a complete property interest in the accounts). 
 212 995 F.2d 948, 957 n.9 (10th Cir. 1993) (rejecting view that sale of asset, if perfected, 
removes it from transferor’s bankruptcy estate). 
 213 In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 285 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (“To suggest that Debtor 
lacks some ownership interest in products that it creates with its own labor, as well as the proceeds to 
be derived from that labor, is difficult to accept. . . .  [T]here seems to be an element of sophistry to 
suggest that Debtor does not retain at least an equitable interest ” in the cash collateral.). 
 214 See, e.g., Letter from John R. Vogt, Bond Market Association Executive Vice President, to 
Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner (Jan. 30, 2002), at 
http://199.106.213.75/regulatory/abs013002.pdf, at  2-3. 
 215 S. 220, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001); H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001). 
 216 See Lipson, Enron, supra note 16, at 3. 
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Nevertheless, several states have enacted non-uniform statutes which 
would reach the same result, although they take a more circuitous and 
troubling route.217  Delaware’s ABSFA is perhaps the most aggressive 
example of this.  It declares that a true sale will be whatever the parties to 
the securitization transaction say it is.218  ABSFA provides, 
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” any property purported in 
the transaction documents to be transferred in a securitization transaction 
“shall be deemed to no longer be the property, assets or rights of the 
transferor.”219  The transfer of property by the originator shall, under 
ABSFA, be effective notwithstanding bankruptcy, insolvency, or any 
other rights third parties might assert in the transferred assets.  “A 
transferor in the securitization transaction, its creditors or, in any 
insolvency proceeding with respect to the transferor or the transferor’s 
property, a bankruptcy trustee . . . shall have no rights, legal or equitable, 
whatsoever to reacquire, reclaim . . . or recharacterize as property of the 
transferor any property” transferred in the securitization.220  For emphasis, 
ABSFA further provides that if the transferor enters bankruptcy, the 
transferor’s “property, assets and rights shall not be deemed to be part of 
the transferor’s property, assets, rights or estate.”221 
For purposes of the problem of secret liens, the critical language in 
ABSFA is “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”  This 
presumably means the rules in Article 9 and any other state commercial 
finance statutes do not apply if property is conveyed in a “securitization,” 
a term pointedly not defined by the statute.222  Thus, ABSFA creates an 
exception to the Article 9 requirement that parties to a securitized 
transaction give notice of the transaction by filing a UCC-1 financing 
statement.  ABSFA requires no notice to render a sale effective, and 
purports to displace any conflicting law. 
 
 217 See supra note 192. 
 218  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 , § 2703A(a)(1) (2004). 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. § 2703A(a)(2). 
 221 Id. § 2703A(a)(3).  In 2002, Delaware apparently sought to bolster the effectiveness of 
ABSFA by amending its former Business Trust Act to rename it the “Statutory Trust Act ” “for the 
purpose of avoiding any implication that a trust formed [thereunder] constitutes a ‘business trust’ 
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.”  Stephen H. Case, I Thought I Put That Where You 
Couldn’t Reach It:  Bankruptcy-Remote Entities, Special Purpose Vehicles and Other Securitization 
Issues, 853 PLI/Comm. 53, 79 (2003) (citing Matthew J. O’Toole, Analysis of 2002 Amendments to 
the Delaware Statutory Trust Act, at [unnumbered page] DEL. LAWS AFFECTING BUSINESS ENTITIES 
(2002)); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3801. 
 222 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §§ 2701A-2703A. 
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A quick response may be:  So what?  As noted above, Article 9 
contemplates a growing number of transactions in which property 
transfers can be effective without notice filing.223  Security interests in 
data and intellectual property will often be undiscoverable from the public 
record.224  Similarly, security interests in a wide variety of assets—deposit 
accounts and investment property—can be perfected by control.225  The 
problem is that ABSFA applies not only to financial collateral, but also to 
“[a]ny property, assets or rights purported to be transferred, in whole or in 
part.”226  Had ABSFA applied to the securitizations in LTV, for example, 
it would have validated even the controversial transactions involving 
inventory, although such assets are not typically securitized. 227  A similar 
result might obtain in Enron.228  Indeed, read literally, ABSFA should 
authorize intentional fraudulent transfers because it trumps any competing 
state law. 
ABSFA’s failure to define a qualifying transaction is equally 
troubling.  ABSFA guarantees true sale treatment “to the extent set forth 
in the transaction documents.”229  Thus, a transfer of property can be 
effected solely by contract, whether or not the transaction bears any 
resemblance to the common securitization.  Any secret lien would appear 
to be effective under Delaware law so long as it is “set forth in the 
transaction documents.”230 
ABSFA appears to envision a world in which any property transfer is 
enforceable , even if secret, so long as the transaction documents contain 
the magic statutory incantation.  Notice filing under ABSFA appears to be 
entirely optional.  In order to discover that a debtor has already sold its 
assets in a securitization, a potential purchaser or secured party could 
never rely on a clean lien search.  The possibility that a debtor may, in 
secret, have engaged in a qualifying transaction under ABSFA means that 
there is simply no way other than contract and diligence to know that one 
is in fact acquiring clean title to, or pr iority in, the debtor’s property.  
ABSFA contains no exception for fraud or mistake.231 
 
 223 Supra  Part II. 
 224 See supra Part II.A. 
 225 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 226 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 , § 2703A(a)(1). 
 227 Compare Plank, True Sale of Loans, supra note 205. 
 228 See Lipson, Enron, supra note 16. 
 229 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2703A(a). 
 230 Id. 
 231 There are ways that a bankruptcy trustee, disappointed purchaser, or secured party could try 
to get around ABSFA.  They could argue that based on choice-of-law principles, Delaware law did 
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III. HOW DID WE GET HERE?  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NOTICE 
FILING IN COMMERCIAL FINANCE LAW 
Why are we increasingly tolerant of secret liens?  In simple terms, it 
is because we have become convinced that notice filing is economically 
unsound.  The benefits of notice filing, we are told, do not justify the 
costs.  This Part considers these arguments. 
A. The Economic Analysis of Commercial Finance Law 
A certain kind of economic analysis of law—typically associated 
with the University of Chicago and Ronald Coase—has altered the way 
we approach most categories of private law, from antitrust to 
bankruptcy. 232  Like the economic analysis of law in general, the question 
here is one of institutional choices and the costs and benefits those 
choices imply.  Is the “state,” in the form of mandatory notice filing rules, 
or the “market,” in the form of “secret” contracts, likely to produce 
greater benefit to society? 233  Commercial finance law—and in particular, 
the law of secured lending—has not been immune from this inquiry.  Its 
specific roots are located in a 1979 Yale Law Journal article by Professors 
Jackson and Kronman, which asked a very basic question:  Is secured 
lending efficient? 234 
 
not apply; that the transaction was not a “securitization” (however defined); or, in the case of 
bankruptcy, that federal law preempts ABSFA.  These are not necessarily trivial arguments, but they 
have little to do with assuring that information about nonpossessory property interests is reasonably 
easy to discover. 
 232 See Richard A. Epstein, Law and Economics:   Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future, 64 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1167, 1167 (1997) (“The magnitude of the intellectual revolution [of economic analysis] 
is hard to recount today because virtually everyone who works in common law subjects is familiar 
with the now routine exercise of showing why it is, or has to be, the case that this or that common law 
rule is, or is not, efficient.”). 
Coase’s landmark contribution to legal thought appears in R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J.L. ECON 1 (1960), reprinted in  R.H. COASE , THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 95 (U. 
of Chi. Press 1988), an article which has become the runaway citation champion among published law 
review articles.  See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 751, 759 (1996) (indicating Coase’s article was cited almost twice as often as the next most 
cited law related article).  Coase had earlier suggested the contours of the problem of social cost in 
R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 33 (1959)). 
 233 See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:  CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
 234 Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among 
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979). 
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This seductive question emanates from the Modigliani-Miller 
invariance theory.235  Economists Modigliani and Miller famously 
suggested that in a perfect capital market, the value of a firm could not be 
traced to the organization of its capital structure.236  Thus, if a debtor, D, 
granted a security interest in its assets in order to obtain financing from a 
secured party, SP, other firm investors—in particular, unsecured 
creditors—should charge more, reflecting their increased risks arising 
from SP’s security interest.  Whatever D might save in reduced interest 
costs charged by SP should be at least offset by an increased rate of 
interest charged by unsecured creditors.  A firm’s value—and in 
particular, the cost of capital to a firm—would not vary by virtue of the 
use of secured financing. 
The persistence of secured lending puzzled economically-oriented 
writers.237  Secured transactions were challenging not only on a Paretian 
model, but also in larger societal terms.238  It is expensive to engage in a 
secured transaction, and doing so may also create greater social costs 
through negative externalities.  Many creditors—unsophisticated trade 
creditors, tort creditors, terminated employees, taxing authorities, and 
others—do not in fact charge higher rates of interest to offset the risk of 
 
 235 Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the 
Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). 
 236 Id.; see Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After Thirty Years, 2 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 99 (1988).  Cf. David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending , 80 VA. L. 
REV. 2179, 2299 (1994) [hereinafter Carlson, Efficiency] (Economic analysis of secured lending 
“emanates from a peculiar misunderstanding of the famous Modigliani-Miller model . . . .”).  
According to Carlson, “[t]he Modigliani-Miller model died in 1976, when Michael Jensen and 
William Meckling pointed out that Modigliani and Miller assumed that corporate structure never 
changes debtor behavior.”  Id. (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 332-33 (1976)).  
Jensen and Meckling identified the problem of agency cost—the cost imposed by the risk that an 
agent will act, wittingly or not, to the disadvantage of its principal.  Jensen & Meckling, supra.  
While the Modigliani-Miller theory may have many flaws, it remains an important tool in 
conceptualizing the microeconomics of firm financing.  Professor Schwarcz, for example, purports to 
have “solved” the puzzle of secured lending, given certain assumptions, using Modigliani and Miller.  
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425, 429 
(1997) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Easy Case]. 
 237 See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 234. 
 238 “Paret ian” refers to the concept of “pareto superior” transactions—transactions where “at 
least one person in the world [is] better off and no one worse off.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12 (Little, Brown & Co. 3d ed. 1986).  The Pareto test of efficiency is 
sometimes contrasted with the “Kaldor-Hicks” model, which provides that “a move is efficient 
whenever the winners win more than the losers lose, in the sense that, if the winners compensated the 
losers to their satisfaction, the winners would still be better off than they were before the change.” 
Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto:  Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1222 
(1991). 
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extending credit to a debtor whose assets are encumbered; they cannot 
“adjust” to the increased risk posed by the debtor’s grant of a security 
interest.239  Thus, while a secured creditor with full contractual priority 
has access to all of a debtor’s property, vulnerable unsecured creditors do 
not.  This would create perverse managerial incentives for D to disregard 
risks thus externalized.240  The debtor that gave full priority in its assets to 
a particular secured creditor would have externalized all losses onto those 
in the worst position to protect themselves.241  Because the transaction 
costs associated with secured lending were presumed greater than the 
transaction costs associated with other methods of financing, many 
academics followed the lead of Jackson and Kronman in asking why 
rational market actors would engage in such transactions.242 
Asking and answering the questions posed by the Modigliani-Miller 
puzzle, as writ small in commercial finance law, became an enormously 
attractive enterprise for legal academics.243  Because it has been so 
 
 239 The term “nonadjusting creditors” is generally associated with Bebchuk and Fried, who use it 
in Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 864 (1996).  Bebchuk and Fried take the term one step further and 
apply it to all creditors for whom adjustment may either be costly or implausible, such as small dollar 
trade creditors or creditors who extended unsecured credit before the debtor granted the security 
interest.  Id. at 864-66. 
 240 Id. at 934 (arguing the rule of full priority “causes excessive use of security interests, reduces 
the incentive of firms to take adequate precautions and choose appropriate investments, and distorts 
the monitoring arrangements chosen by firms and their creditors”). 
 241 As Bebchuk and Fried explained: 
The fact that security interests may be used to transfer value from nonadjusting creditors 
under a full-priority rule means that security interests may be used even when they give 
rise to inefficiencies.  As our analysis will demonstrate, the ability to use security interests 
to divert value from nonadjusting creditors tends to distort the borrower’s choice of 
contractual arrangements with its creditors, giving rise to certain efficiency costs.  
Id. at 865. 
A number of responses have developed reasonably plausible claims that secured lending, under 
certain circumstances, can be efficient.  See, e.g ., Carlson, Efficiency, supra note 236, at 2209-12; 
Homer Kripke, Law and Economics:  Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a 
Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (1985); Schwarcz, Easy Case, supra note 236; Paul M. 
Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067 (1989). 
 242 Contributions to this body of literature are collected in Lipson, Remote Control, supra  note 
101, at 1403 n.403. 
 243 See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra  note 234, at  1154 n.46; Shupack, supra  note 241 
A curious feature of the economic analysis of commercial finance law—the “puzzle 
literature”—is its obsession with Modigliani and Miller, to the apparent exclusion of other economic 
concerns.  See William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships:  Legal Theory in a Time of 
Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 124 n.140 (“Oddly, the irrelevance hypothesis has had a 
stranglehold on commercial-law theory.”).  There is, as David Gray Carlson and others have 
observed, more to the economic story than simply a price-theory explanation of firm capitalization.  
See Carlson, Efficiency, supra  note 236, at 2198, 2211 (summarizing critiques); see also G. Ray 
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difficult to develop a satisfactory explanation for the persistence of 
secured credit on traditional price theory, a number of economically 
oriented writers have suggested the real virtue of secured credit lies in the 
informational value of these, as distinct from other, financing 
transactions.  Varieties of this theory appear in the work of, among others, 
Jackson and Kronman,244 Frank Buckley,245 Alan Schwartz,246 Barry 
Adler,247 Saul Levmore,248 and George Triantis.249  All have suggested 
that secured credit plays an important part in solving information 
asymmetries among a debtor and its various constituents and, implicitly, 
that information may play some role in assessing the efficiency of secured 
lending. 250  As Professor Triantis has explained, “[t]here is little doubt that 
when a firm secures a larger portion of its debt than similarly situated 
firms it communicates information of some sort to the market.”251 
Ironically, while economic analysis has been quick to recognize the 
link between property, information, and commercial finance law, it has 
been indifferent at best, and occasionally hostile, to established methods 
(i.e., financing statements) of signaling the existence of nonpossessory 
property interests, such as security interests.  It is this indifference which, 
at a theoretical level, may in part explain our increasing tolerance for 
secret liens. 
 
Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act:  Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 3, 
12 (2001) (“[A]lthough the economic analysis is useful in analyzing questions of allocative efficiency, 
it does not provide much insight into questions of distributive efficiency.”). 
 244 Jackson & Kronman, supra  note 234. 
 245 Frank H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1986). 
 246 See Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities:  A  Review of Current 
Theories, 10 J.  LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (1981) [hereinafter Schwartz, Review] (“A firm willing to 
encumber its assets is, thus, ‘signaling’ that, in its view, its prospects justify” the costs of secured 
credit); see also  Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities,  18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989 
[hereinafter Schwartz, Theory]; Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 1396 (1997). 
 247 Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 73 (1993). 
 248 Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE 
L.J. 49 (1982). 
 249 George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 225 (1992). 
 250 Information asymmetries arise whenever one party to a transaction possesses superior 
information.  See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency , 70 
VA. L. REV. 549, 595 n.134 (1984) (“The difficulty of assuring oneself of the value of purchased 
information has been recognized for some time.”); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs 
and Benefits of Ownership:  A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J.  POL. ECON. 691, 698 
(1986). 
 251 Triantis, supra note 249, at 255. 
 2005] Secrets and Liens 475 
1. Signaling 
One informational function a secured transaction might perform can 
be characterized as “signaling.”  Alan Schwartz initially suggested—but 
later rejected—the idea that a security interest would be a kind of “signal” 
because it would “restrict future borrowing opportunities, give secured 
creditors greater leverage over firm behavior, and make it more difficult 
for a firm to reschedule debts in the event of hard times.”252  A security 
interest might thus be an efficient signal to the world that a firm believes 
its prospects justify these costs.253  “The apparent property of a secured 
debt to communicate accurately to creditors a firm’s true estimate of its 
expected earnings indicates that the existence of secured debt may be 
explained as a signaling phenomenon.”254  Secured lending may thus be 
“a way” for debtors to “sort[] themselves out by risk class.”255 
Schwartz nevertheless had doubts about the signaling explanation.256  
First, he correctly observed that the strength of the signaling explanation 
depended on the knowledge that other creditors have of the risk 
preferences of the owners and managers of the debtor.257  But there is no 
particular reason to imagine that creditors will know this, or that such 
information is necessarily cheap and easy to obtain.258  Moreover, the 
signal may itself be ambiguous as to the quality of firm projects.259  If so, 
these informational ambiguities would infect the equilibrium obtained 
from viewing security interests as signals.260  The signal-to-noise ratio 
 
 252 Schwartz, Review, supra note 246, at 15.  Professor Buckley developed a related view that 
secured lending performs a “screening” function.  See Buckley, supra note 245, at 1421-1426.  
Buckley observed that if a debtor had only unsecured creditors, lenders would have to examine a 
debtor carefully to determine its liquidation value in a bankruptcy.  Id. at 1424.  This would be costly 
because, among other reasons, they would have to know of one another’s claims.  Inserting a secured 
creditor into the mix, however, would reduce the screening costs of unsecured creditors because they 
would assume that they would recover nothing if the debtor liquidated.  Id. (Where unsecured 
creditors assume that they recover nothing in bankruptcy, they “need not estimate how many other 
claims will be made on bankruptcy.”). 
 253 Schwartz, Review, supra note 246. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. at 17.  Judge Posn er makes a similar claim about the informational virtues of secured 
lending.  “Secured credit reduces the information costs of secured creditors while not raising, and 
possibly even reducing, the information costs of the unsecured creditors.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 436 (Aspen Law & Business 5th ed. 1998). 
 256 See Schwartz, Review, supra  note 246, at 18. 
 257 Id. at 17-18. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. at 18. 
 260 Id. 
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may not, in general, be great enough to justify the externalities created by 
secured lending.261 
2. Contractual Priority 
For purposes of this Article, Schwartz’s principal contribution on the 
information function of secured lending appeared in a 1989 article in 
which he argued that notice filing had little value as a means of conveying 
information about property interests in commercial finance transactions, 
at least so far as other creditors might be concerned.262  This followed 
from his view of the capital structure that rational parties would choose ex 
ante.263  Schwartz surmised that such parties would, absent legal 
intervention, choose highly rigid capital structures, which would always 
give the first lender priority in the debtor’s assets, subject to a limited 
purchase-money carve-out, whether or not the parties characterized the 
loan as being secured.264 
Schwartz began his analysis by surveying form books and 
practitioner guides, which indicated lenders often asked borrowers to 
agree to restrictive covenants that forbade later borrowing, subject to 
certain agreed-to exceptions , such as ordinary course trade debt.265  From 
the existence of these covenants, Schwartz concluded the “optimal 
contract” would give first financers priority over all (or most) later non-
ordinary course lenders.266  That is, the law should recognize what he 
called a “true first-in-time (FT)” rule, “that confers senior rank on the 
initial financer who just enters into a loan contract.”267 
The problem with such a system, Schwartz observed, was 
informational:  How would later creditors learn that the earlier creditor 
had priority? 268  How, in other words, would later creditors verify and 
measure other interests affecting the debtor’s property?269  Schwartz 
 
 261 Id. (“If a security-interest signal . . . actually tells creditors little about the riskiness of firm 
projects, too much signaling could occur in equilibrium; the total costs that firms incur in sending 
signals will exceed the total social gain generated by more appropriate credit extensions.”). 
 262 Schwartz, Theory, supra note 246. 
 263 Id. at  222. 
 264 See id. at 213 (“The UCC should give initial financers first priority, whether or not they are 
secured, except for a reduced purchase-money priority.”). 
 265 Id. at 216-18. 
 266 Id. at 218-19. 
 267 Id. at 219. 
 268 Id. 
 269 “The question is whether to adopt a true FT rule and thereby permit parties to create secret 
liens or to incur the expense of a new filing regime.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
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argued that in a true FT system, later creditors would learn of prior 
interests because debtors would want to inform them. 270  Schwartz 
reasoned that “sensibly conservative” lenders would assume that all or 
most debtors are “bad” and should therefore pay a high rate of interest.271  
Truly “good” debtors—those that should receive a low rate of interest—
would therefore have an incentive to distinguish themselves.272  “Good 
debtors,” Schwartz suggested, “could avoid paying the high interest rates 
that uninformed lenders would charge by informing the lenders that they 
had little or no prior debt.”273  The “key question,” Schwartz observed, 
was whether borrowers could “make credible communications of their 
debt status at acceptable cost.”274  He also observed that firms which 
borrow take the interest cost deduction. 275  A simple review of any given 
borrower’s income tax return would therefore reveal the existence of 
significant prior debt.276  Moreover, to the extent a debtor was required to 
report under federal securities laws, material indebtedness would likely be 
reported.277  In any case, Schwartz argued: 
[B]ecause private disclosure seems both cheap and common, there is no 
good case for retaining current law on the sole ground that implementing a 
new priority scheme would prohibitively increase the necessary costs of 
notifying creditors of the existence of prior claims in a borrower’s 
property. . . .  The expense to the parties of observing the borrower’s books, 
which is the primary marginal cost of a true FT rule, seems cheaper than 
the costs of a new public system. 278 
 It is not clear how a notice filing regime would work in a system 
with a true FT rule.  On the one hand, Schwartz seems to believe that a 
true FT rule could peacefully coexist with the extant notice filing 
regimes.279  While notice filing may no longer be necessary vis-à-vis other 
 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. at 220. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id.  He was thus not concerned with demarcating priority clearly, as might happen with a 
notice filing system.  “A true FT system probably would date priority from when the initial loan 
contract was legally effective.  This almost always will be when it is signed.”  Id. at 222 n.24. 
 275 Id. at 220. 
 276 Id. at 220-21. 
 277 Id. at 221. 
 278 Id. at 222. 
 279 Id. at 223 (“The conclusion that a true FT rule is preferable to creating a new filing system 
does not imply that the existing filing system should be abo lished.”). 
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creditors, it would, in his view, continue to perform an important function 
as to buyers of a debtor’s assets.280  Indeed, it could even persist as to 
creditors, although it would not likely have much value.281  On the other 
hand, it is not clear why creditors would bother to take security in a world 
in which it was always possible, and perhaps probable, that the debtor had 
a true FT creditor who would trump the later secured party.282  In a world 
with a true FT rule, secured creditors would be few and far between. 
Although Schwartz does not speak of the true FT system as if it 
would create encumbrances, he recognized its potential to create a secret 
lien problem. 283  Schwartz dismissed the problem, however, because 
“good debtors conveniently can separate themselves from bad debtors.”284  
First, he argued, “borrowers know that to commit fraud would require 
them to sustain credible lies against skilled inquirers for a considerable 
period of time.”285  Second, he reasoned that borrowers want to preserve 
good will; incorrect disclosures about the existence or not of a true FT 
lender would harm the debtor’s reputation. 286  Third, if the loan market 
were competitive, a separating equilibrium would develop in which the 
pooling rate of interest would tend to price in the assumption that 
borrowers had prior true FT debt.287  Truly debt-free borrowers would 
have an incentive to disclose credibly their debt-free status or risk 
“punishment” in the form of the higher pooling rate.288  Unless the cost of 
disclosure were enormous, he reasoned, it would be in the interest of 
 
 280 Id. (“Consequently, the FT rule should apply only to creditor disputes, and the filing system 
should be retained to regulate conflicts between financers and later buyers.”).  This creates an 
interesting problem:  How should it work in the presence of securitizations, which purport to sell 
assets? 
 281 Id. at 223-24 (“A . . . reason to retain the filing system is that filing has been considered a 
necessary condition to the perfection of security interests.  There is no good reason to ban security 
interests . . . .”). 
 282 Such a system might present practical problems.  If a debtor had a true FT creditor, the 
creditor’s effective interest in the debtor’s property would correspond to the amount of credit 
extended, which would presumably be an amount that could vary over time as the creditor made 
subsequent advances, as interest and other costs accrued, and as the debtor made principal and interest 
payments.  If a later creditor sought to take a security interest in an item of equipment it was selling to 
the debtor, it could never know for certain that the true FT would not make a subsequent advance that 
effectively primed the secured party. 
 283 See Schwartz, Theory, supra note 246, at 223-24. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. at 224. 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. at 225. 
 288 Id. at 224. 
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borrowers to convey accurately the truth about the interests others had in 
their property. 289 
Of the prominent economic writers, Schwartz’s analysis has the 
virtue of being the most forthright in its indifference to notice filing and 
the problem of secret liens.  The problem disappears, in Schwartz’s world, 
because markets and contracts will, over time, produce more efficient 
results than mandatory regimes like Article 9. 290  Schwartz’s position 
suffers, however, from the optimism that tends to afflict much hard 
economic analysis of commercial finance law.  There is simply no reason 
to believe debtors and creditors would behave in the ways that he 
predicted in a true FT system.  If nothing else, recent corporate scandals 
suggest that very sophisticated people can make serious mistakes about 
the real value of complex firms.  People can—and apparently will—use 
this complexity to conceal true firm value.  It has not been demonstrated 
that a true FT system would address and modify such behavior. 
Economic analysis of this sort is no longer cutting edge291 and has 
long been the subject of considerable skepticism.  Part of the problem 
appears to be that this analysis privileges contract in a way that many find 
questionable on normative or institutional grounds.292  Even on its own 
terms, much of the “low hanging fruit” promised by the economic study 
of law has been captured and devoured, in some cases digested and in 
other cases regurgitated.  Still, it is highly likely this type of economic 
thought has influenced the legislative trend away from notice filing.  An 
overarching goal of revising Article 9, for example, was to promote 
economic efficiency by making secured transactions easier, more certain, 
and theoretically cheaper.293  The Reporters for the committee that drafted 
Revised Article 9 explained it thus: 
 
 289 Id. at 224-25. 
 290 Id. 
 291 See Epstein, supra note 232. 
 292 See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 503; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795 
(2004). 
 293 Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of U.C.C. 
Article 9?:  Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1357 (1999); see Harry C. Sigman, 
Twenty Questions About Filing Under Revised Article 9:  The Rules of the Game Under New Part 5, 
74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 861 (1999) (Revised Article 9’s provisions are intended to “make filing office 
practices more efficient, transparent, and uniform.”); see also  Patrick A. Murphy, Revised Article 9 in 
Bankruptcy Cases, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE 
HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI  ORDER NUMBER A0-00HP  (Sept. 2003) (“The purpose of Revised Article 9 
is to simplify commercial transactions and, in the process, to make them more efficient and less likely 
to be upset in bankruptcy cases.”). 
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[M]any . . . provisions of Revised Article 9 reflect the Drafting 
Committee’s effort to achieve more than merely “better,” more “efficient,” 
“equitable,” or “reasonable” rules to govern secured transactions.  An 
overarching goal of the revisions was to provide in the transactional context 
enhanced certainty and predictability from the inception of transactions.  
This certainty can facilitate transactions even though an understandable 
rule with predictable consequences may be normatively suboptimal.294 
B. The Political Economy of Notice Filing 
As applied, economic arguments about notice filing have been fairly 
crude and somewhat counterintuitive.  After all, intuitively, we might 
think that notice filing is an efficient method of conveying information 
about property, especially to those outside of the debtor’s immediate 
community.  This, however, is not how our thinking has developed. 
1. Revenue Theory 
The crudest argument against notice filing involves the upfront, 
direct costs of the systems:  namely, that these systems are covert sources 
of revenue for the government.  There are many who view all schemes to 
require the recordation of interests in personal property as little more than 
state confiscation. 295  This is because most such regimes require the 
payment of a filing fee when the interest is recorded.  Professor Bowers, 
for example, has characterized the filing system under Article 9 as “little 
more than a rip-off”296 because “[t]he market for information could 
probably efficaciously do whatever the filing system bureaucracies do and 
at a lesser aggregate resource cost.”297  On this view, the UCC-1 system is 
simply the worst form of rent seeking, plagued by incompetent and 
indifferent bureaucrats who happen to be the brothers-in-law of politicians 
or obligees of political favors.298 
 
 294 See Harris & Mooney, supra note 293, at 1363. 
 295 See Alces, supra note 3, at 680; Bowers, supra note 48, at 724. 
 296 Bowers, supra note 48, at 722. 
 297 Id. at 725.  Bowers argues both that notice filing itself is little more than a tax on secured 
lending, id. at 733 (“The filing system consequently operates as if it were a tax on secured 
transactions.”), and that, if any notice system were appropriate, the market would better provide this 
information than the government.  Id. at 734 (“A properly privatized system, for example, encourages 
those who own the system to adopt any advantageous technologies, without a legislative mandate.”). 
 298 Id. at 724. 
 2005] Secrets and Liens 481 
There is no question that these systems are important sources of 
revenue for the states and localities that maintain them, and this has long 
been true.299  Some of the earliest recordation statutes were enacted 
largely, if not wholly, on the theory they would feed the public fisc.  One 
of the earlier recording statutes, the Statute for the Enrollment of Bargains 
and Sales promulgated under Henry VIII, requiring the recordation of 
transfers of title to real property, was allegedly intended as a revenue 
statute.300  Professor Mooney has indicated that the same can be said of 
the first fraudulent conveyance statute, the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, which, 
he argues, was “intended in large part as a revenue measure.”301 
To characterize notice filing as a deal tax is, of course, to stigmatize 
it.  Most commercial lawyers view taxes suspiciously, regardless of the 
value one might ascribe to good government.  Yet, the proper question is 
not whether filing imposes costs—it imposes many—but whether it is 
worth the price paid.  For the reasons discussed more fully below, sub 
rosa taxation cannot be a complete, or even particularly good, explanation 
for the rise and persistence of public notice systems. 
First, if raising revenue were the only or most important goal of 
filing systems, one would expect that legislatures would never have 
enacted the revisions to Article 9 or the securitization facilitation acts, all 
of which tend to reduce or eliminate the obligation to file revenue 
generating notice in commercial finance transactions.  Indeed, one of the 
reasons Article 9 is viewed as a triumph of efficiency is the fact that it 
reduced the obligation to file financing statements in multiple states or on 
a county-by-county basis—often required under former law—which 
necessarily reduced aggregate revenue to the state filing authorities.302 
Second, and perhaps more important, there are, as discussed infra, a 
number of plausible substantive rationales for requiring public notice of 
security interests.303  It would appear, for example, that notice filing 
developed as a proxy for information about property that would otherwise 
 
 299 Paul M. Shupack, On Boundaries and Definitions:  A Commentary on Dean Baird , 80 VA. L. 
REV. 2273, 2273 n.1 (1994) (indicating under former Article 9, UCC-1 filing system produced net 
gain to states of between $300,000,000 and $400,000,000 annually). 
 300 See Bowers, supra note 48, at 731-32 (citing Statute of Enrollments, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, c. 16). 
 301 Mooney, Myth , supra note 33, at 726 n.162 (citing 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 61b, 61c, at 89-93 (rev. ed. 1940)). 
 302 Prior law—including earlier iterations of Article 9—was generally viewed as requiring more 
filings in more offices than revised Article 9 because, among other reasons, former law occasionally 
required that financing statements be filed not only at the state level, but also by county.  See U.C.C. 
§ 9-401 (2000). 
 303 See supra Part IV. 
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be readily available in tightly knit communities.304  While we do not know 
the costs of this information in all cases, we know that as a general matter, 
property rights are, or should be, cheaply and readily discoverable.  
Moreover, the availability of such information—and the fact that it must 
be made available—may have important behavioral effects that have not 
been accounted for. 
In short, it is difficult to imagine that legislatures are able to enact 
covert revenue regimes without any supporting principle.  These 
rationales may vary in force, but they all suggest that raising revenue 
alone cannot explain why public notice is adjunct to certain types of 
property transfers. 
2. Rational Apathy:  Charlie Don’t Surf  
A second argument against notice filing focuses on the benefit side 
of the equation and argues that few actually care about notice filing—
especially those historically characterized as its principal beneficiaries:  
unsecured trade creditors.  Except for actual or potential secured 
creditors—those who are said formally to “rely” on the debtor’s 
property—the general population of creditors is apathetic to the 
information provided by the notice filing system—and rationally so. 
Professor White, for example, has argued that certain members of the 
presumed audience for financing statement information could  not, in fact, 
care less: 
Neither the plumber, carpenter, accountant, Commonwealth Edison nor any 
other thousands of general creditors check the files to determine who has a 
financing statement on file before it decides whether it will extend 
unsecured credit in the form of the sale of goods or services.  In the words 
of the trade, these are “non-reliance creditors” and are not entitled to 
protection of a lack of filing because they would not rely on it in any 
case.305 
Professor Baird similarly claims “the notice filing system of Article 9 
provides virtually no assistance to unsecured creditors.  Parties without 
ownership interests in the debtor’s property rarely check the filing system, 
and if they do, they rarely learn anything.”306 
 
 304 See supra Part IV.B. 
 305 White, Wasteful Litigation, supra note 119, at 827.  
 306 Baird, Ostensible Ownership, supra note 23, at 55.  This is a curious statement.  It is true the 
UCC defines secured creditors as a species of “purchaser,” lumping them together with those who 
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Professor LoPucki has offered a slightly more systemic gloss, 
arguing that unsecured creditors often do little more than “cash-flow 
surf.”307  As discussed supra, cash-flow surfing happens when unsecured 
creditors make small, short-term extensions of credit, hoping that the 
debtor will be able to pay the debt from cash flow in the ordinary 
course.308  These creditors may reason that the debtor’s assets are already 
fully encumbered, or that they are worth nothing, or that it is simply not 
worth making a credit decision based on such complex analyses.  Apathy 
to the information produced by the system is rational because learning 
about what is out there costs more than it is worth.  The unsecured 
creditor expects to be repaid not because it relies on the value of any 
particular asset, but as the result of “a combination of nonlegal pressures 
on the debtor.”309  The involuntary creditor—the tort claimant or 
terminated employee—is certainly not going to care much, ex ante, about 
what the public record says about nonpossessory interests in the debtor’s 
property.  Having not chosen to extend credit, involuntary, “non-
adjusting,” creditors can hardly be said to have relied on a debtor’s assets 
or publicly available information about those assets.310 
Those who assert a general indifference to filed notice are often 
quick to distinguish between two hypothetical audiences.  While trade and 
other “simple” creditors will not consult the record, other more 
sophisticated creditors—in particular, secured creditors—will. 311  The 
claim is thus not usually that the notice filing system should be 
dismantled entirely, only that it should not be geared to an audience that 
does not use it.312  Notice should matter only to “reliance” creditors, who 
are presumed to be those who have taken security or similar interests in a 
debtor’s property.313 
 
acquire their interests by sale or “any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.”  
U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(29) (2003).  But most people who think about commercial finance law appear to 
recognize that secured transactions are different in kind from “ownership.” 
 307 See LoPucki, Creditor’s Bargain , supra note 131, at 1923, 1938-39. 
 308 Id. at 1924. 
 309 Id. at 1941. 
 310 Professor Gilmore has observed that some of the drafters suggested that no one—not even 
lenders—truly relied on the pre-Code notice filing systems.  Rather, the decision to extend credit was 
based “not on public records, but on financial statements—balance sheets and profit and loss 
statements.”  GILMORE , supra  note 8, at § 15.1, at  463.  In his view, the “[p]ublic files . . . will be 
rarely consulted.”  Id. 
 311 See discussion supra notes 139-41. 
 312 See supra  notes 305-06.  Professor Schwartz’s theory of a “true FT ” priority system would, 
as discussed supra  notes 252-90 and accompanying text, appear to be an exception. 
 313 As Douglas Baird argued, 
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Professor Baird has argued that “general creditors rely only in part 
on the debtor’s assets when extending credit.  General creditors base their 
decision to lend on the debtor’s general financial health, of which a 
present or potential encumbrance on the debtor’s property is only one 
factor.”314  Moreover, he claimed, “[c]ases in which creditors decide to 
lend because of their mistaken belief that an asset is unencumbered are 
rare.”315  Thus, he concluded, “the needs of general creditors neither 
justify the costs of the present filing system nor explain its contours.”316 
Arguments against notice filing based on claims about who does or 
does not rely on it are curious and troublesome for at least three reasons.  
First, these are often empirical claims about actual behavior in the real 
world.  Professors White and Baird may be correct that “the dross of 
Article 9” (White’s colorful phrase)317 are wholly indifferent to the 
presence or absence of filed notice about nonpossessory interests in a 
debtor’s property, whether because they make their credit decisions on 
other grounds or because they have no choice at all.  But they may also be 
wrong.  It may, in fact, be the case that involuntary creditors check the 
financing statement system, not when they incur their claims, but when 
they make decisions about whether to sue, settle, or try a case.  Indeed, 
most claims about who the audience is for this information should be 
empirically verifiable.  Yet, these claims have not, to date, been tested, at 
least in any rigorous and public way. 
Second, there is reasonably good anecdotal evidence that many less 
traditional lenders use the system for a variety of purposes.  In certain 
transactions, parties may use these systems as bulletin boards to ward off 
those who might try to take an interest in the debtor’s property, even 
though the filers themselves have no such interest.  For example, Edwin 
Smith, a leading practitioner, has indicated that a lender benefiting from a 
“negative pledge” might file a financing statement, even though such a 
 
the notice filing system of Article 9 provides virtually no assistance to unsecured creditors.  
Parties without ownership interests in the debtor’s property rarely check the filing system, 
and if they do, they rarely learn anything.  Article 9’s filing system principally serves the 
interests of secured creditors. . . .  A notice filing system . . . sorts out property claims 
among those who have or seek property claims; its function is not to give the world at 
large notice of security interests. 
Baird, Ostensible Ownership, supra  note 23, at 55. 
 314 Id. at 60. 
 315 Id. at 60. 
 316 Id. at 62. 
 317 White, Wasteful Litigation, supra note 119, at 827. 
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transaction would not necessarily result in the staking of a claim by the 
lender.318 
Paul Shupack has suggested that in certain contexts, trade creditors 
rely on a clean record in deciding whether to ship to a debtor who has 
promised not to encumber its inventory. 319  Trade creditors, Shupack 
observed, might “view the debtor’s use of inventory as security as a 
public statement of the debtor’s financial distress, particularly if the 
debtor had not previously done so.”320  Others have suggested that 
equipment lenders would “trawl” the financing statement records, looking 
for financing statements that were about to expire.321  Reasoning that the 
loans covered by the financing statements were about to expire, they 
might then contact the debtors indicated in those financing statements in 
order to “sell” replacement financing. 322  Professor Carlson has argued 
that the notice filing system may have performed a kind of antitrust 
 
 318 Smith explained: 
I have seen this technique used on various occasions for negative pledge agreements and 
subordination agreements.  In the case of a negative pledge agreement, of course, it is in 
the interest of the creditor in whose favor the negative pledge is granted to put other 
creditors on notice of the existence of a negative pledge.  In the case of a lender filing a 
subordination, it is in the interest of the debtor to provide comfort to a new senior creditor 
extending credit to the debtor that the senior creditor will in fact be senior.  Although 
neither example fits squarely into the original purposes of the Article 9 filing system, it 
seems to me that the commercial “bulletin board” approach, by providing even additional 
information about the debtor than that required by the Article 9 filing system, is useful.  
And, as the examples indicate, can benefit either the creditor or the debtor depending on 
the particular circumstances.  
Alces, supra  note 3, at 696 (quoting Letter from Edwin E. Smith, Bingham, Dana & Gould, to 
Professor Peter A. Alces, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary 1-2 (July 
31, 1991)); see also  Posting of Kenneth C. Kettering, Filing a Financing Sta tement on a Negative 
Pledge, ucclaw-l@lists.washlaw.edu. (Feb. 8, 2005), available at http://lists.washlaw.edu/ 
mailman/private/ucclaw-l/2005-February/subject.html) (“I agree that such a filing can’t hurt and 
might help Lender-1, and I’m surprised that I didn’t see more such filings when I was in private 
practice.”) (copy on file with author). 
 319 Paul M. Shupack, Preferred Capital Structures and the Question of Filing, 79 MINN. L. REV. 
787, 803-07 (1995). 
 320 Id. at 806.  This makes sense only if the trade creditors do not understand purchase-money 
priority, or rationally conclude (for any number of reasons) that the mechanics involved in obtaining 
that “super” priority are not worth the effort.  Shupack suggests certain trade creditors may not find 
purchase-money priority attractive because, among other things, “these sellers have a visceral feeling 
that the inventory should be ‘theirs’ because they supplied it . . . .”  Id. at 805. 
 321 See e-mail from Howard Ruda, attorney, to author (July 21, 2003) (“There was a time (and 
perhaps still is) when UCC (and predecessor) records were searched for marketing information.”) (on 
file with author). 
 322 Id. 
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function, preventing local lenders from gaining a strangle -hold on 
borrowers, to the exclusion of national lenders.323 
Third, and perhaps most important from a policy perspective, there 
are reasons other than current, direct usage that justify the system.  Most 
prominent of these would be the credit reporting systems maintained by 
firms like Dun & Bradstreet.324  As discussed supra, it is likely that even 
if general unsecured creditors do not routinely check the records 
maintained by the secretary of state when deciding whether to extend 
credit, they may well consult services whose information does depend, in 
part, on this information.325  While these systems may be expected to 
continue to grow in sophistication, there is no reason to believe they 
would be more effective if they have access to less, and less reliable, 
information about the companies they cover. 
3. Redistribution Theory 
Perhaps the greatest reason to challenge the view that creditors are 
apathetic is that it is disingenuous.  That is, the real concern of those who 
grouse about the notice filing system is not that creditors ignore it, but 
that the penalty for failing to comply with it is excessive.  As discussed 
above, this penalty derives from the strong-arm power of Bankruptcy 
Code § 544(a), which provides that the bankruptcy trustee “shall have . . . 
the rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the 
debtor . . . that is voidable by . . . a creditor that . . . obtains . . . a judicial 
lien” on the property in question.326  This power has often been used 
arbitrarily, in the sense that a lender might lose its lien even though there 
was, in fact, no real information failure.327  Thus, Professor Bowers has 
argued, “[t]here is good reason to believe that bankruptcy legislation is 
 
 323 Professor Carlson explained: 
By providing information to the national credit market, Article 9 filing improves 
competition in the credit market generally . . . .  [T]he system socializes a useful screening 
function, thus depriving local creditors of an advantage over national creditors.  But this 
rationale presumes a context that may no longer be empirically correct.  For example, 
where it is generally known that assets are always encumbered by security interests, a 
filing system may serve no useful screening function.  Or, the filing system may simply 
cost too much, as many now allege.  In these contexts, filing systems might violate the 
logic upon which they are founded, in which case reform is in order. 
Carlson, Debt Collection, supra note 120, at 831. 
 324 See supra discussion accompanying note 130. 
 325 See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text. 
 326 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2000). 
 327 See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text. 
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intended mainly to chisel secured creditors out of their bargains.”328  
Notice filing has existed “mostly [as] insurance against bankruptcy” 329 or 
as a “bankruptcy tax” on secured transactions.330 
There is no question that the strong-arm power to redistribute wealth 
imposes costs on certain parties.  The important question, however, is 
whether the costs imposed by the strong-arm power exceed the benefits 
that might flow from compliance with the notice filing rules.  I think, in 
this instance, the balance sheet becomes difficult to assess, especially 
when there is no secret lien.  Where the community of creditors knows or 
has reason to know that a debtor’s property is encumbered, it is difficult 
to see the efficiencies that would result from ex post avoidance on purely 
technical grounds.  By definition, cognizant creditors will choose to 
extend credit informed of the economic risks that the secured party had 
priority; it is not clear how the parties or society benefit economically if 
these creditors are not required to internalize these risks because a court 
later avoids the security interest for technical reasons not apparent or 
relevant to the parties ex ante. 
Conversely, where a secured party or other investor has priority in 
the debtor’s assets that is not known or readily discoverable, the more 
formal attributes of the notice filing system may become important for the 
same basic reasons.  Voluntary creditors that extend credit based on 
signif icant information asymmetries—who, for example, lend against 
secretly encumbered data or intellectual property—are being forced to 
transfer value to secured creditors who have no rational incentive to make 
their property interests known.  This is because the holder of the secret 
lien might want its debtor to acquire as much property as possible from 
creditors who would not otherwise choose to lend or sell on credit if they 
knew the debtor’s true economic risks. 
The problem with all of the economic arguments marshaled against 
notice filing thus far is that they are largely speculative.  They are based 
on assumptions made about human behavior (who looks at the financing 
 
 328 See Bowers, supra note 48, at 733. 
 329 See White, supra note 1, at 531.  Professor White’s statement is a bit tendentious because 
filing is insurance against only one form of loss:  that caused by the strong-arm power.  But, secured 
creditors often lose their collateral or its value.  The ordinary course rules expressly contemplate the 
loss of rights in collateral by “cutting off” security interests when there has been a complying (e.g., 
“ordinary course”) disposition.  See U.C.C. §§ 9-320, 9-321 (2003).  Similarly, the security interest 
itself is worth only as much as the underlying property.  While collateral may insure against the risk 
the debtor will not have sufficient unencumbered assets to service the debt, there is little about filing 
that “insures” the value of the security interest. 
 330 See Bowers, supra note 48, at 733. 
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statement records), cognition (what will they understand from their 
review), and risk preferences (creditors may, or may not, adjust based on 
the information thus obtained).  An empirical analysis may well fill in 
some of the blanks that many have chosen to ignore.  Yet, even if an 
empirical analysis reveals who uses the notice filing system, it does not 
tell us whether they should, or whether notice filing systems produce 
benefits or costs not yet captured by the economic analysis. 
IV. THREE ARGUMENTS AGAINST SECRET LIENS AND IN FAVOR OF 
NOTICE FILING 
Until we have an empirical analysis of the notice filing systems, it 
remains important to understand what is lost by moving away from them.  
This Part develops three arguments against secret liens and in favor of 
notice filing that have not yet been considered.  First, this Part assesses 
the role of notice filing through the lens of recent developments in 
property theory, which emphasize the information costs of property rights 
that are difficult to discover.  Second, it considers the role that 
information about property plays more generally in commercial 
communities.  Finally, this Part applies some of the literature on cognitive 
theory to the problem of secret liens and notice filing. 
A. Neoclassical Property Theory and Information Costs 
To tolerate secret liens is to challenge a deep intuition in our law, 
which links property rights to public notice obligations.  Strong claims 
about this intuition have been made by, among others, Richard Epstein,331 
Carol Rose,332 Douglas Baird, and Thomas Jackson.333  Most recently, 
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have elaborated on this intuition in what 
may be characterized as a neoclassical approach to property law theory. 334  
They argue that property rights are unique because they create “universal 
duties” that “are broadcast to the world from the [property] itself.”335 
 
 331 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1355-56 (1982). 
 332 See, e.g., Rose, Possession, supra  note 22, 78-79. 
 333 See, e.g. , Baird & Jackson, Information Uncertainty, supra note 23, at 312 (“Filing systems 
work because the legal rules provide not only a benefit to a person who desires to acquire a property 
right but also a corresponding responsibility.  One is obliged to stake one’s claim in the filing system 
so that future parties will be able to find it.”). 
 334 See Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics, supra  note 12. 
 335 Id. at 359. 
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1. The Numerus Clausus 
Neoclassical views about the notice function of property are rooted 
in the “numerus clausus,” the idea that property rights come in a fixed and 
closed number of forms.  “Property law,” Merrill and Smith argue, 
“requires that the parties adopt one of a limited number of standard forms 
that define the legal dimensions of their relationship; generally speaking, 
these are mandatory rules that may not be modified by mutual 
agreement.”336  The number (numerus) of property forms is, in the 
vernacular, closed (clausus) because “common-law courts will not enforce 
an agreement to create a new type of property right.”337 
The numerus clausus appears to be a well-articulated feature of many 
civil law jurisdictions.338  In the common law, however, its role is more 
opaque.  Although courts and lawyers are characterized as hostile to the 
numerus clausus, Merrill and Smith contend they “routinely abide by the 
principle, even if they are unaware of its existence.”339  For example, as to 
estates in land, “courts enforce the numerus clausus principle strictly. . . .  
The menu of forms is regarded as complete and not subject to 
additions.”340  With respect to personal property, Merrill and Smith claim 
the list is even narrower.341  They argue that the chief exception—the one 
area in which courts will respect novel claims of property rights—is in the 
intellectual property arena.342  Here, “judicial creativity in fashioning new 
intellectual-property interests has been sanctioned” in recognizing rights 
of publicity and misappropriation of information.343 
The principal explanation for the sub rosa vitality of the numerus 
clausus is economic, oriented around the inefficiency that stems from the 
excessive fragmentation of rights or rights holders.344  Merrill and Smith 
 
 336 Merrill & Smith, Interface, supra note 19, at 776. 
 337 See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Property, supra  note 19, at 5. 
 338 See id . at 4-5 (In civil law countries the numerus clausus is “widely acknowledged by 
commentators as being a substantive limitation on the definition of property . . . .”). 
 339 Id. at 8.  “Scholars and judges tend to react to manifestations of the numerus clausus as if it 
were nothing more than outmoded formalism.”  Id. at 6. 
 340 Id. at 13. 
 341 Id. at 17 (“Personal property is restricted to fewer available forms of ownership than real 
property.”). 
 342 Id. at 19. 
 343 Id. 
 344 Merrill and Smith appear concerned chiefly with the fragmentation of rights themselves.  A 
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Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 79, 87 (2001); Michael A. Heller, 
The Tragedy of the Anticommons:  Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 
633-40 (1998). 
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take the economic explanation one step further, arguing that we restrict 
property forms not out of concerns about fragmentation, per se, but about 
information costs associated with the creation of excessively idiosyncratic 
property rights (“fancies”).345  Thus, Merrill and Smith believe that the 
need for the numerus clausus “stems from an externality involving 
measurement costs:  Parties who create new property rights will not take 
into account the full magnitude of the measurement costs they impose on 
strangers to the title.”346 
The information costs of idiosyncratic property forms explain for 
Merrill and Smith the underlying basis of the numerus clausus.347  “One 
way to control the external costs of measurement to third parties is 
through compulsory standardization of property rights.”348  According to 
Merrill and Smith, the standardization of property forms imposed by the 
numerus clausus  
reduces the costs of measuring the attributes of such rights.  Limiting the 
number of basic property forms allows a market participant or a potential 
violator to limit his or her inquiry to whether the interest does or does not 
have the features of the forms on the menu.  Fancies not on the closed list 
need not be considered because they will not be enforced.  When it comes 
to the basic legal dimensions of property, limiting the number of forms thus 
makes the determination of their nature less costly.  The “good” in question 
here might be considered to be the prevention of error in ascertaining the 
attributes of property rights.  Standardization means less measurement is 
required to achieve a given amount of error prevention.  Alternatively, one 
can say that standardization increases the productivity of any given level of 
measurement efforts.349 
There is, on this view, an “optimal” number of property forms, and this 
number is determined by the information costs associated with 
excessively idiosyncratic forms of property.  On the one hand, costs in 
 
 345 Merrill and Smith refer to idiosyncratic property forms as “fancies” after the opinion in 
Keppell v. Bailey, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1049 (Ch. 1834) (“[N]ovel forms of property cannot ‘be 
devised and attached to property at the fancy or caprice of any owner.’”).  Merrill & Smith, Optimal 
Property, supra note 19, at 25 nn.102-04. 
 346 Merrill & Smith, Optimal Property, supra note 19, at 26-27. 
 347 Merrill and Smith use the example of a one hour time-share in a wrist-watch.  Id. at 27.  Note 
that UCC,  Article 2A, would appear to recognize the time-share in the watch as a lease.  See U.C.C. § 
2A-103 (2000).  UCC § 2A-103(j) defines a lease as “a transfer of the right to possession and use of 
goods for a term in return for consideration.”  There is no apparent reason why the “term” of the lease 
could not be every Monday for one year.  It might be fanciful and inefficient, but it is permissible. 
 348 Merrill & Smith, Optimal Property, supra note 19, at 33. 
 349 Id. at 33-34 (footnotes omitted). 
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error and measurement would be lowest, Merrill and Smith observe, in a 
highly regimented system, which recognizes only a single, simple form of 
property, such as the fee simple absolute.350  However, frustration costs 
arising from stymied creativity would be quite high.  On the other hand, a 
system of unfettered customization of property forms—pure contract—
may have low frustration costs—it is difficult to be frustrated if the law 
recognizes anything you do—but high costs of verification and 
measurement.  Both the parties that created the fancy, and others who 
might try to discover what it is and what rights are held in it, will expend 
large sums in ascertaining and managing these rights.  The social cost of 
limitless customization of property rights is simply too great.  The optimal 
level of customization—the number and type of fancies permitted by the 
numerus clausus—is somewhere in between and should result in the 
lowest information cost. 
The information problems addressed in this Article are not 
specifically about novel property forms and, thus, not directly about the 
numerus clausus.  Neither the Article 9 security interest nor, arguably, 
asset securitization depend for their effectiveness upon the recognition of 
novel property forms.351  Yet, the underlying informational problem is the 
same:  Notice filing systems may channel transaction forms in ways that 
pure contract would not.  For example, lawyers likely structure 
commercial finance transactions bearing in mind the specific collateral 
types established by Article 9.352  Article 9 does not, as noted above, 
rigidly require that secured transactions within its scope be described 
according to the property designations established by statute.  Yet, it 
would appear that lawyers are very mindful of these categories and 
intentionally depart from them only rarely. 353  To the extent these 
categories create shorthand descriptions of specific types of rights with 
respect to specific types of property, they perform a function at least 
analogous to that of the numerus clausus.  To the extent we abandon 
 
 350 Id. at 39-40. 
 351 See id.  Note, however, that asset securit izations may present a challenge to the numerus 
clausus to the extent the problem of true sale generally challenges established property categories.  
 352 I base this claim not only on personal experience, but also on repeated and extensive 
discussions on the UCC-LAW listserv about the proper methods of describing collateral and the risks 
of using non-UCC terms in collateral descriptions.  See, e.g., Posting of Michael Evan Avidon, UCC 
Financing Statement Collateral Descriptions, to ucclaw-l@lists. washlaw.edu (Dec. 9, 2004), 
available at http://lists.washlaw.edu/mailman/private/ucclaw-/2004-December/ 010996.html (copy on 
file with author). 
 353 Id. 
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notice filing, therefore, we should drive up the cost of obtaining 
information about the types of, and interests in, property. 
Merrill and Smith’s view of the existence of, and rationale for, the 
numerus clausus is not without critics.  In a recent article, Henry 
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman question the neoclassical assertion that 
the list of property forms is closed or that there may be an “optimal” 
number of property forms.354  Rather, they argue “[t]he law’s limitations 
on property rights take the form not of standardization in a discreet 
number of well-defined forms, but rather of regulation of the types and 
degree of notice required to establish different types of property rights.”355  
They argue that non-standard property rights are recognized by the 
common law, but “are simply governed by highly unaccommodating 
verification rules that place a heavy burden on the holder of the right to 
provide notice to third parties.”356  They argue that “[t]he optimal 
standardization theory makes little sense when applied at the category 
level.”357  By this, they appear to mean that a highly idiosyncratic form of 
property right in one category—say, intellectual property—should not 
create meaningful information costs for property in another category, such 
as real estate.358  Even within categories, increasing the number and 
complexity of rights will not necessarily increase costs signif icantly, 
assuming “the same verification rules are used” for types of rights within 
the given category.359 
2. Property as Information 
Perhaps the key point about the numerus clausus is informational:  
The forced standardization of property forms creates a kind of shorthand 
which, in turn, reduces information costs.  “When we encounter a thing 
that is marked in the conventional manner as being owned,” Merrill and 
Smith write, “we know that we are subject to certain negative duties of 
 
 354 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 19. 
 355 Id. at 374. 
 356 Id. at 399. 
 357 Id. at 401. 
 358 Id. 
 359 Id.  Nor does the numerus clausus account for the creation and destruction of property forms 
over time.  Michael Heller, for example, has observed that property law in Blackstone’s time 
recognized a variety of forms that have since fallen away.  Michael Heller, The Boundaries of Private 
Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1176 n.62 (1998) (“In Blackstone’s time, the numerus clausus was 
much more numerous, populated with incorporeal hereditaments such as corodies and advowdsons 
that no longer exist. . . .  Over time, these forms were pared down to the streamlined list that exists 
today.”) (citations omitted). 
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abstention with respect to that thing . . . .”360  Because the thing has been 
“marked,” “we know all this without having any idea who the owner of 
the thing actually is.”361  Property law creates “universal duties” that are 
“broadcast to the world from the thing itself.”362 
In one sense, the problem of secret liens challenges this claim.  If 
property, in fact, always conveyed sufficient information to “broadcast 
universal duties,” we would never have secret lien problems.  The mere 
existence of property would somehow warn those who might otherwise be 
duped.  Yet, we know that history is replete with examples of such 
mistakes, which often arise from secret liens.  Perhaps the claim is 
therefore more modest, i.e., that property law essentially “presents a 
massive coordination problem.”363  As Merill and Smith discuss, 
 
[i]f the legal system allowed in rem rights to exist in a large variety of 
forms, then dutyholders would have to acquire and process more 
information whenever they encountered something that is protected by an 
in rem right.  If in rem rights were freely customizable—in the way in 
personam contract rights are—then the information-cost burden would 
quickly become intolerable.  Each dutyholder would either incur great 
costs in informing herself, or would be forced to violate property rights 
wholesale, defeating the benefits of security, investment, and planning that 
these rights were meant to secure.364 
 
The problem is that our commercial finance law would appear 
inclined to increase—not decrease—the costs of discovery precisely 
because transactions are increasingly customizable and decreasingly 
subject to mandatory notice rules.  To the extent that contract alone—
whether the control agreement or the pooling and servicing agreement in a 
securitization—effectively transfers whole or partial interests in property, 
we either make these more expensive to discover or more likely subject to 
violation.  To the extent that Article 9 and securitization facilitation 
statutes govern the creation and transfer of property rights, they do not, 
contrary to Merrill and Smith’s claim, “reduce the widespread 
information-gathering and processing costs imposed on third 
 
 360 Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 12, at 359. 
 361 Id.  “Marking” was at least one of the problems encountered by Twyne in his eponymous 
case.  See Twyne’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).  Twyne’s Case is discussed supra  in 
Part I.B.1. 
 362 Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 12, at 359. 
 363 Id. at 387. 
 364 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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parties . . . .”365  Rather, at least for the transactions discussed in this 
Article, they would appear to increase these costs. 
Although Hansmann and Kraakman disagree with the neocla ssical 
conclusion that the forms of property rights are, and economically-
speaking must be, limited, they whole -heartedly endorse the link that 
Merrill and Smith make between property rights and notice, which they 
call “verification.”366  However, Merrill and Smith err, they argue, by 
suggesting that notice is required to facilitate communication among 
persons who transact in property rights.367  Hansmann and Kraakman 
argue that limitations on the types of property “facilitate verification of 
ownership of the rights offered for conveyance.”368  Notice and property 
rights are correlated because “[t]he degree of notice required and the 
extent to which the law affirmatively facilitates the giving of notice vary 
across different types of property rights according to the utility of the 
partitioning and the costs of giving notice.”369  In other words, “[b]ecause 
the benefits of partial property rights are often low and the costs of 
verifying those rights are generally high, property law necessarily takes an 
unaccommodating approach to all but a few basic categories of partial 
property rights.”370 
Perhaps the most important—or most common—partial property 
interest is the security interest.  If the trend away from notice filing is as 
described supra in Part II of this Article, then we are in fact taking an 
increasingly accommodating approach to increasingly hard-to-discover 
property rights.  Neither Merrill and Smith nor Hansmann and Kraakman 
express a strong opinion about how property information should be 
disseminated.  Merrill and Smith seem to believe, for example, that notice 
filing systems generally are cheap sources of information about property 
rights.371  They offer as an example the Article 9 financing statement 
system which, they claim, “allowed the loosening of the earlier quite strict 
limits on the types of security interests permitted.”372 
It may be that the neoclassicists are not commercial lawyers, and so 
they do not focus on the technical details of trends in financing techniques 
 
 365 Id. 
 366 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 382-85. 
 367 Id. at 374-75. 
 368 Id. at 374. 
 369 Id. at 374-75. 
 370 Id. at 375. 
 371 See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Property, supra  note 19, at 40 (“[R]egisters of interests in real 
property, that is, recording acts . . . lower[] the costs of notice . . . .”). 
 372 Id. at 42 (footnote omitted). 
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and how these trends might influence, or be influenced by, developments 
in thinking about property law.  But it may also be that the trend in 
commercial finance law is mistaken to the extent it ignores the 
information cost lessons of the neoclassical analysis.  If we are to take the 
neoclassical position seriously, it invites us to see how the abandonment 
of notice filing creates two related categories of information cost.  First, 
as suggested above, notice filing may perform a channeling function that 
creates a shorthand means of describing information about property. 373  
Lawyers who deviate from the UCC’s collateral types in their financing 
statements risk avoidance under the strong-arm power.374  If, however, 
they have nothing to file at all, then the parties are (or should be) free to 
describe the collateral idiosyncratically, even if the description might not 
make sense to (or be discoverable by) third parties.375  Although it is 
obviously possible to discover and interpret such transactions and 
interests via contract and due diligence, it is likely to be more costly the 
more stylized and elliptical the information is. 
Second, the secret-lien-creating transactions discussed above subvert 
the basic information function of property.  In a world where property 
increasingly has no physical attributes such that it “broadcasts” anything 
about or from itself, it becomes important to find cheap and effective 
means of managing the information costs created by the massive 
coordination problem that Merrill and Smith identify. 376  While we may 
someday live in a world in which the Dun & Bradstreets have computers 
that are sufficiently sophisticated and reliable to render notice filing 
vestigial, we are not there yet.  Those who, like Alan Schwartz, view 
skeptically the public notice filing system may be correct that in a better 
world “good” debtors will tell the truth and the costs of ferreting out 
“bad” debtors will be comparatively low.377  Today, however, it would 
seem that the neoclassicists have the intuitively more appealing position:  
The increased use of contract (e.g., through control security interests and 
 
 373 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text. 
 374 See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text. 
 375 TKO Equip. Co. v. C& G Coal Co., 863 F.2d 541, 545 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(“Under the prevailing will theory of contract, parties, like Humpty Dumpty, may use words as they 
please.  If they wish the symbols ‘one Caterpillar D9G tractor’ to mean ‘500 railroad cars full of 
watermelons,’ that’s fine—provided parties share this weird meaning.”); see Smith, supra note 19, at 
1183-84 (discussing the TKO case and observing, “[a]s is the concern with the numerus clausus 
principle and the recording acts, subsequent purchasers and lenders cannot be expected to share the 
secret knowledge of the parties.  And [as] this concern becomes more acute, the broader this third-
party audience becomes.”). 
 376 See Merrill & Smith, Law & Economics, supra note 12, at 387. 
 377 See supra notes 271-90 and accompanying text. 
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asset securitization) will increase the costs of discovering these property 
interests. 
B. Merchant Community Norms 
Increased information costs are not the only troublesome byproduct 
of the trend away from notice filing.  There are other, less overtly 
economic, costs created by this trend.  One involves the role of notice 
filing systems in and across contemporary commercial communities. 
As discussed supra in Part I, one way to understand the rise of notice 
filing systems is as a response to increasing social complexity:  As the 
world became more complex, more formalized information systems (e.g., 
notice filing) arose both to convey information about property and to 
control members’ uses of that property.  For example, the title registry 
systems used in Massachusetts before the American Revolution existed 
both to deal with fraudulent conveyances and to regulate the admission of 
new members to the community. 378  Notice filing can be seen in part as a 
response to community transgressions that may flow from separating 
property from information about it.  But community also implies a set of 
understandings about the development and distribution of information.  
Those within a community, the idea seems to be, will have access to, and 
the means of interpreting, certain kinds of information.  Those who are 
not members of the community will not. 
We know something about how at least some contemporary 
communities deal with information about the property rights of their 
members.  The work of writers such as Robert Ellickson379 and Lisa 
Bernstein380 suggest that community structures can often be a proxy for 
more formal information-generating rules which might govern notice 
filing. 
Consider Order Without Law, Ellickson’s study of ranchers in Shasta 
County, California in the early 1980s.381  Ellickson studied what may be 
 
 378 See discussion supra notes 50-54. 
 379 See sources supra note 20.  Although Ellickson has made an enormously valuable 
contribution, he was not the first to study property rights in small communities.  See, e.g., Harold 
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967) (studying family 
property in beaver-hunting territories among the Montagnes in eastern Canada with the advent of the 
fur trade). 
 380 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  Like Ellickson, Bernstein’s work grows out of a 
rich tradition of empirical legal analysis, which emanated generally from Yale Law School and found 
its most important early expression in Stewart Macaulay’s work, Non-Contractual Relations in 
Business:  A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963). 
 381 See ELLICKSON, ORDER, supra note 20. 
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the seminal form of property problem—boundary disputes among 
adjacent landowners, specifically among ranchers and farmers382—that 
Coase imagined in his landmark 1960 article, The Problem of Social 
Cost.383  In attempting to find out how a particular group of individuals 
addressed the problem of social cost, Ellickson found that neither 
traditional doctrine nor received economic wisdom would predict 
behavior accurately.384  As the title of the book suggests, Ellickson found 
that members of this fairly close-knit community often declined to resort 
to formal legal action when boundary disputes arose amongst its 
members.385 
But that is not to say that formal law had no role in resolving 
disputes in Shasta County.  Ellickson observed that when the cattle 
wandered off the fields and onto the highway, California tort law—and 
not the communal norms of cooperation—would likely resolve any 
dispute that arose between the owner of the cow and the driver of the car 
that might have occupied the same point in space and time.386  While the 
ranchers may not have fully understood the nature of their liability—they 
believed, despite repeated losses, that “the motorist who hits a bovine in 
open range ‘buys the cow’”387—the rest of the world did.  Furthermore, 
this liability was determined not by the norms of the Shasta County 
community, but by California law on negligence, animals, and 
insurance.388 
Based on this, among other things, Ellickson developed an intuitively 
appealing hypothesis:  “[M]embers of a close-knit group develop and 
maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare 
that members obtain in their workday affairs with one another.”389  In 
simpler terms, Ellickson observed, “members of tight social groups will 
informally encourage each other to engage in cooperative behavior.”390  
But, the corollary would have to be that informality or norms-governed 
 
 382 Id. 
 383 See Coase, supra note 232. 
 384 ELLICKSON, ORDER, supra note 20, at 82. 
 385 Id. 
 386 Id. 
 387 Id.  Or perhaps they failed to appreciate that highways were not “open range.”  Id. at 103. 
 388 Id. at 82. 
 389 Id. at 167 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 390 Id.  Ellickson recognized this position resonated with works of writers as diverse as 
Alexander Bickel, Lon Fuller, Friedrich Hayek, Thomas Schelling, “and similar scholars who in 
diverse ways have kept alive the Burkean notion that decentralized social forces contribute 
importantly to social order.”  Id. at 168 (citations omitted). 
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rule making would be inappropriate when these conditions—principally 
the social cohesion condition—were not obtained.  Among other things, 
Ellickson recognized that normatively influenced systems of control 
might tend to externalize costs to those outside the community. 391  
“[N]orms that add to the welfare of the members of a certain group,” he 
noted, “commonly impoverish, to a greater extent, outsiders to that 
group.”392 
Ellickson did not discuss the secured financing of cattle in Shasta 
County, so it is not clear whether a more insular, norms-based system 
applied to the resolution of debtor/creditor disputes or the more formal 
legal rules were assumed to apply.  The suggestion seems to be that 
within the community, the norms-based regimen would apply.  Thus, he 
observed, “[w]hen a notorious informal debt has been repaid, the party 
who has been made whole bears an informal duty to tell others that 
accounts have been squared.”393  But, outside the community, the 
suggestion seems to be that more traditional, baseline rules of law do and 
should apply.  This is because the informal methods of rule generation 
and enforcement within the community do not necessarily obtain outside 
the community. 394  It would be difficult, for example, to imagine that 
agricultural lenders would rely solely on reputation, gossip, and informal 
social control to enforce their loans or to make a decision to extend credit.  
On the other hand, within the group, informal measures may be adequate 
proxies for obtaining information about a debtor’s property. 
Lisa Bernstein’s study of diamond merchants yielded a similar 
suggestion.  Bernstein sought to understand why diamond merchants, 
especially those in the New York Diamond Dealers Club (“DDC”), rarely 
resorted to established legal mechanisms to create contracts or to resolve 
disputes over them. 395  Unlike Ellickson, Bernstein discussed the role that 
credit and financing play in the diamond trade.396  Credit was an important 
component of sales among diamond merchants, where “bargaining over 
the term of payment became an important and contentious stage in 
 
 391 Id. at 169. 
 392 Id.  Ellickson cited, among other things, the treatment of African Americans in the presence 
of norms of racial discrimination.  Id. 
 393 Id. at 232. 
 394 Id. at 283 (“As prior investigators have found in other contexts, disputants are increasingly 
likely to turn to legal rules when the social distance between them increases . . . .”). 
 395 Bernstein, Diamond Industry, supra  note 21, at 116 (“[T]he diamond industry is unique in its 
ability to create and, more important, to enforce its own system of private law.”). 
 396 Bernstein characterized diamond markets as both a commodities market and an “implicit 
capital market.”  Id. at 131. 
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contract negotiation.”397  According to Bernstein, payment terms, other 
than cash on delivery, were often thirty or sixty days.398  These periods 
often corresponded to the time involved in finishing the stone, so 
Bernstein surmised that “sellers generally finance most, if not all, of the 
buyer’s (manufacturer’s) cash gap.”399 
Bernstein discussed the mechanics of external financing only 
indirectly.  She observed that a fairly small number of banks were 
involved in the diamond industry because valuing diamonds was often 
beyond the expertise of most bankers.400  While diamonds may be 
valuable property, it would appear their value played only an incidental 
role when banks decided to extend credit to insiders in the diamond 
industry.  Rather than the collateral value of the diamonds, per se, lenders 
in Bernstein’s study were more concerned with merchant reputation. 401  
“[A]lthough defaulting on a loan would hurt any businessman’s credit 
rating,” Bernstein observed, “the damage to a diamond dealer is more 
severe since there are only a few industry lenders and banks must rely to a 
greater extent on the dealers’ reputation in valuing his assets.”402 
One might infer from this that information-generating rules on such 
things as notice filing did not matter.  But it would appear that notice 
filing does play a part in the financing of diamond transactions, especially 
vis-à-vis those outside the “community,” such as banks.403  Bernstein 
observed that many transactions within the industry took the form of 
consignments—sales where the seller retained title until the buyer resold 
or returned the goods in question.404  As under current law, the UCC in 
the early 1990s provided that a consignor would protect its interest in 
consigned goods if it filed an effective UCC-1 financing statement 
adequately describing the goods.405  If the consignor failed to file an 
effective financing statement, however, it would lose its rights in the 
 
 397 Id. 
 398 Id. 
 399 Id. 
 400 Id. at 155 n.67.  Bernstein noted that , at the time of her writing, Merchants Bank of New 
York was attempting to develop an in -house group of gem experts with access to important 
intraindustry reputation information.  Id. at 132 n.38. 
 401 Id. at 154 n.67 (quoting banker as observing “in terms of extending credit a bank has to look 
at the 3 C’s—Capital, Culpability, and Character.  At our bank, we think that character is the most 
important C.”). 
 402 Id. 
 403 Id. at 155. 
 404 Id. 
 405 See U.C.C. § 2-326 (2000) (discussing rights of consignment seller); id. § 9-102(a)(20) 
(2003) (defining consignment); id. § 9-319 (discussing rights of consignment seller). 
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goods as against a competing bankruptcy trustee under the strong-arm 
power or a bank with a perfected security interest in the buyer’s 
inventory. 406 
As a historical matter, Bernstein found that consignment agreements 
were always concluded orally. 407  However, Bernstein observed, this 
began to change as dealers discovered they would lose their interest in the 
consigned goods if the buyer got into financial trouble.408  Thus, the legal 
counsel to the DDC advised dealers that the UCC “will give you 
protection if you adequately describe your diamonds and file a UCC-1 
Financing Statement . . . .  This will give you a legal leg to stand on if you 
unfortunately have to seek the return of your merchandise from a bank or 
a trustee in bankruptcy.”409  Thus, consignment agreements—and in larger 
transactions UCC-1 financing statements—became part of the diamond 
industry by the early 1990s.410 
Bernstein suggested the formal consignment agreement served two 
important functions:  one internal, the other external.  Internally, the 
consignment agreement would function like a bill of sale, providing 
evidence of what the transaction was supposed to have been in the event 
of a later dispute.411  Externally, the formal consignment agreements were 
critical to demonstrating the intentions of the parties to a court.412  
“[W]ithout them,” Bernstein noted, “courts tend to interpret the meaning 
of an intraindustry consignment agreement in ways that are strongly at 
odds with industry custom and the intent of the original contracting 
parties.”413 
Like the ranchers of Shasta County who collide with outsiders, 
Bernstein’s study suggested that informal, community-based methods of 
setting rules and remedies may be appropriate within a group, but not 
 
 406 The strong-arm power is discussed supra in Part I.B.2.  A recent example of this appears in 
In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 132 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (holding “unperfected” 
consignment sellers lost priority to bankruptcy trustee). 
 407 Bernstein, Diamond Industry, supra note 21, at 155. 
 408 Id. 
 409 Id. at 155 n.69 (quoting S. Herman Klarsfeld, Legal Gems, N.Y. DIAMONDS, May 1988, at 
63). 
 410 Id. at 155 (“[W]hen a dealer gives goods on consignment, a formal consignment 
memorandum that satisfies the requirements of the [UCC] is now sometimes drawn up to ensure that 
the [consignment seller’s] title to the goods will be recognized by the legal system.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 411 Id. 
 412 Id. at 155-56. 
 413 Id. at 156. 
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necessarily outside of it.414  Community can be a proxy for more formal 
methods of gathering and disseminating information, such as notice filing 
systems.  Notice filing may not matter to diamond merchants inter se 
because they know—or believe they know—all that is important to know 
about one another in order to trade internally.  But the possibility that 
their transactions will have to be explained to an outside judge or bank 
suggests that more formal informational mechanisms are still important.415  
Put another way, while the community of diamond merchants may elect 
to adopt or reject certain commercial conventions inter se, there seems to 
be no doubt that more formal rules will govern the interface between 
those within the community and those outside of it.416  Notice filing may 
be an informational bridge to the outside world. 
The work of Ellickson and Bernstein has two important lessons for 
the role of notice filing.  First, where information about property and 
other credit-related matters (e.g., reputation for trustworthiness) is readily 
available to all members of the relevant community, it is not clear that 
more formal notice filing systems are necessarily useful.  If all creditors 
of a debtor know the debtor’s assets are fully encumbered by a first 
priority security interest, is there any legitimate basis for avoiding the 
security interest if the financing statement perfecting the interest is 
somehow technically deficient?  If there is no secret lien in fact, who 
benefits from avoiding the security interest? 
Second, and perhaps more important, where there is no information-
rich community, in which the existence and extent of property (and other) 
interests are reasonably well understood, the more formal methods of 
generating and disseminating information about property (e.g., notice 
filing) become increasingly important.  Thus, in simpler times, when 
communities were more closely knit, cruder signals about property were 
or should have been acceptable.  On this view, the nonpossessory security 
interest in Clow417 and the factor’s lien in Ryttenberg418 should have 
survived challenge.  Neither case suggests that anyone—within or without 
the community—lacked knowledge of the security interests in question. 
As things become more complex, community structures may break 
down.  Thus, the downstream buyer or licensee of data or intellectual 
 
 414 Id. 
 415 Id. at 155-56. 
 416 Id. 
 417 See discussion of Clow, supra text accompanying notes 24-31.  Recall that Clow avoided an 
unrecorded, nonpossessory security interest . 
 418 See discussion of Ryttenberg, supra text accompanying notes 83-85.  Recall that Ryttenberg 
avoided a factor’s lien despite the posting of a sign at the debtor’s warehouse. 
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property may have to worry about the security interest of a lender several 
generations prior in the chain of interest, which is not known to the 
buyer’s or licensee’s general community and which would not be 
discoverable by even a reasonably diligent search.  Similarly, it is not 
clear how to address the rights and expectations of those who may come 
into conflict with a control-perfected security interest.  The equipment 
vendors of the world may be sophisticated enough to understand that their 
borrower’s banks have a right of setoff, which is akin to the bilateral form 
of control.419  But would the equipment vendors necessarily understand 
that they can lose the casualty value of their collateral to an undisclosed 
third party (e.g., in a trilateral control agreement)?420   
A similar analysis might inform our thinking about the role of notice 
filing in asset securitization.  Where a transaction is well-publicized—and 
generally understood by the debtor’s community of creditors—it is not 
clear that notice filing adds much.  But the complexity of asset 
securitization transactions suggests that even if they are public, they may 
not be well understood. 421  While notice filing will not necessarily explain 
much about the intricacies of the transaction, it provides some basic 
information to those outside the community, who may be the parties with 
the least information about, and poorest understanding of, the deal.  It will 
increase the likelihood that creditors and other interested parties know of 
the potential existence of the transaction, and by implication its affect on 
the debtor’s assets. 
There, nevertheless, remains the objection that the “community” may 
be indifferent to this information because they do not in fact search the 
public records.422  This may be narrowly true.423  But even if, as many 
speculate, the unsecured creditor pool does not search the financing 
statement system,424 they nevertheless may well rely indirectly on the 
information that it produces.  This is because, as discussed supra, the 
notice-filing system is a link in a much larger informational chain created 
by credit reporting services such as Dun & Bradstreet.425  Weakening that 
link because we assume no one uses the link itself ignores the larger 
informational system of which it is a part, and which has come to replace 
more traditional community structures. 
 
 419 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 420 See supra text accompanying notes 185-86. 
 421 See, e.g., Schwarcz, Complexity, supra note 16. 
 422 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 423  But see supra  Part III.B.2. 
 424 See LoPucki, Creditor’s Bargain , supra note 131. 
 425 See discussion in Part I.C.; Mann, Verification, supra note 138. 
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C. Behavioral Implications of Notice Filing 
Discussions about information costs and communities run the risk of 
making inappropriate assumptions about how people process the 
information in question.  In general, such discussions have been 
dominated by the economic analyses previously set forth.426  While these 
analyses have produced both heat and light, they also have significant 
limitations.  Perhaps the most important shortfall stems from their 
assumptions about human behavior.  Economic analysis in general has 
been dominated by rational choice theory, the view that human beings are 
logical maximizers of self-interest.427  Rational choice theory describes 
“how people would behave if they followed the dictates of a series of 
logical axioms, [and] posits that people make outcome-maximizing 
decisions.”428 
Perhaps the most important incursion into the rational choice fortress 
has come from the field of behavioral economics, sometimes called 
cognitive theory.  Emanating from the work of Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky,429 behavioral economists, and the many legal academics 
who trail in their wake,430 have argued that human beings often make 
 
 426 See supra Part III.A. 
 427 See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded:  Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997 Pt.1 
WIS. L. REV. 433, 436 (“The single most important contribution that law and economics has made to 
the law is the use of a coherent theory of human decision-making (‘rational choice theory’) to 
examine how people are likely to respond to legal rules.”). 
 428 Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115, 1116 
(2003) (citing Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:  Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060-66 (2000)).  Herbert 
Simon describes the “economic man” who is perfectly rational as follows: 
This man is assumed to have knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment which, 
if not absolutely complete, is at least impressively clear and voluminous.  He is assumed 
also to have a well-organized and stable system of preferences, and a skill in computation 
that enables him to calculate, for the alternative courses of action that are available to him, 
which of these will permit him to reach the highest attainable point on his preference scale. 
Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice , 69 Q.J.  ECON. 99, 99 (Issue 1, Feb. 1955). 
 429 CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES, IX-X (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., Cambridge 
U. Press 2000); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCH . 
341 , 342-44 (1984); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:  An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of 
Preferences, 246 SCI. AM. 160 (1982); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect 
Theory:  Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty , 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297, 298 (1982); 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 
SCI. 453 (1981); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice:  A 
Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (Issue 4, Nov. 1991); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S257-60 (1986). 
 430 See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., Cambridge U. Press 
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significant mistakes in judgment and analysis, or are influenced by 
emotions, moods , and feelings, which would be inconsistent with the 
rational actor model.  While we may attempt to be rational, we often 
engage in what Mark Seidenfeld has aptly called “cognitive loafing”431—
we find mental shortcuts (“heuristics”) that help us make decisions.  
These heuristics, however, often lead to results that are demonstrably at 
odds with what rational self-maximizers would choose.  In particular, 
these cognitive errors “plague many financial decisions,”432 including 
those involving extensions of credit. 
1. Cognitive Errors 
Cognitive theory literature has sought to help us understand 
borrowing behavior.  Professor Rachlinski recently catalogued three 
related cognitive biases that might lead to overinvestment in the form of 
taking on too much debt:  (i) the “availability” heuristic, (ii) anchoring, 
and (iii) overconfidence.433  The availability heuristic holds that we will 
more likely remember instances of overcoming hardship to pay debts than 
the failure to do so.434  Anchoring means that a borrower roots her 
decision to borrow today in her past ability to satisfy obligations—not her 
anticipated ability to do so in the future.435  Overconfidence means 
borrowers may tend to overstate their ability to foresee unfavorable 
economic circumstances which might lead to default.436  Together, these 
biases create “vulnerability to excess indebtedness” that might influence 
how people decide to borrow money and perhaps how we develop rules 
 
2000); Symposium, Empirical Legal Realism:  A New Social Scientific Assessment of Law and 
Human Behavior, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1075 (2003); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behaviorism Too 
Seriously?  The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1907 (2002); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The ‘New’ Law and Psychology:  A Reply to Critics, Skeptics 
and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000); Cass Sunstein, Behavioral Law and 
Economics:  A Progress Report, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115 (1999). 
 431 Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 523 (2002). 
 432 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Case for Paternalism , 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1165, 1182 
(2003) (citing Donald Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:  Market 
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992)). 
 433 Id. at 1183. 
 434 Id. 
 435 Id. 
 436 Id. 
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governing the rights and remedies of those who engage in these 
transactions.437 
Cognitive error has been studied in the context of securities law,438 
commercial law (e.g., sales),439 and contract law.440  However, to date, 
there has been no attempt to understand what these phenomena might 
imply for notice filing in commercial finance transactions.  What might 
the behavioral effects of notice filing be? 
First, the financing statement might counter the irrational optimism 
that comes from the collective force of the availability, anchoring, and 
overconfidence biases.  As the warning that alerts a creditor to further 
investigate various competing claims to a debtor’s property, the financing 
statement might slow the otherwise exuberant creditor from making a 
precipitous decision.  It might inject a level of caution and deliberation, 
forcing the creditor to consider more carefully the full ramifications of the 
credit decision. 
This, of course, assumes creditors actually pay attention to the 
information generated by financing statements.  As suggested above, it is 
 
 437 Id. 
 438 See, e.g. , William J. Carney, Defining a Security:  The Addition of a Market-Oriented 
Contextual Approach to Investment Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY L.J.  311 (1984); Peter H. Huang, 
Trust, Guilt and Securities Regulation , 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1059 (2003); Peter H. Huang, Moody 
Investing and the Supreme Court:  Rethinking Materiality of Information and Reasonableness of 
Investors, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 99 (2005); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of 
“Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977 (1992); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Accounting for Greed:  
Unraveling the Rogue Trader Mystery, 79 OR. L. REV. 301, 315 (2000); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Selling Hope, Selling Risk:  Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers 
and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 634-41 (1996); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming 
the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets:  A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. 
L. REV. 135 (2002); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:  
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 859-62 (1992); Robert A. Prentice, The Case of 
the Irrational Auditor:   A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133 
(2000). 
 439 See, e.g., Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance:  Of Risk, Duress, and 
Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71 (1998); Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and the Law of 
Consequential Damages:  Default Theory and Cognitive Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339 (1998); Russell 
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 UNIV. CHI. L. 
REV. 1203 (2003); Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, the Economic Analysis of 
Bankruptcy Law and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1688 (1998). 
 440 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 211, 213-14 (1995); Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the 
Bargain Principle, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1142-49 (1986) (showing contracting parties rely on the 
“representativeness” and “availability” heuristics, which lead them to overestimate the likelihood that 
the terms of the contract will be performed); Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care 
“Patient Protection” Laws:  Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing cognitive errors in consumers justify imposing mandatory terms 
in health insurance contracts). 
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likely that they do, although this reliance may only be indirect.441  But, if 
creditors do care about credit ratings in general, and those ratings reflect 
public information about nonpossessory interests in a debtor’s property, 
then the result would be the same:  The financing statement will, directly 
or indirectly, likely lead to more scrutiny of the debtor than would be the 
case if none were on record. 
An even more basic point may also involve the general integrity of 
financial information systems.  If creditors believe these systems give 
them information about the debtor that materially aids a decision to 
extend credit, the systems will develop a self-reinforcing authority.  
Creditors will be able to use the presence—or absence—of a filed 
financing statement as a kind of heuristic for assessing the debtor’s credit 
worthiness. 
If, by contrast, the system is viewed as unreliable, creditors may be 
expected to react with excessive caution.  If creditors, purchasers, or 
others who care about the debtor’s property have reason to believe that 
undisclosed interests in that property may be asserted against them, they 
will likely discount the value of that property and the value of the debtor 
as a potential trading partner.  Whether a rational response to a lemons 
problem,442 or a biased response that impedes self-interest, the lack of 
confidence in the system should, over time, affect the informational value 
of the system.  If no one believes it is accurate, no one will rely on it. 
2. The Reflexive Function of Notice Filing 
Another behavioral implication of the notice filing system would 
look not at the effect that giving notice has on the presumed audience for 
the information—creditors and other investors—but instead on how 
notice filing obligations channel and possibly improve the behavior of 
those obligated to file.  This has been an especially important and 
controversial topic in the securities law context, where disclosure per se—
while voluminous—has not necessarily produced more intelligent 
decision making.443  There is, nevertheless, a view that forcing corporate 
 
 441 See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text. 
 442 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”:  Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism , 84 Q.J.  ECON. 488, 500 (Issue 3, Aug. 1970) (“[T]he difficulty of distinguishing good 
quality from bad is inherent in the business world . . . .”). 
 443 Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light:  Information Overload and Its Consequences for 
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH . U. L.Q. 417, 419 (2003) (“[T]he provocative implication of 
information overload is that the federal mandatory disclosure system might be more effective if it 
were scaled back—that is to say, if less were disclosed, not more.”); Schwarcz, Complexity, supra 
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actors to divulge information about the firm and themselves will affect 
their behavior with respect to the firm and third parties.444  This claim has, 
for example, been made where there are social or environmental 
consequences to corporate action that might be affected or altered by 
disclosure.445  This “reflexive”446 function of disclosure focuses on the 
ways in which behavior may be shaped by forced disclosure.  Reflexive 
theories of disclosure capitalize on the idea that if we are forced to tell the 
world what we are doing, we may reflect more carefully on our actions 
than would otherwise be the case.447 
How might this play out when applied to the UCC-1 financing 
statement?  A debtor and a secured party, or securitization financer, who 
have no obligation to inform the world that one of them (the debtor) is 
conveying some property to the other will likely treat that property 
differently than if disclosure, no matter how discursive, were required.  
The property may, actually or metaphorically, be held out as an 
inducement to third parties of one sort or another, akin to the misplaced 
reliance considered so distressing by the court in Clow.448  The debtor and 
the secured creditor may tolerate dissipation of the property or 
carelessness with its maintenance.  If, however, the relationship has been 
disclosed, behavior might change. 
 
note 16. 
 444 See David Hess, Social Reporting:  A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social 
Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41 (1999); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999). 
 445 See generally Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995) 
(discussing environmental disclosure from a “reflexive law” viewpoint); Perry E. Wallace, Disclosure 
of Environmental Liabilities Under the Securities Laws:  The Potential of Securities-Market-Based 
Incentives for Pollution Control, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1093 (1993) (analyzing environmental 
disclosure from a market-based efficiency perspective); Michael Barsa, Note, California’s 
Proposition 65 and the Limits of Information Economics, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1223, 1239 (1997) (noting 
mandatory environmental hazard disclosure “also supplies powerful incentives for manufacturers to 
become informed about and possibly to reduce the carcinogens and teratogens in their products”). 
 446 Reflexive law “attempts to influence decision-making and communication processes with 
required procedures.”  Hess, supra note 444, at 51 (citing J. Bregman & Arthur Jacobson, 
Environmental Performance Review:  Self-Regulation in Environmental Law, in  ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW AND ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY 211 (Gunther Teubner et al. eds., J. Wiley & Sons 1994)). 
 447 Reflexive theories about securities law are nascent and are the subject of some controversy.  
See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 
WASH . U. L. Q. 487 (2003); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of 
Compliance, 52 VAND . L. REV. 1343, 1407-10 (1999) (disclosure regimes may create false image of 
“corporate social responsibility”); see also  RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND 
SENTENCING 867-83 (Lexis Law 1994).    
 448 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
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The reflexive function of disclosure, Professor Malloy recently 
observed, is likely more powerful when disclosure rules are “fuzzy” rather 
than “binary.”449  A binary disclosure system is one in which compliance 
is “a black or white state of affairs.”450  Either disclosure has been given 
according to the prescribed rules or it has not.  Fuzzy disclosure, by 
contrast, establishes “a gray relationship between an indeterminate 
standard and an uncertain factual situation.”451  Malloy has argued that in 
the presence of ambiguity, binary disc losure rules tend to undercut the 
reflexive effects that disclosure might otherwise produce, creating 
opportunities for strategic noncompliance.452  “[B]inary disclosure 
provisions simply task [a] manager with answering the same question all 
over again.”453  Fuzzy disclosure rules, by contrast, “challenge[] the 
individual to think more closely about the position taken than would be 
the case absent the disclosure obligation.”454 
The UCC notice filing system as it has developed to date can 
certainly be seen as a binary system.  As discussed above, the slightest 
technical errors in the giving of notice have often been used to avoid 
security interests entirely. 455  Where notice has been required, especially 
under prior law, the notice was either effective or it was not.456  The 
survival of the security interest was a black and white matter that did not 
turn in any meaningful sense on the actual knowledge of those transacting 
with the debtor.  Not surprisingly, this has led those who craft disclosure 
rules—the drafters of revised Article 9 and the securitization facilitation 
statutes, for example—to formulate rules that are as easy as possible  with 
which to comply.  The easiest disclosure rule to comply with, of course, is 
none at all, which is where our commercial finance law seems to be 
headed. 
A fuzzier tolerance for the real distribution of information in any 
given situation might encourage more reflexive behavior on the part of 
those required to file notice (i.e., the debtor and the secured party).  In 
 
 449 Timothy Malloy, Disclosure Stories, 32 FL. ST. UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) 
(manuscript at 21, on file with author). 
 450 Id. 
 451 Id. at 21-22 (citing BART KOSKO, NEURAL NETWORKS AND FUZZY SYSTEMS:  A DYNAMICAL 
SYSTEMS APPROACH TO MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 3, 33  (1992); MICHAEL SMITHSON, IGNORANCE 
AND UNCERTAINTY:  EMERGING PARADIGMS 108-18 (1988)). 
 452 Id. at 39-43. 
 453 Id. at  42. 
 454 Id. at 48. 
 455 See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text. 
 456 See supra Part I.B.2. 
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particular, Professor Malloy has argued, fuzzy disclosure rules may lead 
to greater individual accountability. 457  This may cause greater cognitive 
dissonance for those responsible for the filing, but may also lead them to 
consider more carefully the full effects of the course of action.  This is, 
Malloy observes, especially important when disclosure might involve 
multiple audiences with potentially conflicting responses to the 
information in question. 458  Fuzzy disclosure rules, at least potentially, 
would require individuals to “engage in [a] more sophisticated evaluation 
of the alternative positions than under a binary disclosure scenario.”459 
Fuzzier disclosure rules might therefore reduce the likelihood of 
arbitrary avoidance, while still channeling and perhaps improving the 
behavior of those primarily responsible for generating and filing notice.  
If secured parties, in particular, were more concerned about who actually 
knew of their interest in the debtor’s property, and less concerned with 
satisfying the binary rules of notice filing that have developed to date, 
they might be less inclined to engage in strategic but meaningless 
compliance.  If, for example, a secured party could pursue data or 
intellectual property in the hands of remote parties only when the remote 
party actually knew or had reason to know of the proceeds security 
interest, the secured party could take steps to assure that that remote party 
had knowledge.  If a security interest in a bank account would be 
enforceable only if other creditors of the debtor had some actual or 
constructive knowledge of the bank’s interest in it, the secured party and 
debtor would likely take meaningful action to assure that it is known.  
Fuzzier rules would permit the easy transfer of property interests 
envisioned by revised Article 9 and the securitization facilitation statutes 
 
 457 Malloy, supra  note 449, at 47-49. 
 458 Id. at 50-51.  Malloy’s examples involve the conflicting disclosure pressures of federal 
environmental and tax laws. 
 459 Id. at 50.  There are, Malloy notes, important limits to this analysis.  Among other  things, 
“accountability in the complex context of the business firm and regulatory environment is still quite 
young.”  Id. at 56.   
I also note that sophistication itself is an important, but not necessarily well-understood, feature 
of this analysis.  It is somewhat artificial to cast the world in terms of “debtors” and “creditors” for 
purposes of this discussion, because many of the decisions about notice-filing will in fact be made by 
lawyers, not by the clients themselves.  As Judge Posner observed, in critiquing psychological studies 
postulating the existence of an endowment effect, we often act not directly, but through more 
sophisticated intermediaries.  See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and 
the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1566 (1998) (“When we do have something to sell, we usually sell 
through middlemen, such as real estate brokers, rather than directly to the ultimate consumer.”).  
Although the behavioral implications of notice-filing should still matter for the clients, they will be 
cognitively intermediated by lawyers and perhaps other sophisticated parties.  
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with a reduced possibility of secrecy.  Fuzzy rules may permit liens while 
inhibiting secrets. 
There are undoubtedly other behavioral implications of notice filing, 
which may warrant further explanation.  The important point here is that 
the system may have behavioral consequences that have not been fully 
internalized by those proposing changes in policy. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has investigated the causes and effects of the reduction 
or elimination of notice filing from common commercial finance 
transactions, including those involving data, intellectual property, and 
bank and brokerage accounts.  The principal cause appears to be 
excessive or misplaced concerns with economic efficiency.  The princ ipal 
effect will be increased incidence of secret liens. 
Increasing tolerance of secret liens will have at least three collateral 
effects.  First, by replacing notice filing with diligence and contract, we 
will increase information costs imposed on those who might affirmatively 
seek information about the existence of nonpossessory property interests.  
Second, by relaxing or eliminating notice filing, we ignore the role that 
these systems play in the development of merchant communities.  Third, 
there may be important behavioral consequences for both those required 
to provide the notice and the audience for the information thus provided. 
The massive coordination problems presented by nonpossessory 
property interests cannot be solved merely by the UCC-1.   Indeed, 
information problems of the sort discussed here will likely always be with 
us.  As Oliver Williamson has observed, “[b]ut for the limited ability of 
human agents to receive, store, retrieve, and process data, interesting 
economic problems vanish.”460  Yet, this simple piece of paper plays 
important roles—economic and otherwise—in generating information 
that, directly or indirectly, affects the commercial finance system at many 
points.  Those who would reduce or eliminate notice filing have failed 
fully to consider the larger informational consequences of such decisions.  
In a world full of nonpossessory liens and other property interests, we 
should be wary of tolerating too many secrets. 
 
 460 Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics:  The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 vol. 5 J.L. & ECON. 233, 234 n.5 (Oct. 1979). 
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ANNEX A 
 
UCC FINANCING STATEMENT 
FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS (front and back) CAREFULLY 
A. NAME & PHONE OF CONTACT AT FILER [optional] 
 
 
B. SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO:  (Name and 
Address) 
Granada Bank and Trust Co., N.A. 
25 South Harbor Street  
Boston, MA 02110 
 
 
 
 
 
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE 
ONLY 
1. DEBTOR’S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME  – insert only one debtor name (1a or 1b) – do not abbreviate or combine 
names 
1a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME  
Maimonedes Medical Finance Services LLC  
 
 
OR 
1b. INDIVIDUAL’S LAST NAME FIRST NAME  MIDDLE NAME  SUFFIX 
1c. MAILING ADDRESS 
60 Boston Street 
CITY 
Baltimore 
STATE 
MD 
POSTAL 
CODE 
02101 
COUNTRY  
 
USA  
1d.  
TAX ID 
#:SSN 
OR EIN 
ADD’L INFO RE 
ORGANIZATION 
DEBTOR 
1e. TYPE OF 
ORGANIZATION 
 
LLC 
1f. 
JURISDICTION 
OF 
ORGANIZATION 
Delaware 
1g. ORGANIZATIONAL ID #, 
 if any 
NONE 
2. ADDITIONAL DEBTOR’S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME – insert only one debtor name (2a or 2b) – do not abbreviate 
or combine names 
2a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME   
 
OR 2b. INDIVIDUAL’S LAST NAME 
Principal  
FIRST NAME  
Peter 
MIDDLE NAME  SUFFIX 
2c. MAILING ADDRESS 
 
622 West 40th Street  
 
CITY 
 
Baltimore 
 
STATE 
 
MD 
POSTAL 
CODE 
 
02120 
COUNTRY  
 
USA  
2d. TAX 
ID 
#:    SSN 
OR EIN 
ADD’L INFO RE 
ORGANIZATION 
DEBTOR 
2e. TYPE OF 
ORGANIZATION 
2f. JURISDICTION 
OF 
ORGANIZATION 
2g. ORGANIZATIONAL ID #, if 
any 
  
3. SECURED PARTY’S NAME  (or NAME of TOTAL ASSIGNEE OF ASSIGNOR S/P) – insert only one secured party 
name (3a or 3b) 
3a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME  
Granada Bank and Trust Co, .N.A. 
 
 
OR 3b. INDIVIDUAL’S LAST NAME FIRST NAME  MIDDLE NAME  SUFFIX 
3c. MAILING ADDRESS 
25 South Harbor Street  
CITY 
Boston 
STATE 
MA 
POSTAL CODE 
02110 
COUNTRY  
USA  
4. This FINANCING STATEMENT covers the following collateral:  
Equipment, inventory, chattel paper, accounts, general intangibles  
5. ALTERNATIVE DESIGNATION [if applicable]:   ¨ LESSEE/LESSOR  ¨ CONSIGNEE/CONSIGNOR 
¨ BAILEE/BAILOR  ¨ SELLER/BUYER  ¨ AG. LIEN  ¨ NON-UCC FILING 
6. ¨  This FINANCING STATEMENT is to be filed [for record] (or 
recorded) in the REAL ESTATE RECORDS.  
Attach Addendum  if applicable) 
7. Check to REQUEST SEARCH 
REPORT(S) on Debtor(s) 
[ADDITIONAL FEE] [optional] 
¨ All Debtors  ¨ Debtor 1   ¨   Debtor 2  
8. OPTIONAL FILER REFERENCE  DATA  
 
